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IV
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this matter as stated
in Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(j).

V
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Did Judge Shumate err in failing to identify the alleged undisputed facts
upon which he allegedly relied when issuing his Oral Ruling granting Mr. Lewis'
motion for summary judgment, orally rendered on March 24, 2014? (Docket,
pages 529-610).
Standard of Review:

The failure of a trial court to specify what Widisputed facts the trial court
relied upon in its grant of swmnary judgment is reviewed as a matter of law and an
appellate cowi correctness and grants no deference to the trial court's conclusions
oflaw. State v. Orr, 127 P.3d 1213, 2005 UT 92 (Utah 2005).
2. Did Judge Shwnate err in failing to specify the legal theory upon which
he relied in granting Mr. Lewis' motion for summary judgment, orally rendered on
March 24, 2014? (Docket, pages 529-610).
Standard of Review:

Mr. Nelson could not find any standard of review for a situation where a
court fails to identify the legal theory upon which it is granting summary judgment,
and Mr. Nelson doubts if such a standard exists. Mr. Nelson respectfully asserts
-1-

that the statement of this Court in Adams v. Board of Review of hldus. Com'n, 821
P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) to wit: ''Inasmuch as our standard o_f"review varies

depending upon whether Adams failed to prove legal or medical causation, the
Commission's failure to ident(/y whether Adams jailed to prove legal or medical
causation prevents us from reviewing thaJ conclusion, "is controlling, as the
standard of review for a contract claim is different from m1 equitable clai~ m1d
without any indication as to whether Judge Shwnate and/or Judge Westfall granted
Lewis ' motion for smmnary judgment on Lewis' breach of au oral contract claim,
or his unjust enrichment claim, and, therefore, Mr. Nelson cannot identify a proper
stm1dard of review.
3. Did Judge Westfall err in signing, and entering, the Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Swnmary Judgment, entered on May 20, 2014? (Docket,
pages 529-610).
Standard of Review :

Grants of swnmary judgment are reviewed for correctness. Ryan v. DaJ.11s
Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998).

"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of
material/act and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 910.(Utah
1996). Because "a challenge to summary judgment presents only a question
of law," we review it/or correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872
P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). In reviewing a grant ofsumma,y judgment,
"[w]e determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held thaL there were no
disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989).
-2-

4. Did the district court err in entering the Judgment, entered on May 20,
2014? (Docket, pages 616-810).
Standard of Review:

Grants of smmnary judgment are reviewed for correctness. Ryan v. Dan's
Food Stores, lnc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998).
5. Did Judge Westfall err in issuing his Memorandw.n Decision and Order
denying Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or Amend the Plaintiff's Motion for
Swmnary Judgment, and his Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, entered
October 20, 2014? (Docket, pages 895-900).
Standard of Review:

Grants of smmnary judgment are reviewed for correctness. Ryan v. Dan's
Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998).
6. Did the district court err in entering the Amended Judgment, entered on
November 11, 2014, against Mr. Nelson? (Docket, pages 898-900).
Standard of Review:

Grants of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness. Ry an v. Dan's
Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998).
7. Did Judge Shwnate err denying Mr. Nelson's Motion to file an Amended
Answer and Amended Counterclaim? (Docket, pages 155-156, 197-200).
Standard of Review:
An appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to amend for

-3-

a11

abuse of discretion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc. , 2004 UT 44,~14, 87 P.3d
734.

VI
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULA TIONS.
The relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules and
Regulations are printed in the Addendum.

VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns the purchase of a11 "exclusive" Nutty Guys route, to
provide various retail locations with snacks, and the alleged breach of the
"agreement" for the purchase of the "exclusive" Nutty Guys route.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The litigation of this case involves a gra11t of summary judgment in favor of
Lewis, based on the alleged breach of an w1sigued a11d w1dated written contract, or
au alleged oral contract, or unjust enrichment by Mr. Nelson.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS lN THE DISTRICT COURT
Lewis filed a complaint, against Mr. Nelson, on July 2, 2012.
Lewis filed an amended complaint on July 7, 2012.

Mr. Nelson, acting pro se, moved to dismiss the amended complaint on
September 27, 2012. That motion was denied on Jrumary 2, 2013.

-4-

Mr. Nelson answered Lewis ' amended complaint on January 25, 2013 .

Lewis served Mr. Nelson with 13 interrogatories, 30 requests for
admissions, and 13 requests for production of docwnents and things on March 22,
2013. That discovery stated that it was served as provided in Rules 7036 and 9014
of the Federal Rules of Bankmptcy Procedure.
Mr. Nelson objected to the discovery, on April 22, 2013, because it was

submitted pursuant to Rules 7036 and 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.
On May 6, 2013, Lewis responded to Mr. Nelson's objection. On May 6,
2013, Lewis also sent Mr. Nelson revised interrogatories, requests for admissions,
and requests for production of documents and things. This revised discovery stated
that it was served pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Lewis
again sent 13 interrogatories 30 requests for admissions and 13 requests for
production of docwnents.
On May 8, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a cow1terclaim.
On May 23, 2014, Judge Shwnate ordered Mr. Nelson to answer all 13
interrogatories, all 30 requests for admissions, and all 13 requests for production of
documents, from Lewis, by Jw1e 27, 2013 , even though the discovery stated that
it was submi tted w1der Rules 7036 and 9014 of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.
On June 27, 2013 , Mr. Nelson filed a motion, for leave of the cowt, to file

-5-

an Amended Counterclaim, as a Compulsory Counterclaim.
On July 9, 2013, Lewis filed his response to Mr. Nelson's Motion to File fill
Amended Cow1terclaim.
On October 11, 2013, the district court entered an order denying

Mr. Nelson ' s Motion to file ru1 Amended Cow1terclaim.
On January 10, 2014, Lewis filed a motion for summary judgment.
Mr. Nelson filed a memorandum opposing Lewis ' motion for swnmary
judgment on February 5, 2014.
Lewis filed his reply memorandwn, in support of his motion for swnmary
judgment, on February 6, 2014.
Judge Shwnate held oral argw.nents on Lewis' motion for swmnary
judgment 011 March 24, 2014. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Shwnate
granted Lewis' motion for summary judgment, without identifying any undisputed
facts upon which he allegedly relied in granting Lewis' motion for summary
judgment, and without specifying on what legal theory he was grru1ting Lewis
summary judgment.
Ou May 20, 2014, the court entered

ru1

Order Grfil1tiug Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, and a Judgment. This Order granted Lewis summary

judgment on both his claim for breach of fill oral contract, and unjust enrichment.
On June 2, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Swmnary Judgment, and the Judgment.
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On June 16, 2014, Lewis filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Nelson's
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or
Amend the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
A hearing was held

011

Mr. Nelson's Motions to Alter or Amend on

September 9, 2014.
Ou October 10, 2014, Judge Westfall entered a memorandum decision
denying Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and Mr. Nelson's
Motion to Alter the Order on Summary Judgment.
An Amended Judgment was entered on November 17, 2014.
On November 19, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Appeal.
Mr. Nelson filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal on

November 20, 2014.
Mr. Nelson filed a Request to Submit for Decision his Motion for a Stay

Pending Appeal, on December 10, 2014, and Request for an Expedited Decision of
that Motion, on December 11, 2014.
The Clerk of the court issued a writ of execution on December 11, 2014.
On December 11, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution.
Judge Westfall would not rule on Mr. Nelson's Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal. Therefore, on February 11, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a motion with th.is

-7-

Court, asking the Court to order Judge Westfall to rule on his Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal.
On February 12, 2015, Judge Pearce entered au order granting Mr. Nelson's
Motion for Stay on Appeal.

DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Judge Shmnate orally granted Lewis' motion for summary judgment on
March 24, 2014.
Judge Westfall signed the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and authorized the entry of a judgment against Mr. Nelson on May 20,

2014.
Judge Westfall denied Mr. Nelson' s Motions to Alter or Amend on October

10, 2014.
On November 19, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Appeal.

Mr. Nelson filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal on
November 20, 2014.

Mr. Nelson filed a Request to Submit for Decision his Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal, on December 10, 2014, and Request for an Expedited Decision of
that Motion, on December 11, 2014.
Judge Westfall would not ruJe on Mr. Nelson's Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal. Therefore, on February 11, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a motion with this
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Court, asking the Court to order Judge Westfall to rule on his Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal.
On February 12, 2015, Judge Pearce entered an order granting Mr. Nelson's
Motion for Stay on Appeal.
On Febrna..-y 24, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a supersedeas bond vvith the district
court in the amow1t of $41,408.46.
On March 2, 2015, Lewis filed an objection to Mr. Nelson's Supersedeas
Bond, claimn1g that Mr. Nelson must post a supersedeas bond in the amount of
$63,513.49, consisting of ai1 additional amount of $9,930.03, post judgment interest
from May 20, 2014,

ai1d

continuing for three years; ai1d $12,167.00, post judgment

attorney fees.
On March 6, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a Reply Memorandwn in Support of his
Motion to Accept and Approve his Supersedeas Bond filed with the district court
on February 24, 2015.
On March 3, 2015, Judge Westfall had ''Minutes for ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE JST APPE, "filed on the district cow1's docket for this case.

VIlI
RELEVANT FACTS
1. In the fall of 2010, Mr. Nelson answered an ad on KSI.com by Lewis,
offering to sell an • exclusive" Nutty Guys distribution route in Southern Utah.
(Docket page 412).
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2. After several phone calls, Mr. Nelson agreed to accompany Lewis for
deliveries on January 1, 2011. (Docket page 412).
3. Lewis said that he needed to sell the business so he could take a job with
UTA in Salt Lake City. (Docket page 412).
4. After accompanyiug Lewis on the delivery, Nelson told Lewis he was
not interested in purchasing the business, but that he would help with deliveries
occasionally. (Docket page 412).
5.

One week later, Lewis called Mr. Nelson and said he had the UTA job

and asked Mr. Nelson to take over the Nutty Guys route. (Docket page 412).
6. Mr. Nelson agreed to do the next round of deliveries and subsequently

agreed to take over the Nutty Guys route. (Docket page 412-413).
7. Mr. Nelson met with Lewis at his n1-laws home, where Lewis showed

Mr. Nelson how to do mvoices and run the business. (Docket page 413).
8.

After some discussion~ Mr. Nelson and Lewis agreed on tenns for the

purchase of the Nutty Guys route, and Mr. Nelson wrote an agreement, which both
he and Lewis signed. (Docket page 413).
9. The agreement contan1ed only the basic terms of the sale. (Docket page
413).
10. Lewis retained the handwritten agreement, because he was going to take
it to his uncle, who is au attorney, to have a complete contract prepared. (Docket
page 413).
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11. Because Lewis kept the contract, Mr. Nelson is unable to remember the
exact content of the handwritten agreement. (Docket page 413).
12. Lewis explained that the sale of the Nutty Guys route had to be
approved by Nathan Murray, the owner of Nutty Guys. (Docket page 414).
13. Mr. Murray subsequently approved the sale of the Nutty Guys route.
(Docket page 414).

14. After taking over the Nutty Guys route, Mr. Nelson had trouble reaching
Lewis with questions, or when he needed help. (Docket page 414).

15. In June 2011 , Lewis went to Mr. Nelson's warehouse in Hurricane,
Utah, to get him to sign a commission check th.at had been written to Mr. Nelson by
mistake. (Docket page 414).

16. During this visit, Lewis gave Mr. Nelson a new contract, and asked Mr.
Nelson to sign it. (Docket page 414).

17. After reading the contract, Mr. Nelson realized that it was entirely
different than the handwritten agreement Lewis and Mr. Nelson signed. (Docket
page 414).

18. Mr. Nelson told Lewis that he would not sign Lewis' contract, and that
Lewis needed to get him an accurate accountii1g of the remai.J.1.u1g balance owed for
the sale of the Nutty Guys route, and provide him with proof that the area was an
"exclusive" area. Exclusivity was an essential term of the agreement. (Docket
page 414).
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19. Mr. Nelson also asked Lewis for a copy of the original handwritten
agreement. (Docket page 414 ).
20. Several weeks later, Lewis sent Mr. Nelson a text with an amow1t that
he claimed Mr. Nelson owed, and demanded payment. (Docket page 414).
21. Mr. Nelson responded that Lewis needed to provide him with an
accurate, itemized accounting, with payments, credits, and accounts receivable,
because Mr. Nelson's figures differed substantially from Lewis'. (Docket page
414).
22. Rather than providing Mr. Nelson with the requested documentation,
Lewis continued to demand payment, threatened legal action, and stated that he
would come and take over the Nutty Guys route. (Docket page 414).
23. During this time, Mr. Nelson continued to ask for an accounting,
original documentation, and proof of an '"exclusive" area. (Docket page 414).
24. During the time that Mr. Nelson owned and operated the Nutty Guys
route, other Nutty Guys distributors had openly contracted Mr. Nelson's customers,
in the supposed "exclusive" area, causing a substantial loss of business for Mr.
Nelson. (Docket page 415).
25. On April 18, 2012, Mr. Nelson received an email from Ryan Olivier,
an owner of Nutty Guys, stating that Mr. Nelson was just a sales agent, not a
distributor. (Docket page 415).
26. Mr. Nelson never would have agreed to purchase the Nutty Guy route
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from Lewis if he had known that he was not purchasing an "'exclusive" area.
(Docket page 415).
27. Lewis filed a complaint against Mr. Nelson on July 2, 2012. (Docket,
page 1).
28. On July 7, 2012, Lewis filed an amended complaint. (Docket, page 21).
29. Mr. Nelson answered Lewis' complaint on January 25, 2013, and served
Lewis with requests for production of documents, asking Lewis to produce all
docwneuts that he intend to introduce as exhibits at the trial, and copies of forms
1099, issued to Lewis, by Nutty Guys of Salt Lake City for tax years 2010
and 2011, so that he could determine how much Lewis had actually been paid by
Nutty Guys. (Docket, pages 62- 67).
30. Lewis refused to provide Mr. Nelson with any documents. (Docket,
page 73).
31. Lewis served Mr. Nelson with 13 interrogatories, 30 requests for
admissions, and 13 requests for production of documents and things on March 22,
2013. (Docket, page 76).
32. That discovery stated that it was served according to Rules 7036 and
9014 of the Federal Rules of Banlcruptcy Procedme. (Docket, page 76).
33. Mr. Nelson objected to the discovery because it was submitted pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. (Docket, page 79).
34. On May 6, 2013, Lewis sent Mr. Nelson revised interrogatories,
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requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents and
thi11gs.(Docket, page 82). This discovery stated it was served pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Lewis again submitted 13 interrogatories, 30
requests for admissions and 13 requests for production of documents. (Lewis'
revised first set of requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for
production of docwnents to defendant, which is included in the Addendum to this
Brief).
35. On May 8, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a counterclaim. (Docket, page 11).
36. On May 23, 2014, Judge Shumate ordered Mr. Nelson to answer all 13
interrogatories, aU 30 requests for admissions and all 13 requests for production of
documents by June 27, 2013, even though the discovery stated it was submitted
under the Rules 7036 and 9014 of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy procedure.
(Docket, page 152).
3 7. In Lewis ' amended complaint, he asked for a judgment for damages in
an amount of "$15,020." (Docket, page 21).
38. Because Lewis asked for a judgment for damages in an amount of
$15,020, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(c) URCP, this case became a ·•ner
I" case. (Docket, page 21, Rule 26(c)(3), and Rule 26(c)(5), URCP)
39. On Jw1e 27, 2013, Mr. Nelson submitted responses to Lewis' revised
discovery. (Docket, page 154).
40. Because this case is a Tier l case, Mr. Nelson only answered the first
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five of Lewis' 30 requests for admissions, and requests for production of
documents. Mr. Nelson did not respond to the interrogatories. (Mr. Nelson's
Response to Lewis discover, contained in the Addendum to this Brief).
41. On June 28, 2013, Mr. Nelson filed a Motion and Memorandum for
Leave of Court to File an Amended Counterciaim, as Compulsory Cow1terclaim.
(Docket, page 155).
42. On October 11, 2013, the district court entered an order denying

Mr. Nelson's Motion to file an Amended Counterclaim. Judge Shumate said that
all counterclaim issues would be handled at trial. (Docket, page 230).
43 . On January 10, 2014, Lewis filed a motion for summary judgment.
(Docket, page 295).
44. In the memorandum, submitted in support of his motion for summary
judgment, Lewis relied on the 25 requests for admission to which Mr. Nelson did
not respond, claiming that those requests for admissions were deemed admitted.
(Docket, page 297).
45 . Mr. Nelson filed a memorandum opposing Lewis ' motion for swnmary
judgment, and a declaration, on February 5, 2014. (Docket, page 368).
46. Judge Shumate held oral argwnents on Lewis ' motion for swnmary
judgment on March 24, 2014. (Docket, page 450).
47. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Shumate granted Lewis ' motion
for summary judgment, without identifying any w1disputed facts upon which he
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allegedly ielied in granting Lewis' motion for summary judgment, and without
specifying on what legal theory he was granting smmnary judgment. (Transcript of
Hearing on Lewis motion for smmnary judgment, contained in the Addendum to

this Brief).
48. On May 20, 2014, Judgment was entered in favor of Lewis, and

m1

Order Granting Lewis ' Motion for Summary Judgment was also entered. This
Order granted Lewis swmnary judgment on both his claim for breach of an oral
contract, and mtjust enrichment. (Docket, pages 506 mid 492).
49. On Jm1e 2, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Swnmary Judgment, and the Judgment
entered by the court on May 20, 2014. (Docket, page 529, and 616).
50. A hearing was held on Mr. Nelson ' s Motions to Alter or Amend on
September 9, 2014. (There is no entry on the Docket prepared by the District Court
in St. George. However, in on the docket for the electronic filing, there is a, entry
No. 191, that states "2014-09-09 M;nutesfor M0110N TO ALTER JUDGMENT).
51. On October 10, 2014, Judge Westfall entered a ruling on Mr. Nelson's
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, at1d on his Motion to Alter the Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, denying Mr. Nelson's Motion
to Alter or Amend the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
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but making small changes to the Judgment, entered on May 20, 2014. 1 (Docket,
pages 883).
52. In denying Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and
his Motion to Alter or Amend the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Smmnary
Judgment, Judge V✓estfall indicated that he was denying the Motions, because
Mr. Nelson did not respond to the 25 requests for admission Lewis submitted to
Mr. Nelson, in addition to the five requests for admissions to which Mr. Nelson

responded. (Docket, pages 884-5).
53. An Amended Judgment was entered on November 17, 2014. (Docket,
page 958).
54. On November 19, 2014, Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing
Judge Westfall's Amended Judgment entered November 11, 2014; the
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Order
Granting Summary Judgment, and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, entered
October 10, 2014; the Judgment, entered May 20, 2014; the Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Smmnary Judgment, entered May 20, 2014; the Oral Ruling
on motion for smnmary judgment, entered March 24, 2014; and the Order denying

l. Judge Westfall granted Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or Amend the May 20,
2014, judgment, to remove unauthorized costs from the judgment, i.e., postage,
copying costs, and something called "Tracers People Search CSR lnvestigahons, "
costs that would never have been allowed, had Judge Westfall actually read the
judgment before signing it.
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Mr. Nelson' s Motion to file an Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim.,
entered October 11, 2013. (Docket, page 977).

55. Mr. Nelson filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal on
November 20, 2014. (Docket, page 985).

56. Lewis filed a memorandum :iJ.1 opposition to Mr. Nelson's Motion for
Stay of Judgment Pend:iJ.1g Appeal on December 4, 2014. (Docket, page 1009).

57. Mr. Nelson filed a reply memorandwn in support of his Motion for Stay
Pend:iJ.1g Appeal 011 December 9, 2014. (Docket, page 1027).

58. Mr. Nelson filed a Request to Submit for Decision his Motion for a Stay
Pend:iJ.1g Appeal, on December 10, 2014, and Request for an Expedited Decision of
that Motion, on December 11, 2014. (Docket, page 1042, and 1057).

59. Judge Westfall would not rule on Mr. Nelson ' s Motion for a Stay
Pending appeal, so on February 11, 2015, Mr. Lewis filed a motion asking this
Court to order Judge Westfall to rule on bis Motion for a stay pending appeal.
(Because the Motion was filed with this Court, it does not appear on the district
court's docket).

60. On February 12, 2015, Judge Pearce issued an order granting Mr.
Nelson's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. (Because the Docket prepared by he
District Court in St. George ends at February 1, 2015, everything that transpired
after that date is not on the Docket submitted to this Court. (Because the Docket
prepared by the District Court in St. George ends at February 1, 2015, everything
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that transpired after that date is not on thGDocket submitted to this Court.
However, in the Docket for the electronic filing for this case, entry No. 328
indicates that on 2015-02-12, a Cowt of Appeals Order was filed in this Case).
61. The Clerk of the Court issued a writ of execution, authorizing the sheriff
to sell Mr. Nelson's properties, on December 11 , 2014. (Docket, page 1039).
62. Mr. Nelson filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution on December
11, 2014. (Docket, page 1051).
63. Mr. Nelson filed a request to submit for decision his Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution, on January 15, 2014. (Docket, page 1088).

64. Lewis did not file a timely response to Mr. Nelson's Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution, and did not file any response, until after Mr. Nelson had
filed a request for decision of his Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. (Docket,
page 1093).
65. On February 13, 2015, after receiving Judge Pearce's order granting his
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Mr. Nelson filed a second Motion to Quash the
Writ of Execution issued by Judge Westfall, and a Motion to Quash the scheduled
Sheriff Sale of his real properties. (District Court's Electronic Filing Docket,
entries Nos. 329 and 330).
66. Judge Westfall has not ruled on either Mr. Nelson's Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution or his Motion to Quash the Sheriff's Sale. (District Court's
Electronic Filing Docket, entty No. 345).
67. On Febrnary 24, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a supersedeas bond, in the form
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of cash, with the district court. (District Court's Electronic Filing Docket, entries

""5 , _.,_,
...... 5 an d ..,..,
"'""6).
N os. _.,_.,
68. On February 24, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a supersedeas bond with the
district court in the amow1t of $41,408.46. (District Court' s Electronic Filing
Docket, entries Nos. 335, 335 and 336).
69. On March 2, 2015, Lewis filed an objection to Mr. Nelson's
Supersedeas Bond, claiming that Mr. Nelson must post a supersedeas bond in the
amow1t of $63 ,513.49, consisting of au additional amow1t of $9,930.03, post
judgment interest from May 20, 2014, and continuing for three years; and
$12,167.00, post judgment attorney fees. (District Courf s Electronic Filing
Docket, entry No. 342).
70. On March 6, 2015, Mr. Nelson filed a Reply Memorandum in Support
of his Motion to Accept and Approve his Supersedeas Bond filed with the district
court on February 24, 2015. (District Court's Electronic Filing Docket, entry No.
346).
71. On March 3, 2015, Judge Westfall had "Minutes for ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE 1ST APPE, " filed on the district court's docket for this case.
(District CoU1t' s Electronic Filing Docket, entry No. 345).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Shwnate erred, as a matter of law, when be failed to specify the legal
theory upon which he was granting Lewis ' motion for swrunary judgment, and
when he failed to jdentify any w1disputed facts , upo11 which he allegedly relied, i11
granting Lewis' motion for swnmary judgment. Judge Westfall erred, as a matter
oflaw, when he signed the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motio11 for SUlllinary
Judgment, prepared by Lewis ' attorney, when he failed to grant Mr. Nelson's
Motion to Alter or Amend the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and when he authorized the entry of the judgment against Mr. Nelson,
entered on May 20, 2014, and when he authorized the entry of au amended
judgment against Mr. Nelson, on November 17, 2014.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE
Because Judge Shumate did not specify the legal theory upon wruch he
orally granted Lewis' motion for summary judgment, or any facts, that he
concluded were Ulldisputed facts, it is nearly .impossible to marshal the evidence to
support his oral grant of swnrnary judgment in favor of Lewis. Nonetheless,

Mr. Nelson will attempt to identify every bit of evidence that he believes could
possibly be considered to support any of the two possible legal theories, on which
Judge Shumate could have granted Lewis' motion for summary judgment, as well
as all evidence upon which Judge Westfall could have relied in denying
Mr. Nelson ' s Motions to Alter or Amend.
-2 1-

A. BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT.

The evidence which could possibly support a holding that Lewis was
entitled to summary judgment, based on breach of au oral contract claim, is as
follows:
1. At the hearing on Lewis motion for summary judgment, Lewis ' counsel

states: "... or othen41ise he says that the contract was never signed, but the case law
is clear in Utah that you can have an oral contract. "

2. In his declaration, in paragraph 7, Lewis states:
Although neither Nelson nor I signed the Agreement, we both orally agreed
that its terms and condWons would bind us and govern Nelson 's acquisition
of the right to operate the Route from me. "

B. UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

The evidence which could possibly support a holding that Lewis was
entitled to swnmary judgment, based on an W1just enrichment claim, is as follows:
1. Lewis claimed Mr. Nelson agreed to pay him $25,000.00 for the purchase

of the Nutty Guys route.
2. Lewis claimed that Mr. Nelson only paid him $11,00.00, of the
$25,000.00, for the purchase of the Nutty Guys route.
3. Mr. Lewis claimed that Mr. Nelson owed him $22,000.00, in addition to

the $11,000.00, Mr. Nelson paid Lewis, for the Nutty Guys route.
4. Mr. Nelson operated the Nutty Guys route from sometime in January

2011, until May 2014.
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POINT I
JUDGE SHUMATE ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FAILING TO
IDENTIFY THE ALLEGED UNDISPUTED FACTS, UPON WIDCH HE
RELIED, WHEN GRANTING LEWIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, ORALLY RENDERED ON MARCH 24, 2014. JUDGE
WESTFALL ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN HE SIGNED AND
AUTHORIZED THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN HE HAD ABSOLUTELY
NO IDEA OF WHAT ALLEGED FACTS, UPON WIDCH JUDGE
WESTFALL ALLEGEDLY RELIED, WHEN HE ORALLY GRANTED
LEWIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ON MARCH 24, 2014.
Nowhere iu his oral ruling, granting Mr. Lewis' s motion for summary
judgment, does Judge Shumate identify any facts, that he believes are undisputed
facts, upon which he allegedly relied, when granting Mr. Lewis' motion for
summary judgment, in spite of his statement that he wanted a clean record for Mr.
Nelson' s appeal.

In Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997), the Utah
Supreme Court Stated:
It is unclear what undisputed facts the trial court relied upon in its grant of
summary judgment wherein it concluded that Turnabout was a "health care
provider. " Without an adequate basis ofundisputed facts, summary
judgment is inappropriate. Without an adequate indication as to the
undisputed facts that were applied to the law, it is impossible to determine
on appeal whether the trial court erred in its application of the law to those
facts. Therefore, the court ofappeals should have remanded the matter to
the trial court to set out an adequate basis ofundisputed facts to justify its
grant of summary judgment or, if necessary, to holdfi1rther proceedings to
make adequate factual determinations.
Nowhere in Judge Westfall's memorandwn decision denying Mr. Nelson's
Motion to Alter or Amend the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Swmnary
Judgment, does Judge Westfall identify any alleged facts that he considers to be
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undisputed facts, upon which he allegedly relied to affirm Judge Shumate's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Lewis.
Based on the Platts decisio~ at a minimum, this Court must reverse Judge
Shwnate 's, and Judge Westfall' s, grants of smmnary judgment in favor of Lewis,
and remand this case back to the district court, with instructions to identify the
alleged wulisputed facts upon which Judge Shmnate, and/or Judge Westfall relied
in granting Lewis' motion for swrunary judgment, so this Court can determine if
either Judge Shwnate, or Judge Westfall, properly applied the appropriate law,
whatever law they allegedly applied, to the alleged undisputed facts, whatever
those alleged w1disputed facts are.

POINT II
JUDGE SHUMATE ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FAILING TO
SPECIFY THE LEGAL THEORY UPON WHICH HE RELIED, WHEN
GRANTING MR. LEWIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
ORALLY RENDERED ON MARCH 24, 2014. JUDGE WESTFALL
ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN HE SIGNED AND
AUTHORIZED THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN HE HAD ABSOLUTELY
NO IDEA OF THE LEGAL THEORY, UPON WHICH JUDGE WESTFALL
ALLEGEDLY RELIED, WHEN HE ORALLY GRANTED LEWIS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ON MARCH 24, 2014.
Because Judge Shmnate never identified the legal theory, upon which he
relied in granting Mr. Lewis' motion for swmnary judgment, it is impossible for
this Court to detennine if Judge Shwnate properly applied the law, whatever law he
allegedly applied, to the alleged w1disputed facts, whatever the alleged undisputed
facts are.
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Judge Westfall does not identify any legal theory upon which he relied in
affirming Judge Shumate ' s grant of slllmnary judgment. Therefore, at a minimwn,
this Court must reverse Judge Shwnate's, and Judge Westfall's, grants of summary
judgment in favor of Lewis, and remand this case back to the district court, with
instructions to Judge Shumate, and/or Judge Westfall, to specify the legal theorf
upon which they granted Lewis' motion for summary judgment, so this Cornt can
detennine if they properly applied the law, whatever law they applied, to the
w1disputed facts, whatever the alleged disputed facts are. Platts v. Parents Helping
Parents, supra.
POINT ill
JUDGE WESTFALL ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN SIGNING, AND
AUTHORIZING THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER GRANTING LEWIS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A. JUDGE WESTFALL ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN HE
SIGNED THE ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN HE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA
OF THE LEGAL THEORY, UPON WIDCH JUDGE SHUMATE
RELIED, WHEN HE ORALLY GRANTED LEWIS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

As proven in Points I and II, of this brief, in his oral ruling on Lewis' motion
for swmnary judgment, Judge Shwnate never stated the legal theory on which he
was granting Lewis' motion for swmnary judgment. Therefore, it is impossible to
determine whether Judge Shlllnate granted Lewis ' motion for swmnary judgment
on his claim for breach of au alleged oral contract, or unjust enrichment.
The only "reason" Judge Shwnate appeared to give for granting Lewis'
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sUimnary judgment motion is his statement that: ''My job, however, gentlemen, is to

issue a ruling. Looking at thefonn of this lawszdt and the.form of the pleadings
under Rule 7 as we have, I'm going to grant the motion for summary judgment"
(Transcript of SUimnary Judgment Hearing, pages 20-21, lines 24-2). However,
Judge Shumate never explains, or gives any guidance, as to what "Looking at the

form of this lawsuit and the.form of the pleadings under Rule 7 as we have, I'm
going to grant the motion for summary judgment" means.
Because Judge Shumate never specified the legal theory on which he granted
Lewis' motion for summary judgment, as a matter of law, Lewis' counsel could not
prepare au Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for SU1mnary Judgment, when Judge
Shumate never stated the legal theory, on which he was relying, when he orally
granted Lewis' motion for SU1mnary judgment.
Lewis' counsel is not authorized to detennine the legal theory(s) upon which
Judge Shlllnate was relying, when he orally granted Lewis' motion for summary
judgment. Therefore, Judge Westfall erred, as a matter of law when he signed
Lewis' Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for SU1mnary Judgment, when neither he,
nor Lewis' cow1sel, had any idea of the legal theory on which Judge
Shumate was relying, when he orally granted Lewis' motion for swmnary
judgment.
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B. BECAUSE JUD"GE SHUMATE DID NOT MAKE ANY FACTUAL
FINDINGS, BOTH ASA MATTER OF FACT,ANDASA MATTER
OF LAW, LEWIS' COUNSEL COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY
ALLEGED UNDISPUTED FACTS, UPON WHICH JUDGE SHUMATE
ALLEGEDLY RELIED, WHEN ORALLY GRANTING LEWIS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND JUDGE WESTFALL
ERRED,ASA MATTER OF LAW, WHEN HE SIGNED THE ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHEN HE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA OF WHAT ALLEGED
FACTS, UPON WHICH JUDGE WESTFALL ALLEGEDLY RELIED
WHEN HE ORALLY GRANTED LEWIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, ON MARCH 24, 2014.
Again, it is w1disputed that Judge Shumate never identified any alleged
w1disputed facts, upon which he allegedly relied, when granting Lewis' motion for
summary judgment, in spite of his statement that he wanted a clean record for

Mr. Nelson's appeal.
As stated in Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, supra,

It is unclear what undisputed facts the trial court relied upon in its grant of
summary judgment wherein it concluded that Turnabout was a "health care
provider. " Without an adequate basis of undisputed facts, summa,y
judgment is inappropriate. Without an adequate indication as to the
undisputed facts that were applied to the lcrw, it is impossible to determine
on appeal whether the trial court erred in its application of the law to those
facts. Therefore, the court of appeals should have remanded the matter to
the trial court to set out an adequate basis of undisputed facts to justify its
grant of summary judgment or, if necessary, to hold fi1rther proceedings to
make adequate factual determ;nations.
Although Judge Shwnate stated, during the hearing on Lewis' motion for
swnrnary judgment, that "There are zmd;sputed ;ssues o.ffact ;n the varfous

statements and declarahons as well as the arguments, but - and you can h1clude
those, because I want there to be a clear record for Mr. Nelson to appeal, "
(Transcript of Swrunary Judgment Hearing, page 21, lines 3-7), because Judge
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Shumate did not identify the "undisputed ;ssues of/act," Lewis' cow1sel was not
lawfully entitled to determine to what, alleged, "undisputed ;ssues ojjact" Judge
Shumate was refeITing, and include them in the Order Granting Plaintiff's' Motion
for Summary Judgment, because Lewis' counsel had absolutely no idea of what
alleged facts Judge Shumate supposed.Jy considered "undisputed issues ojfact. "
Because Judge Shwnate never identified any alleged w1disputed facts, upon
which he was relying, when granting Lewis' motion for swnmary judgment, Judge
Westfall erred, as a matter of law, when he signed the Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Swnmary Judgment, containing alleged facts, that Judge Shumate did
not make, suggest, or even allude to, as neither he, nor Lewis's counsel, had any
idea on what alleged undisputed facts Judge Shumate was allegedly relying when
he orally granted Lewis' motion for swnmary judgment.

C. AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGE SHUMATE COULD NOT HA VE
GRANTED LEWIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED
ON A BREACH OF AN ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT.

In his amended complaint, Lewis asserted a cause of action, based on an
alleged oral contract. However, Lewis also claimed he was entitled to summary
judgment, on a claim of w~ust enrichment.
In paragraph I , subparagraph e., of Lewis' alleged undisputed facts,
contained in his Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Lewis
claims:

After a p eriod of negotiation., Nelson agreed to purchase, and Lewis agreed
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to sell, the right to operate the Route in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in a written Asset Purchase Agreement (the
''AGREEMENT'').
A copy of Lewis' Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is
included in the Addendum to this Brief.

In subparagraph f., of paragraph 1, of Lewis' Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Srumnary Judgment, Lewis states:

Although neither of the parties signed the Agreement, they orally agreed
that its terms and conditions would bind both parties and govern Nelson 's
acquisition of the right to operate the Route from Lewis..
Subparagraphs e., and f., of paragraph 1, of Lewis' Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, are not undisputed facts, as Lewis
falsely claims, and Judge Shumate never stated that the statements made in
subparagraphs e., and f. , of paragraph 1, of Lewis' Order Granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment are undisputed facts.
Although Judge Shumate never stated that he was granting Lewis' motion
for summary judgment based on an alleged oral agreement, as a matter of law, he
could not have, lawfully, granted swmnary judgment, on Lewis' false claim that he
and Mr. Nelson entered into an oral agreement, and agreed that the alleged oral
agreement would be governed by the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
During the hearing on Lewis' motion for smrunary judgment, Lewis ' counsel
states:

Mr. Nelson claims there is no contract, because either - he says that he
didn 't get this exclusive area, but that doesn't mean there's no contract.
Thatjust means there 's breach, and so he 's not - I don 't or othen11ise he
-29-

says that the contract was never signed, but the case law is clear in Utah
that you can have an oral contract. J'liis isn 't covered by the Statute of
Frauds. And so to the extent he claims that we didn't convey an exclush1e
area, that doesn 't mean there 's no contract, that just means that there's a
potential breach.

(Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Srumnary Judgment, page 8, lines 4-7).
However, Lewis' counsel does not specifically state that Lewis is entitled to
srunmary judgment on any alleged "oral contract," and neither Judge Shumate nor
Lewis' coru1sel mentions an oral contract after the referenced c01mnent.
Iu his Declaration in Opposition to Lewis' motion for srunrnary judgment,

Mr. Nelson states:
1. I, Rodney Nelson, am the defendant in the above-caphoned case, and I
am at least 18 years old. I have personal knowledge and am competent to testify
regarding the matters herein. I make this declaration in opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. In the.fall of2010 1 answered an ad on KS1.com by Reggie Lewis
offering an "exclusive" Nutty Guys distribution route in Southern Utah.
3. Ajier several phone calls with Lewis, 1 agreed to accompany Lewis for
deliveries on Janua,y 1, 2011.
8. I met with Lewis at his in-laws home in South Salt Lake where he showed
me how to do invoices and run the business.
9. After some discussion, we agreed to terms on the purchase of the
business and I hand wrote an agreement which both Lewis and I signed
JO. This agreement contained only basic terms of our agreement.

11. Lewis retained the handwritten agreement and was going to take ii to
his uncle, who is an attorney, to draft a legal contract.
12. Due to the fact that Lewis maintained the contract, I am zmable to
remember the entire contract.
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14. Lewis explained that the sale of the route had to be approved by Nate
Murray, the owner ofNutty Guys.
15. Murray approved the sale of the route.
16. After taking over the route, it became very difficult to reach Lewis when
I had questions or needed help.
17. In June 2011, L ew;s came to my warehouse in Hurricane, Utah, to ger
me to sign a Nutty Guys commission check that had been written to me by mistake.
18. Durh1g this v;sit, he presented me with a new contract and attempted to
get me to sign it attached hereto as EXHIBIT A-1.
19. Ajier reading over the contract it was easily evident that this was an
entirely difjerent contract.
20. I told Lewis that I would not sign the contract and he needed to get me
an accurate accounting of the balance remaining and proof of the "exclusive area' 1
as contracted.
30. I would never have entered into this agreement fl had known that I was
not purchasing an exclusive area as I was led to bebeve.
A copy of Mr. Nelson's Declaration is included in the Addendum to his Brief

Mr. Nelson specifically disputed that he agreed to any oral contract, and
specifically disputed that the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement represented
the tenns of his preliminary agreement, with Lewis, for the purchase of an
. "exclusive" Nutty Guys route. Therefore, Lewis' asse1tion that: ''Although neither

of the parties signed the Agreement, they orally agreed that its terms and
conditions would b;nd both parties and govern Nelson's acquisition of the right to
operate the Route from Lewis.. ," is not an undisputed fact, as Lewis falsely claims
in his Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for SU1runary Judgment, and cannot be
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relied

011

to grant smmnary judgment, based on a claim of at1 oral contract.

Because Mr. Nelson specifically disputed that the Asset Purchase
Agreement represented the tenns of his preliminary agreement, with Lewis, for the
purchase of an "exclusive" Nutty Guys route, as a matter of law, Judge Shumate
could not have granted Lewis Smmnary Judgment based on au alleged oral
contract, as "[l}t only takes one sworn statement under oath to d;spute the

averments on the other s;de of the controversy and create an issue of/act. " Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), and summary judgment is
precluded, as a matter of law, when there are issues of material fact.

By definition, summary judgment cannot be granted where there are
d;sputedfacts. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. SMelds, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah
1994) ("Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of
material fact remain. ... ';.
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996).

Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material fact, no
matter how improbable the evidence may appear, judgment as a matter of
law is improper. Kleh1ert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).
Yom1g v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 182 P.3d 911, 2008 UT App 114
(Utah App. 2008).
Because Mr. Nelson specifically disputed that he ever agreed to the tenns of
the Asset Purchase Agreement, and specifically stated that it was never agreed the
terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement would apply to any alleged oral contract,
because Mr. Nelson agreed to purchase an "exclusive" Nutty Guys route, while
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Lewis knew he did not have an "exclusive" Nutty Guys route to sell, there was
never a meeting of the minds, on any alleged oral contract, or th.e W1signed w1dated
Asset Purchase Agreement, that was allegedly the basis for the alleged oral
contract, and thus, no oral contract was ever fonned. Additionally, Lewis'
fraudulent claim that he was selling Mr. Nelson au "exciusive" Nutty Guys route,
renders any alleged oral contract void, and because Mr. Nelson specifically
disputed that he ever entered into any oral agreement with Lewis for the purchase
of any Nutty Guy Route, as a matter of law, Judge Shumate could not have,
lawfully, granted smmnary judgment based on any alleged oral agreement.
Additionally, because the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, signed by Judge Westfall on May 20, 2014, and entered by the court on
the same date, specifically states th.at Lewis is granted summary judgment on both
his claim for breach of an oral contract, and his claim of unjust enrichment, it is
invalid, as a matter of law, because judgment cannot be entered on both a contract
claim, and an mijust enrichment claim. 2 Therefore, Judge Westfall, erred as a

2. E & M Sales West, hlc. v. Diversified Metal Products, Inc., 221 P.3d 838,

2009 UT App 299 (Utah App. 2009)

(" The [unjust enrichment] doctrine is designed to provide an equitable
remedy where one does not exist at law. 11 ) . In other words, if a legal
remedy ;s available, such as breach of an express contract, the law wm not
imply the eqidtable remedy of unjust enrichment. "
11

and as stated in Anderson & Karrenberg v. Warnick, 289 P.3d 600, 2012 UT
App 275 (Utah App. 2012):
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matter of law when he signed the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Smmnary
Judgment, and authorized the court to enter it.

D. IT IS MOST PROBABLE THAT JUDGE SHUMATE GRANTED
LEWIS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON AN
UNJUST ENRICHMENT THEORY, ALTHOUGH, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, HE WAS PRECLUDED FROM DOING SO.
During the hearing on Lewis' motion for summary judgment, Judge Shwnate
makes this statement: "The th;ng that I am curious about that I'd like you to
address ;s whether or not the record, under Rule 7, supports your motion on that
theory of unjust enrichment out of the affidavit that we have from Mr. Lewis, his
statement, "(Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, page 5 lines 9-12). That

statement is a strong indication that Judge Shumate was considering granting
Lewis• motion for summary judgment based on an unjust enrichment theory,
although he never actually stated that he was doing so. Judge Shwnate also makes
this statement: "But if my analysis is incorrect and this is tntly an unjust
enrichment case, that's the way I read it based upon the record that 's before the
Court, but the minute - the process goes like this. " (Transcript of Swnmary

Judgment Hearing, page 21, lines 11-14).

In response to Judge Shumate's statement that "The thing that I am curious
about that I'd like you to address is whether or not the record, under Rule 7,

(" Under our precedent, a cla;m of unjust enr;chment cannot arise where
there is an express contract governing the ' subject matter' of a dispute. ").
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supports your motion on that theory o_f"unjust enrichment out of the affidavit that
we have from Mr. Lewis, his statement, " Lewis' counsel replies:
Your Honor, on the wy·ust enrichment issue, I would Uke to turn the Court's
atlention to what isn't marked, but is, in fact, page JO of the defendant's
opposition memo. "
It states. "It is agreed that thepurchase assets that Lewis corife"ed a
benefit to Nelson, and that Nelson knew of and appreciated this benefit. It
is also undisputed that that - Nelson accepted and retained this benefit
while knowing that Lewis expectedjidl compensahonjor the same."
Those are all three of the elements that are required for wyust enrichment.
So my position is he's not disputing that in his argument. And it goes on,
and it says, "However, Lewis never conferred that which he contracted to
confer. " The contract is an enhrely different issue.
And then it goes on, "Without the ability to confer an exclusive area for
Nutty Guys in Southern Utah, Lewis effectively only conveyed a list of
existing customers that were able to be poached or taken by any Nutty
Guys' representatives," but there's no - if we 're talking about unjust
enrk:hment, there's - he admits he received the benefit. There's - the
language regarding exclusive area would be i"elevant for the unjust
enr;chment. He's claiming that under the contract there was an agreement
as regarding the conveyance of an exclusive area.
(Trauscript of Summary Judgment Hearing, page 6-7, lines 17-12).

In response to Lewis' counsel's statements, Judge Shumate states:
So, counsel, your argument to me is basically that from a conceptual and
Jog;cal reasoned approach to the issues before the Court that there is
really no way that the concept exclusive area can have an impact can be
material to the elements of unjustment - unjust enrichmentjor the reason
that an exclusive area would have been a contract term. And that the
Court, ;njacing the logical dilemma, can only rule in your favor, because
the elements of unjust enrichment haven't been admitted, and Mr. Lewis '
affidavit establishes the facts based upon which the Court can render
judgment?
(Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, page 7, lines 13-23).
Lewis counsel responds: "Yes, and the exclusive area language would be
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I.

,

relevant to the existence of a contract. " (Transcript of Sw.nmary Judgment
Hearing, page 7, lines 24-25).
It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Nelson paid Lewis $11,000.00 for an
"exclusive" Nutty Guys route. See Lewis ' declaration, paragraph 10, where
Lewis states: "from February to May 2011, Nelson made several payments to me

totaling approximately $11, 000. 00. " See also, paragraph 8, subparagraph 1 of
Lewis' declaration., wherein Lewis states:

[Lewis] has owned and operated a business known as "Southern Utah
Nutty Guys " (the "Business") which is an exclusive area and route assigned
to him by the Nutty Guys LLC. The Business consists of the exclusive area in
Southern Utah and other assets described below. (Emphasis supplied).
A copy of Lewis' declaration is included in the addendum to this Brief.
It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Nelson did not get an "exclusive" Nutty
Guys route, because Lewis did not have an "exclusive" route to sell. See page 60,
lines 8-23, of the transcript of the deposition ofNathanMurray, a copy ofwhich
is included in the Addendw.n to this Brief.
Because it is w1deniable that Lewis was paid $11,000.00 for a11
"exclusive" Nutty Guys route, but only conveyed a list of existing customers that
were able to be poached or taken by any Nutty Guys representative, Judge
Shw.nate would have to have made a factual finding that Mr. Nelson was mijustly
enriched by receiving a list of existing customers, that were able to be poached or
taken by a11y Nutty Guys representative, rather than the "exclusive" Nutty Guys
route, that Lewis represented he was selling to Mr. Nelson, in order to grant
Lewis swnmary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim.
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Judge Shwnate would also have to have made a factual finding that paying
$11,000.00 for a list of existing customers, that were able to be poached or taken
by any Nutty Guys representative, was not reasonable compensation to Lewis,
when Lewis agreed to provide Mr. Nelson with an "exclusive" Nutty Guys route,
in order to grant Lewis swnmary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim.

A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary
judgment mo hon, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material
fact exists, Draper C)ty v. Estate a/Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1 JOO (Utah
1995) ( "On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not
weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material
issues offact exist. ''), viewing the facts and all reasonable iriferences to be
drawn there from in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc. , 2000 UT 12, , 2, 995 P.2d 599.
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379 (Utah, 2002).
Because Judge Shwnate would have to have made a factual finding that

Mr. Nelson was, in fact, unjustly enriched by receiving a list of existing
customers, that were able to be poached or taken by any Nutty Guys
representative, rather than the "'exclusive" Nutty Guys route, that Lewis falsely
represented he was selling to Mr. Nelson, and because Judge Shumate would have
to have made a factual determination as to what extent Mr. Nelson was, allegedly,
wrjustly enriched by receiving a list of existing customers, that were able to be
poached or taken by any Nutty Guys representative, rather than the "exclusive"
Nutty Guys route, that Lewis falsely represented he was selling to Mr. Nelson, in
order to grant Lewis swnmary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim, things
that, as a matter of law, Judge Shmnate was specifically precluded from doing on
summary judgment, as a matter of law, Judge Shwnate could not have granted
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Lewis' summary judgment on an wtjust enrichment claim.
Because Judge Shwnate never stated that he was granting Lewis swnmary
judgment on his claim for unjust enrichment, because, as a matter of law, Judge
Shwnate could not have granted Lewis summary judgment on his unjust
enrichment claim, as a mater of law, Judge Westfall also could not grant Lewis
swnmary judgment on his claim of mtjust enrichment, without making a factual
finding that Mr. Nelson was, in fact, wljustly enriched by receiving a list of
existing customers, that were able to be poached or taken by any Nutty Guys
representative, rather than the "'exclusive" Nutty Guys route, that Lewis falsely
represented he was selling to Mr. Nelson, and because Judge Westfall would also
have had to make a factual detennination as to the extent Mr. Nelson was,
allegedly, unjustly enriched by receiving a list of existing customers, that were
able to be poached or taken by any Nutty Guys representative, rather than the
"exclusive'' Nutty Guys route, that Lewis falsely represented he was selling to
Mr. Nelson, in order to grant Lewis swnmary judgment on his wijust enrichment

claim, things that, as a matter oflaw, Judge Westfall was also specifically
precluded from doing on swmnary judgment, Judge Westfall erred, as a matter of
law when he signed Lewis' Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Swmnary
Judgment, granting Lewis swnmary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim.
Furthennore, as a matter of law, Judge Westfall could not lawfully sign the Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Smnmary Judgment, because it grants Lewis
summary judgment on both bis claim of an oral contract and bis claim for wtjust
-38-

enrichment, when a court, as a matter of law, cannot grant judgment on both a
contract claim and unjust enrichment. E & M Sales West, Inc. v. Diversified
Metal Products, Inc., and Anderson & Karrenberg v. Warnick, supra.
Under clear and controlling law, neither Judge Shumate, nor Judge
Westfall could lawfully grant Lewis swnmary judgment on his claim of unjust
enrichment.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE JUDGMENT,
ENTERED ON MAY 20, 2014.
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT COULD NOT HA VE BEEN
ENTERED, IN FAVOR OF LEWIS, BASED ON ANY ALLEGED
ORAL AGREEMENT.
As proven in Point Ill, C, of this Brief, as a matter of law, neither Judge
Shumate, nor Judge Westfall, could grant Lewis summary judgment on the basis
of an alleged oral contract. Therefore, as a matter of law, judgment could not be
lawfully entered against Mr. Nelson, on May 20, 2014, based on the alleged
breach of an oral contract.

B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGE WESTFALL, COULD NOT ENTER
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF LEWIS BASED ON AN UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLAIM.
As proven in Point Ill, D, of this Brief, as a matter of law, neither Judge
Shumate, nor Judge Westfall, could grant Lewis smnmary judgment on the basis
of unjust enrichment. Therefore, as a matter of law, judgment could not be
lawfully entered against Mr. Nelson on the basis of unjust enrichment.
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C. AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGE WESTFALL, COULD NOT
AWARD LEWIS ANY ATTORNEY FEES, OR INTEREST, BASED
ON AN ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT OR ON AN UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLAIM.
Lewis apparently relies

011

paragraph 5 .4, of the Asset Purchase

Agreement, for his request for interest at the rate of 8%, and for an award of
attorney fees. Paragraph 5 .4 of the Asset Purchase Agreement states:

Default. In the event of a payment default by the Buyer under
either paragraphs 2.1 or 2. 2 above, Seller may elect to either sue on the
debt created by those paragraphs or may elect to recover and obtafr1 the
Business as set forth above. Any payment not made with;n 30 days of the
due date as set forth above shall be considered a payment default and
shall entitle Seller to elect his remedies as set forth above. In any action
pursuant to a default declared under this section, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover costs and expenses h2cluding attorney fees.
"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by
contract." Softsolutions, foe. v. Brigham Yoilllg University, l P.3d 1095 (Utah
2000), See also, Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 2001 UT App 404 (Utah App.
2001), citing, Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v . Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah
Ct. App.1993),
stating "112 "In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or

contract. "

I. As A Matter Of Law, Judge Westfall Could Not Award Lewis
Attorney Fees Or Interest, Based On Any Alleged Oral Contract.
As proven in Point lII, C, of this Brief, as a matter of law, neither Judge
Shumate, nor Judge Westfall could not have granted Lewis summary judgment
based on any alleged oral contract. Therefore, as a matter of law, neither Judge
Shumate, nor Judge Westfall, could award Lewis any attorney fees based any
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alleged oral contract. Furthennore, because Judge WestfalJ stated in the Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment that Lewis was granted
summary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim, as a matter of law, Judge
Westfall could not grant Lewis smmnary judgment ou a breach of an alleged oral
agreement, because as stated in E & M Sales West, Inc. v. Diversified Metal
Products, Inc., supra,

(" The [unjust enrichment] doctrine is designed to provide an equitable
remedy where one does not exist at law. 11 ) . 11 In other words, if a legal
remedy is available, such as breach ofan express contract, the law will not
imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. "
and as stated in Anderson & Karrenberg v. Warnick, supra,

(" Under our precedent, a claim of unjust enrichment cannot arise where
there is an express contract governJng the 'subject matter' of a dispute. "),
and in Utah attorney fees can only be awarded by contract or statute.
Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000), See
also, Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 2001 UT App 404 (Utah App. 2001), citing,
Equitable Life & Cas. his. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct.
App.1993).
Because the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Smmnary Judgment
specifically states that Lewis is granted smrunary judgment on his claim of mrjust
enrichment, as a matter oflaw, Judge Westfall, could not lawfully award Lewis
attorney fees, or prejudgment interest, and he erred, as a matter of law, in doing
so.
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II. As A Matter Of Law, J ude:e Westfall Could Not A ward Lewis
Attorney Fees Or Interest, Based On A Claim of Unjust
Enrichment.
As a matter of law, Judge Westfall could not award Lewis attorney fees on
ai1

mtjust enrichment claim, because attorney fees are not recoverable in an wijust

enrichment cause of action.
Judge Westfall stated in the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, that he was granting Lewis summary judgrnent based on his
oral contract claim. However, as a matter of law, as stated in E & M Sales West,
hie. v. Diversified Metal Products, Inc., supra, wijust enrichment is not available

if there is a legal remedy available. "In other words, if a legal remedy is
available, such as breach of an express contract, the lcnv will not imply the
equitable remedy of ioy·ust emkhment, " and as stated in Anderson & Karrenberg
v. Wamick, supra, "Under our precedent, a claim of unjust enrichment cannot

arise where there is an express contract governing the 'subject matter' of a
dispute.

11

Therefore, as a matter oflaw, Judge Westfall could not grant Lewis

attorney fees on his claim of m1just enrichment, because he granted Lewis
summary judgment on his claim of the breach of an oral contract, and as a matter
of law, granting a claim on a claim of a breach of contract, precludes a grant of
judgment on an w1just enrichment claim.
The Order signed by Judge Westfall, at1d entered by the court on May 20,
2014, also awards Lewis prejudgment interest at the rate of 8%. However, as a
matter oflaw, Judge Westfall could not award Lewis interest on his claim of
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unjust enrichment, because the Order states that Lewis is granted swnmary
judgment on his false claim of an oral contract.
Additionally, because the Order grants Lewis prejudgment interest on his
unjust enrichment claim, Judge Westfall erred, as a matter of law, in awarding
Lewis prejudgment interest at any rate, because Lewis never sought prejudgment
interest, directly as damages, in his unjust enrichment claim, Shoreline
Development, Inc. v. Utah Cow1ty, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992, supra.
Judge Westfall simply could not award Lewis attorney fees, or interest, on
any theory, and he erred, as a matter of law, in doing so.

POINTV
JUDGE WESTFALL ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN ISSUING
ms MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MR. NELSON'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND ms
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT, ENTERED MAY
20, 2014.
A. JUDGE WESTFALL'S RULING THAT THE WRITTEN FINDINGS
OF FACT, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, CONTAINED IN THE
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT,
PREPARED BY LEWIS' ATTORNEY, ARE CONTROLLING OVER
JUDGE SHUMA TE'S ORAL RULING IS INCORRECT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Once again, it is an indisputable fact that Judge Shwnate never specified
the legal theory, upon which he was relying, when he orally granted Lewis'
motion for swmnary judgment. And, once again, it is also

ai1

indisputable fact

that Judge Shumate never identified any facts, that he found to be undisputed

-43-

facts, upon which he relied, when he orally granted Lewis' motion for swmnary
judgment. Although Judge Shumate did make the following statement: "There

are undisputed issues ojjact in the various sLatements and declarations as well as
the arguments,.. . "

In his Memorandum Decision and Order denying Mr. Neison' s Motions to
Alter or Amend, Judge Westfall states that the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment, prepared by Lewis' counsel, is valid because it prevails
over Judge Shumate' s oral ruling, with respect to undisputed facts, even though
Judge Shumate never identified any alleged facts that, he considered to be
m1disputed facts.
Because Judge Shumate never identified any alleged facts, that he
considered "llildisputed facts," Judge Westfall ' s statement that

Our case law is clear that where a court's oral ruling differs from a final
written order, the falter controls. "MF. v. IF. 2013 UT App 247, 116, 312
P.3d 946, quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998). The
Court notes, therefore, that to the extent there were any deficiencies in the
prior oral ruling on summary judgment or any discrepancies between that
niling and the written order, the written order obviously prevails,
while accurately representing statements contained in those cases, is irrelevant to
the facts of this case.
A cursory review of FM. v. IF. and Evans v. State, proves that they are not
even remotely applicable to the facts of this case. First, the judges that signed the
written orders in M.F. v. J.F. and Evans v. State, were the same judges that issued
the oral rulings, unlike this case, where Judge Shumate made the oral ruling on
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Lewis' motion for summary judgment, while Judge Westfall signed the written
order, prepared by Lewis' counsel, even though he did not attend the hearing on
Lewis' motion for swrunary judgment, and knew absolutely nothing about what
transpired at the hearing, had any idea of the legal theory Judge Shumate relied on
when granting Lewis' motion for summary judgment, or had any idea of what
facts Judge Shumate considered to be w1disputed facts, upon which he could
grant Lewis' motion for sUinmary judgment. Additionally, the written orders
signed by the judges in M.F. v. J.F. and Evans v. State made only minor changes
to the actual rulings, orally made by the judges who actually presided at the
hearings.

h1 this case, the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for SUllllllary Judgment,
prepared by Lewis' counseL contains findings and rulings, Judge Shwnate never
made, or even alluded to, at the hearing on Lewis' motion for summary judgment.
Furthermore, the findings and rulings contained in the Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, are supposedly based on Mr. Nelson's failure to
respond to Lewis' requests for admissions, that exceeded the number of requests
permitted under Rule 26(c)(3), and Rule 26(c)(5), URCP, which, contrary to
Judge Westfall ' s assertion, are not admitted because Mr. Nelson failed to respond
to them, especially when Mr. Nelson was ordered to respond to 30 requests for
admission, submitted to him, under the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See
excerpts from the Hearing on Lewis Motion for Swnrnary Judgment, infra.
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Because the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
contains, alleged undisputed facts, that Judge Shwnate never stated, suggested, or
even implied, were undisputed facts, and because neither Lewis' attorney, nor
Judge Westfall had any idea of what alleged facts, Judge Shwnate allegedly
considered w1disputed facts, Judge Westfall erred, as a matter of law, in his
assertion that the alleged w1disputed facts, in the written Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Swnmary Judgment, prepared by Lewis' cow1sel, control
over the w.1disputed facts, that Judge Shwnate never made, is wrong, as a matter
oflaw.

B. JUDGE WESTFALL'S RULING THAT MR. NELSON ADMITTED
THE TWENTY-FIVE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, BEYOND THE
FIVE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION THAT LEWIS WAS ENTITLED
TO SUBMIT, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 26 URCP, IS
SIMPLY WRONG, AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Judge Westfall's reliance on Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d
1058, 1061 (Utah 1998); Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah
1985); Kotter v. Kotter, 2009 UT App 60, 16-17, 206 P.3d 633; Barnes v.
Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, IT 11, 178 P.3d 930; and In re E.R., 2000 UT App
143, 13, 2 P.3d 948, for his incorrect assertion that the requests for admissions
submitted to Mr. Nelson, by Lewis, beyond the five requests pennitted under
Rule 26(c)(3) and Rule 26(c)(5) URCP, is admitted, is misplaced.
The current version of Rule 26 URCP, that was in effect at the time Lewis
submitted his discovery to Mr. Nelson, specifies that actions claiming $50,000, or
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less in damages, are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 1 cases.
Rule 26(c)(5) URCP states that only five requests for admissions are permitted in
Tier 1 cases.
It is indisputable that this case is a Tier I case. Lewis filed this case on
July 2, 2012. Lewis' amended complaint states that Mr. Nelson owes him
$15,020.00. Therefore, under the express provisions of the present version of
Rule 26(c)(5) URCP, enacted November 2011, Lewis was only pennitted to ask
five requests for admissions of Mr. Nelson.
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc.; Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.; Kotter
v. Kotter; Barnes v. Clarkson; and In re E.R., supra, the cases cited by Judge
Westfall, for .his erroneous assertion that Mr. Nelson admitted the 25 additional
requests for admission, submitted by Lewis, beyond the five requests for
admission Lewis is pennitted to ask, under the provisions of Rule 26(c)(5) URCP,
are all cases that were decided prior to the November 2011 enactment of the
present Rule 26. Additionally, the requests for admission, that were deemed
admitted, in Langeland v. Monarch Motors, foe.; Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.;
Kotter v. Kotter; Barnes v. Clarkson; and In re E.R., did not exceed the number of
requests for admission permitted under the version of the URCP, that was in
effect, at the time the requests for achnissions were submitted, as Lewis' requests
for admissions did in this case. Therefore, the holdings of Langeland v. Monarch
Motors, Inc.; Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.; Kotter v. Kotter; Barnes v. Clarkson;
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and hi re E.R., with respect to requests for admissions being deemed admitted, are
completely irrelevant to the requests for admissions Lewis submitted to Mr.
Nelson beyond the five requests for admission permitted under Rule 26(c)(5)
URCP.
A court is not pennitted to interpret a Rule of Civil Procedure in a manner
that makes a part of the Rule, or another Rule, meaningless. See Wright v.
University of Utah., 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App. 1994), holding that:

PermUhng Wright to proceed again after she neither amended her
complaint as a matter of right nor properly sought leave to do so would
render Rule J2(b)(6) meanhigless and restrict trial courts seeking to
dispose of motions brought under that rule. This we cannot do.
See also: State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,

~

29, 127 P.3d 682, wherein, the Utah

Supreme Court, citing Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ~ 19, 133 P.3d 370, stated:

Our objective in hzterpreting a court rule is to give effect to the intent of
the body that promulgated it. [I 4} Thus, we interpret a court rule in
accordance wUh its plah1 meaning, {15J and we construe the ntle so that it
is in harmony with related rules. {16}

Mr. Nelson answered the first five of Lewis' requests for admissions, the
maximum number of requests for admission permitted under Rule 26(c)(3), and
26(c)(5), URCP. And although Lewis submitted an additional twenty-five
requests for admissions to Mr. Nelson~ under the provisions of Rule 26(c )(3), and
26(c)(5), URCP, Mr. Nelson was not obligated to respond to any of those
additional requests for admissions.
Rule 26(c)(6) URCP states:

Extraordinary discovery. To obtain discovery beyond the /;mils
established in paragraph (c)(5), a party shall.file:
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(c)(6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and afier reaching
the limits of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a stipulated
statement that extraordinary discovery is necessary and proportional
under paragraph (b)(2) and that each party has reviewed and approved a
discovery budget; or
(c)(6){B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching
the limits ofstandard discovery imposed by these n,les, a motion for
extraordinary discovery setting forth the reasons why the extraordinary
discovery is necessary and proportional under paragraph (b)(2) and
certifying that the party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget
and certifying that the party has in good faith conferred or attempted to
corifer with the other party in an effort to achieve a shpulation.
Lewis did not seek, nor obtain~ any court authorization for any

"Extraordinary discovery, " permitted under the provisions of Rule 26(c) URCP.
Therefore, Mr. Nelson was not obligated to answer the additional twenty-five
requests for admissions submitted by Lewis. And Mr. Nelson' s failure to respond
to the unauthorized requests for admissions, as a matter of law, cannot result in
those requests for admissions being deemed admitted, and/or used for any
purpose, whatsoever, in the litigation of this case.
Judge Westfall's assertion that Mr. Nelson's failure to deny the request for
admission, beyond the five permitted under the provisions of Rule 26(c)(3) and
Rule 26(c)(5) URCP, resulted in those additional admissions being admitted, is
blatantly incorrect, as a matter of law, because Judge Westfall is not permitted to
interpret Rule 26 in such a way to make the provisions of Rule 26(c)(3), and
26( c)( 5), URCP, limiting the uwnber of requests for admissions that may be
submitted meaningless. Judge Westfall is also not pennitted to interpret Rule
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26(c)(6) URCP, that specifies the requirements for submission of additional
requests for admissions, meaningless, as he did, in th.is case, by ruling that the
additional twenty-five requests for admission, submitted by Lewis, were admitted,
because Mr. Nelson did not respond to them.

POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE AMENDED
JUDGMENT, AGAINST MR. NELSON, ENTERED NOVEMBER 17, 2014.
Because, as previously established in this Brief, both Judge Shumate, and
Judge Westfall, erred, as a matter of law,

u1 granting Lewis' motion for summary

judgment, Judge Westfall, also erred, as a matter of law, in authorizing the entry
of the Amended Judgment, entered November 17, 2014, that awarded Lewis
attorney fees, when there is no valid contract, written or oral, or auy statute,
entitling Lewis to collect attorney fees, and Lewis cannot be awarded attorney
fees on au unjust enrichment claim.

In his memorandwn decision, denying Mr. Nelson ' s Motions to Alter or
Amend, Judge Westfall states: "Finally, the Court previously found that the
contract allows "the prevailing party ... to recover costs and expenses including
attorney fees. " Judge Westfall would have to be referring to the alleged oral

contract between Mr. Nelson and him, as Lewis never asserted a claim for breach
of a written contact in either his amended complain, or in his memorandum in
support of his motion for summary judgment. However, Judge Shwnate never
stated, suggested, or even implied, that Lewis is entitled to costs, expenses, and/or
-5 0-

attorney fees, at the hearing on Lewis ' motion for swnmary judgment. And the
language "the contract allows the prevaWng party ... to recover costs and
expenses h1cluding attorney.fees " does not appear anywhere ii1 the Transcript of

the Hearu1g on Lewis' Motion for Swnmary Judgment. However, it is not
sw-prising that Judge Shumate does not mention interest and attorney fees at the
Hearu1g on Lewis' motion for Swnmary Judgment, because Judge Shumate
appears to grant swnmary judgment on an unjust enrichment theory not a written
contract, and, as a matter of law, attorney fees could not be awarded on Lewis'
unjust enrichment claim, and Lewis failed to request interest as damages, in his
amended complaii1t, as he was required to do under the holding of Shoreline
Development, Inc. v. Utah Comity, supra.
As previously established in this Brief, in his Declaration in Opposition to
Lewis' motion for swnmary judgment, Mr. Nelson states:
I met with Lewis at his in-laws home h1 South Salt Lake where he
showed me how to do invoices and run the business.
(Mr. Nelson's Declaration, ~8).
Afier some discussion, we agreed to terms on the purchase of the
business and 1 hand wrote an agreement which both Lewis and I
signed.
(Mr. Nelson' s Declaration, ~9).
In June 2011, Lewis came to my warehouse in Hurricane, Utah, to
get me to sign a Nutty Guys commission check that had been written
to me by mistake. (Mr. Nelson's Declaration, ~17).
During this visit, he presented me with a new contract and
attempted to get me to s;gn it attached hereto as EXHIBIT A-1.
(Mr. Nelson's Declaration, 118).
-5 1-

After reading over the contract it was easily evident that this was an
entirely different contract. (Mr. Nelson's Declaration, 119).
I told Lewis that 1 would not sign the contract and he needed to get
me an accurate accounting of the balance remaining and proof of
the "exclusive area" as contracted.

(Mr. Nelson's Declaration, ~20).
I also asked for a copy of the ohginal contract.
(Mr. Nelson's Declaration, 121).

See, Mr. Nelson's Declaration included in the Addendum to his Brief.
Because Mr. Nelson specifically stated, in his Declaration, filed in
opposition to Lewis's motion for smmnary judgment, that the unsigned, m1dated
Asset Purchase Agreement, Lewis submitted to the court, did not represent the
terms of the preliminary agreement between Lewis and him, for the sale of an
"exclusive" Nutty Guys route, and because Judge Shumate specifically stated in
the hearing on Lewis' motion for surmnary judgment, that "The fact that we don 't
have a written agreement the fact that everybody is of one accord on at least one
point, and that is that nothing got signed, and that there were things proposed
back and forlh, but nobody signed anything impresses the court that this may, in
deed, be an unjust enrichment k;nd of case ifyour client would prevail, " neither

Judge Shumate, nor Judge Westfall, could lawfully grant swmnary judgment
based on the alleged oral contract, as ''{J}t only takes one sworn statement under
oath to dispute the averments on the other s;de of the controversy and create an
issue o,ffact." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995),
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and swnmary judgment is precluded, as a matter of law, when there are issues of
material fact.

By definition, summary judgment cannot be granted where there are
disputed facts. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah
1994) ("Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of
material fact rema;n. ... ''.).

Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996).
Summary judgment is only appropriate where "there is no genzdne issue
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. "
Where there is a,~ evidence that raises a question of material fact, no
matter how improbable the evidence may appear, judgment as a matter of
law is improper. Klehzert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 299
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Young v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 182 P.3d 911 , 2008 UT App 114 (Utah App.
2008). Additionally, as a matter of law, judgment could not be entered against

Mr. Nelson, because il1 the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, Judge Westfall granted Lewis summary judgment on both his claim of
an oral contract and his claim of unjust enrichment.
As previously established

n1 this Brief, judgment based on a contract

clann, as a matter of law, precludes judgment on a clann of m~ust enrichment.
Likewise, as a matter of law, judgment on a clann of wtjust enrichment precludes
judgment on a contract claim. Therefore, as a matter oflaw, Judge Westfall erred
when he authorized the entry of the Judgment, entered on May 20, 2014, and the
Amended Judgment entered on November 17, 2014.
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Judge Westfall granted Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or Amend the May
20, 2014, judgment to remove unauthorized costs from the judgment, i.e.,
postage, copying costs, and something called "Tracers People Search CSR

Investigations," costs that would never have been allowed, had Judge Westfall
actually read the judgment before signing it.
As a matter of law, the judgment could not be entered because Judge
Westfall, as a matter oflaw, could not grant Lewis summary judgment on both his
contract clam and his unjust enrichment claim. Judge Westfall could not lawfully
authorize the entry of the Amended Judgment, awarding Lewis attorney fees
and/or prejudgment interest, even assuming, arguendo, that he could otherwise
enter any judgment in favor of Lewis, which he lawfully could not do.

POINT VII
JUDGE SHUMATE ERRED IN DENYING MR. NELSON'S MOTION TO
FILE AN AMENDED ANSWER AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM.
Although a trial court has discretion to deny a party's request to file a
counterclaim, Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., supra, it is an abuse of
discretion, and error, for a trial court to refuse to permit the filing of a
counterclaim if the request to do so is filed, prior to the trial, so that it will not
delay a scheduled trial. See, East River Bottom Water Co. v. Dunford, 167 P.2d
693, 109 Utah 510 (Utah 1946).
Because Mr. Nelson filed his Motion to File a Counterclaim long before
this case was scheduled for trial, because the issues presented in Mr. Nelson's
-54-

proposed com1terclaim require the same evidence as does Lewis' Amended
Complaint, because Lewis fraudulently induced Mr. Nelson to enter into an
agreement to purchase an "exclusive" Nutty Guys route, when Lewis knew that
he did not have an "exclusive" Nutty Guys route to sell, because Lewis claims
that Mr. Nelson agreed to pay $25,000.00 for an ··exclusive" Nutty Guys route,
that Lewis knew he did not have, and thus, could not sell, yet asked the district
court to award him not the $25,000.00, less the $11,000.00 that he admits Mr.
Nelson paid him, but rather $33,000.00, less the $ 11,000.00, Mr. Nels on paid

him, and because Judge Shwnate stated that Mr. Nelson' s cow1terclaim issues
would be addressed at trial, including Lewis' fraud, and his demand for more
money than he admits Mr. Nelson agreed to pay him for an "exclusive" Nutty
Guys route, that Lewis fraudulently claimed he had to sell, Judge Shumate erred
in denying Mr. Nelson' s Motion to File an Amended Complaint.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Both Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall erred, as a matter of law, in
granting Lewis' motion for swmnary judgment. Judge Westfall also erred, as a
matter of law, when he authorized the entry of the Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Smmnary Judgment, the Judgment on May 20, 2014, and the
Amended Judgment on November 17, 2014. Judge Westfall further erred as a
matter oflaw, when he denied Mr. Nelson's Motion to Alter or Amend the Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Smrunary Judgment, and when he only partially
-5-S-

amended the May 20, 2014 Judgment. Therefore, this Court must reverse the
grants of summary judgment, vacate the Amended Judgment, and remand this
case to the district court for a trial on the merits, before another judge that is not
biased and prejudiced against Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson is also entitled to recover his costs and attorney fees incurred

in prosecuting this appeal, as provided by Utah Code §78B-5-826.

Respectfully submitted this 1711' day of March 2015.

~

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Rodney Nelson
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CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(-0(1) UTAH
RULESOFAPPELLATEPROCEDURE
I, Charles Schultz, hereby certify that this brief complies with the type
volume limitation of Utah R. App. 24(±)(1) because it is 13,671 words, as
detennined by my word processor, that is Word X3 .

Dated this 17u.. day of March 2015 .

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Rodney Nelson
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 17u, day of March 2015, I mailed two true and
copies of this to Brief Penrod W Keith, Michael F. Leavitt, and Elijah L.
Milne, at the address listed below.

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. ,
111 East Broadway, Suite 900,
PO. Box 4050 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Rodney Nelson
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ADDENDUM
Rule 26 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)Q):

Amended Complaint
Counterclaim
Order denying Counterclaim
Requests for Admission
Response to Requests for admissions
Memorandum in support of motion for surmnary judgment
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing on Summary Judgment Motion.
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

'
May 20, 2014 Judgment
Memorandum decision on Motions to Alter or Amend
November 17, 2014, Amended Judgment
Declaration of Reggie Lewis
Declaration of Rodney Nelson
Selected pages of Murray Deposition
''Minutes for ORDER TOSHOWCAUSE JSTAPPE,"
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Penrod W. Keith (4860)
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
PO Box4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500
pkeith@djplaw.com

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH,
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DIVISION
REGGIE LEWIS,

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY
DEMAND

·Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No. 120500402

RODNEY NELSON

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

Plaintiff Reggie Lewis ("Plaintiff' or "Lewis"), complains of defendant Rodney Nelson
("Defendant" or ''Nelson"), and alleges as follows:

A.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE

1.

Plaintiff Reggie Lewis is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.

Defendant Rodney Nelson is an individual residing in St. George, Washington

County, Utah and doing business in Washington County Utah and potentially elsewhere.
Plaintiff believes that the Defendant's street address is 415 South Dixie Drive #10, St. George

Utah.
3.

SLC_!D36327.I

1:'his Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 78A-5-l 02(1).

4.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to the parties' contract, identified below,

and pursuant to Utah Statute because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the dispute
occurred in this district, a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is
situated in this district, and this Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the parties as alleged
throughout this complaint.
B.

1.

STATEMENTOFFACTS

In or about December of 2010, Plaintiff owned and operated a supply route for

Nutty Guys Inc. (the "NG Route"). Nutty Guys is a business located in Salt Lake City, Utah
which distributes various comestible items to retail outlets.
2.

Plaintiff acquired the NG Route from Chuck Lamb in or about October of2009

for a total purchase price of $30,000. Plaintiff operated the NG Route continuously from July of
2009 until January of2011 .
3.

In or about November or December of 2010, Defendant approached Plaintiff

about purchasing the NG Route. After some period of negotiation, Plaintiff agreed to sell the
NG Route to the Defendant under the terms of an oral contract.
4.

The Plaintiff and Defendant had discussed a written contract and had produced a

draft written contract. That draft written contract is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. However, the

Plaintiff and Defendant decided to go forward with a "handshake" agreement instead of
executing the written agreement attached hereto. Nevertheless, the written agreement in
Section 1 and 2 accurately describes the assets to be sold and the purchase price for the NG
Route and related assets and the essential payment tenns agreed to orally by the Parties.
2
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5.

The essential tenns of the oral agreement between the parties are as follows:

(a)
The assets to be so]d by Plaintiff to Defendant included 1) the NG Route,
2) assignment of the existing account receivables and the reserve held by Nutty Guys
LLC in the approximate amount of $8,000 ('the Reserve Account") and 3) all other
inventory, accounts, business names and other good will and intangible property
associated with the NG Route. (the "Purchased Assets").
(b)
the total purchase price of the Purchased Assets was $25,000 as a base
payment plus the value of the Reserve account (approximately $8,000).

(c)
The Defendant committed to make regular payments from his commission
checks from Nutty Guys throughout the coming year with the balance due on February 1,
2012 exactly under the terms set forth in paragraph 2.1 of Exhibit 1 hereto.
6.

The Plaintiff in or about January of2011 transferred all of the Purchased Assets to

the Defendant and notified Nutty Guys of the transfer of the NG Route.
7.

The Defendant made several payments totaling approximately $11,000 from

February 2011 until May of 2011. After making the last payment, Defendant failed to make any
p~yments as contemplated by the oral agreement.
8.

Plaintiff became alanned at the cessation of payments by Defendant in the

summer of 2011 and sent Defendant, through counsel, the letters attached hereto as Exhibit 2 in
September of 2011.
9.

Defendant responded by sending the emails attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

Defendant essentially acknowledged his obligation but asked for more infonnation.
IO.

Plaintiff was confused by the response since information about Defendant's

payments to that point pursuant to the oral agreement were contained in the demand letter.

3
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11.

As set forth under the contract and after expiration of a grace period, all amounts

under the contract were to be paid by July of 2012. Defendant has failed to make payment as
required by the contract.

12.

Defendant has failed to pay and owes Plaintiff the unpaid balance of the $25,000

base payment plus all amounts obtained by Defendant from the Reserve Account. Defendant
owes the Plaintiff, pursuant to the contract, approximately $15,020, pursuant to the purchase
price set forth in the contract and additional amount for the unpaid balance in the reserve account
as set forth below.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract)
13.

Plaintiff incorporates all prior allegations in this complaint as though set forth in

this claim for relief.
14.

The oral agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant constitutes a binding contract

between the parties.
15.

By engaging in the conduct described above and specifically by failing to make

interim payments and final payment, Defendant has materially breached the payment provisions
in the oral agreement.
16.

Prior to Defendant's material breaches, Plaintiff performed fully each and every

material condition, covenant and obligation imposed upon it under the terms of the Agreement.
17.

As a result of Defendant's material breaches and threatened breaches set forth

above, Plaintiff has been severely harmed and damaged and has suffered and will continue to
4
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suffer damages in the approximate amount of$ I 5,020 plus interest and additional amount
attributable to the reserve account.
18.

Plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach of contract in the foregoing amount or

for such other amount to be determined at trial.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Unjust Enrichment, Alternative Count)
19.

Plaintiff incorporates herein each of the above paragraphs.

20.

Pursuant to the transfer of the Purchased Assets, Defendant has obtained

significant rights and property from the Defendant.
21 .

Defendant has failed to adequately compensate Plaintiff for the value of the

Purchased Assets. Based on previous sales of the NG Route, the Purchased Assets were worth at
least $25,000 at the time they were transferred from Plaintiff to Defendant. Defendant also
obtained value from the Reserve Account transferred to him by Plaintiff.
22.

Defendant's conduct in failing to pay the Plaintiff the value of the Purchased

Assets is inequitable.
23.

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to damages from Defendant in the amount of

$15,020 plus interest and any amounts realized from the unpaid value of the Reserve Account.

5
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C.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Lewis demands judgment in its favor and against defendant as follows:
I.

A judgment for damages in an amount of$15,020 plus interest and an accounting

on the balance of the reserve account or an amount to be determined at trial;
2.

A judgment for the costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with

this action and in enforcing the Agreement to the extent permitted by law or the oral agreement
between the parties; and
3.

Such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2012.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
By:

Isl Penrod W. Keith

Penrod W. Keith (4860)
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
PO Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500
pkeith@djplaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
Reggie Lewis
2416 Bonanza Court
South Jordan, UT 84095
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RODNEY NELSON
PRO SE
PO BOX 69
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
F: "(

--------- -----

WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE
206 West Tabernacle Suite 100 St. George, UT 84770
)

Reggie Lewis

COUNTERCLAIM

)

)

Complainant

Rodney Nelson

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant

)

V

Civil Number 12050'402
JUDGE: JAMES L SHUMATE

)

Complaint consists of 32 pages.
Counterclaim Plaintiff, Rodney Nelson, alleges as follows based
on information and belief.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Counterclaim Plaintiff, Rodney Nelson, (hereafter referred to as
Counterclaim Plaintiff), is a resident of Box Elder County, with
business interests throughout Utah.

Cross Defendant, Reggie Lewis,( hereafter referred to as
Lewis) ,is a resident of Salt Lake County, and appears to have
business interests in Washington County Utah.

The Court has jurisdiction over this case as the
case occurred in Washington County, Utah.

events of the

BACKGROUND AND

1.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS

In December of 2011 Lewis, Reggie Lewis, offered

to Counterclaim Plaintiff, Rodney Nelson, a business which he
represented as his sole business, named "Southern Utah Nutty
Guys".

2.

Lewis alleged

that the Route, to be sold,

consisted of exclusive rights to a designated area of Southern
Utah for

3.

f

which he was the sole distributor and owner.

Lewis made every effort to lead Counterclaim Plaintiff

to believe that he had the legal right to sell the route. Lewis
stated the contract he had with Nutty Guys was being rewritten by
Nutty Guys, and He would forward Counterclaim Plaintiff a copy,
however when Counterclaim Plaintiff request a copy, he received
no reply.

4.

Lewis's offer consisted of terms of payment and

the transfer of assets, which were noted on a piece of paper
during the negations, and

kept by Lewis for the purpose of

incorporating the agreed terms together with the necessary legal
information into a contract they could both sign to consummate
their deal.

5.

Lewis was in a hurry to sell the route due to a

new job in Salt Lake city

6.

Lewis negotiated with Count~rclaim Plaintiff to take

•
over the business and allow him to receive Counterclaim
Plaintiff's pay from Nutty Guys for a period of approximately
four months.

7.

The checks Lewis was to receive were commission

checks paid to him by Nutty Guys as though he was still working
the route, however the money was earned by Counterclaim Plaintiff

8.

Counterclaim Plaintiff worked the route and collected the

--

over____::)

~amounts and paid the money to Nutty Guys for Lewiss past due
accounts, with the understanding that for the amounts collected
Lewis would give Counterclaim Plaintiff credit of twenty five
percent of the collected money as additional payment towards the
purchase of the Route.

9.

Therefore, Counterclaim Plaintiff was to receive credit for
the

comm.J.ssion checks and the percentage of the

past due money

collected as credit towards the purchase of the business.

10.

In April 2012, Counterclaim Plaintiff met with his

______accountant

t/

~ s c u ~ i s tax~ for the tax year 2011, he

explained the terms

of the verbal agreement and his lack of correspondence from the
Lewis regarding the payments made to Lewis by Nutty Guys .

11.

The Accountant was concerned that the money paid by Nutty

Guys would be required to be claimed as income on his return or

that of his business. The actual treatment of the income as self
employment income or as payment to acquire a business opportunity
fall under two entirely different IRC Codes and application of
the tax code is governed by the type of income and expense . The
accountant agreed to correspond with Lewis and aiso research the
terms of the proposed sale.

12.

Lewis did not reply to the accountants request for

a copy of the contract of sale that had been promised as well as
an accounting of the payments and credits received by Lewis.

13.

In June of 2012 Lewis presented a Contract (see

Exhibit C )to Counterclaim Plaintiff. Counterclaim Pl aintiff

did

not sign it, and requested i t be corrected to inc lude payments
made and disclosure information.

14.

In June 2012 Counterclaim Plaintiff request an accounting of

the amounts paid to Lewis by Nutty Guys for the period Cross
Plaintiff had worked the route. Lewis did not reply.

15.
of

In July 2012 Counterclaim Plaintiff requested an accounting
the amounts paid to Lewis bv Nuttv Guvs for the period Cross

Plaintiff had worked the route. Lewis did not reply.

16.

In August of 2012 correspondence began by email .

Exhibits CA)

~

17 .

&

(See

(BJ

It was at this time i t appeared obvious that Cross

Complainant was a v ictim of fraud and most likely unlawful

conversion .

18.

Counterclaim Plaintiff never received a corrected contract,

~

the required disclosures or the payment information, therefore

never siqned a contract.

19.

Lewis attached Exhibit A,(see EXHIBIT C),to the

Complaint filed by him in Julv of 2012, which he suqqests
incorporates the contract entered into for the purchase of the
Route.

20.

Counterclaim Plaintiff would not sign the contract presented

~

( Exhibit A, (see EXHIBIT C). The contract was incorrect and lacked
the essential information required . An accountinq of the pavments
made and the following needed to be included in the contract:

(a.) A detailed explanation of the terms of the
..

contract, accurately, clearly, and concisely stated, in a
~

legible, written document to be agreed to and signed prior to any

commitment to a contract of purchase .

(b)

A

factual description of the business opportunity

offered to be sold bv the Lewis.

{c) A statement of the total funds which must be paid to

---

Lewis or to a person affiliated with the business opportunitv
seller, or which the busin~ss opportunity seller or such

affiliated person imposes or collects in whole or in part on
behalf of a third party, in order to obtain or commence the
business opportunity operation, such as initial business
opportunity fees, deposits, down payments, prepaid rent, and
equipment and inventory purchases. If al.l or part of these fees

or deposits are returnable under certain conditions, these
conditions shall be set forth; and if not returnable, such fact

shall be disclosed.

(d) A statement describing any recurring funds required to
be paid, in connection with carrying on the business opportunity
business, by the business opportunity purchaser to the business
opportunity seller or to a person affiliated with the business
opportunity seller, or which the business opportunity seller or
such affiliated person imposes or collects in whole or in part on
behalf of a third party, including, but not limited to, royalty,
lease, advertising, training, and sign rental £ees, and equipment
or inventory purchases .

. (e) A statement setting forth the name of each person
(including the business opportunity sel.l.er) the business
opportunity purchaser is directly or indirectly required or
advised to do business with by the business opportunity seller,
where such persons are affiliated with the business opportunity
seller.

(f)

A statement describing any real estate,

services,

supplies, products, inventories, signs, fi x tures, or equipment
relating to the establishment or the operation of the bus i ness

opportunity business which the business opportunity purchaser is
directly or indirectly required by the business opportunity
seller to purchase, lease or rent; and if such purchases, leases

or re.n tals must be made from specific persons (including the
business opportunity seller), a list of the names and addresses

of each such person. Such list may be made in a separate document
delivered to the prospective business opportunity purchaser with

the prospectus if the existence of such separate document is
disclosed in the prospectus.

(g)

A description of the basis for calculating, and, if

such information is readily available, the actual amount of, any
revenue or other consideration to be received by the business
opportunity seller or persons affiliated with the business
opportunity seller from suppliers to the prospective business
opportunity purchaser in consideration for goods or services
which the business opportunity seller requires or advises the
business opportunity purchaser to obtain from such suppliers.

(h)

A statement of ail the material terms and conditions

of any financing arrangement offered

directly or indirectly by

the business opportunity seller, or any person affi1iated with
the business opportunity seller, to the prospective business
opportunity purchaser; and

(i)

A description of the terms by which any payment is to

be received by the business opportunity seller from:
(a) Any person offering financing to a prospective
business opportunity purchaser; and

{b) Any person arranging for financing for a
prospective business opportunity purchaser.

(j) A statement describing the material facts of whether, by
the terms of the business opportunity agreement or other device

or practice, the business opportunity purchaser is:

(k) Limited in the goods or services he or she may offer for
sale;
(ii) Limited in the customers to whom he or she may
sell such goods or services;

(iii) Limited in the geographic area in which he or
she may offer for sale or sell goods or services; or
(iv) Granted territorial protection by the business

opportunity seller, by which, with respect to a territory or
area,

(1) The business opportunity seller will not establish
another, or more than any fixed number of, business opportunities
or company-owned outlets, either operating under, or selling,
offering, or distributing goods, commodities or services,

identified by any mark set forth under paragraph (a) (1) (iii) of
this section; or

(m) The business opportunity seller or its parent will not
establish other business opportunities or company-owned outlets
selling or leasing the same or similar products or services under
a different trade name, trademark, service mark, advertising or
other commercial symbol.

(n)

A statement of

the

extent

to

opportunity seller requires the business

which

the

business

opportunity purchaser

(or, if the business opportunity purchaser is a corporation, any
person affiliated with

the business

opportunity purchaser)

to

participate personally in the direct operation of the business
opportunity.

(o)

A

statement disclosing,

with

respect to

the business

opportunity agreement and any related agreements:

(i) The term (i.e., duration of arrangement), if any,
ofsuch agreement, and whether such term is or may be affected by
any agreement (including leases or sub1eases) other than the one

from which such term arises;
(ii) The conditions under which the business opportunity
purchaser may renew or extend;

(iii) The conditions under which the business opportunity
seller may refuse to renew or extend;
(iv) The conditions under which the business opportunity

purchaser may terminate;
(v) The conditions under which the business opportunity
seller may terminate;
(vi)

the

obligations

(including

lease

or

sublease

obligations) of the business

FACTS AND POINTS OF AUTHORITY

21.

Per the Federal Register/ Vol. 72, No. 61 / Friday, March

30,2007 / Rules and Regulations, the above disclosures,

(see 24.

(a)-(P) (vi)),
purchasers

are

from

required

fraud

and

by

law,

misleading

to

protect

prospective

representations

made

by

business opportunity sellers in the United States.

22.

FTC RULES GOVERNING DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY A BUSINESS

OPPORTUNITY

FTC

SELLER.

and UTAH

State

1.aw prohibit

sa1e~

of

business opportunities unless the seller gives potential purchasers
. -. - ··- . - -------· - - -- - - - - - - - - a pre-sale disclosure document that has first been filed with a
- -- ·-------·-·--

--·-

designated state agency.

- ·- -·-··

(see Utah Code Ann.

§13-15) ( "The sell.er

wi!l~_ subject to a statutory fine of $2,500.00 for each vio1ation
------------ -- --- -- -- ---·· --- --- -·---····-··- ---- - - - ~·- - - - -------of the statute. In addition, the seller is subject to an order to
cease and desist if the information is .not filed within fifteen
(15}

days of receiving the division's written demand.

If

the

seller violates this order. i t will be subject to a civil penalty
of $5,000.00 for each violation.
to provide the information in a

Further, i f the seller also fails
single disclosure statement or

prospectus to the purchaser at least ten days prior to execution of
the agreement or payment, then the purchaser is entitled to rescind
the agreement, to an award of attorney's fees in enforcing that
rescission, and to a

judgment for the amount of the greater of

$2,000.00 or actual damaqes")

2. Fraud, Deceit, Or Misrepresentation

23.

The Counterclaim Plaintiff asserts that the Lewis

obtained the Counterclaim Plaintiffs 1 consent to the agreement
through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by the plaintiff, and

as a result the contract is invalid.

24.

Counterclaim Plaintiff claims that Lewis fraudulently

misreoresented the Route he was selling as his business
opportunity which included exclusive rights to the sales area.
Counterclaim Plaintiff claims Lewis engaged in the elements of
fraud through:

(1) false representation

(2) His intention to induce the plaintiff to act
(4) Counterclaim Plaintiff justifiably

relied on

Lewis's stated terms and the opportunity offered.
(S)Therefore caused damage to the Counterclaim
plaintiff.

{Pyle v. City of Cedartown, 240 Ga.App. 445, 447(1),

524 S.E.2d 7 (1999).

25.

In 2012 Nutty Guys

requested that Counterclaim Plaintiff

engage in contract negations that would allow him to be a Nutty
Guys distributor in Southern Utah.

26.

Counterclaim Plaintiff has since paid to Nutty Guys of Salt

Lake City over twenty thousand dollars necessary to maintain the
southern Utah sales route, and be a distributor for Nutty Guys.

27.

Counterclaim Plaintiff has information that stipulates He

can not sell the Nutty Guy Route he still services and he also
has no right to ownership. Information provided to him during
negations and in his contract clarify the fact that Nutty Guys
does not provide for ownership of the customer list the ~cutes

distributors have and they do not allow the use of their trade

mark or any other exclusive rights to ciistrihutors. Counterclaim
Plaintiff is not an exclusive distributor, does not have rights
to the sale of the route and is in no way the owner of the route .

28.

Counterclaim Plaintiff therefore suggests the contract he

has been required to enter into~ to be able to distribute! with
Nutty Guys of Salt Lake City, Utah stands as sufficient evidence
that Lewis committed an unlawful act of conversion by offering to
sell Counterclaim Plaintiff a business that was not his to sell.

29.

Counterclaim Plaintiff sites OCGA § 11-2 - 201(1) states that

a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more
is not enforceable unless there is a written contract between the
parties .

PRAYER FOR RELIEF REQUEST FOR DAMAGES

WHEREFOR, RODNEY

NELSON,

demands judgement in his favor and against

Lewis as follows:

1.

Judgment in an amount to be proven at trial, but not less
than $17.676.46.

(A) Commission moneys paid to Lewis from January 23,
2011 through April 1°t 2012.ten thousand nine hundred fifty one
dollars and 8 cent.

($10,951.08)

records. (see EXHIBIT A)

Total per Cross Complaints

{B )The outstanding amounts collected for Lewis by
Counterclaim Plaintiff at the rate of 25% twelve hundred eighty
nine dollars and fifty cents.
(C)

(SEE EXHIBIT A)

Cost for attorney consultations necessary in this

case, three thousand dol1ars.
(D)

(1,289.50).

($3,000).

Accountinq costs for invoiced correspondence and

consultant time billed by Counterclaim Plaintiffs Accountant

$1,700.
(E) Document preparation fee,

dollars.

one thousand two hundred

{$1,200)
(F)Interest on $14,240.58, for the period of time Lewis

had use of Cross Complaints money at 5%, Compounded continuously
for the period of one year

$790.38.

(Interest fiqured at the

rate an investment would pav.(see EXHIBIT E)

2.

Such other relief the court deems appropriate.

Dated this

day of

Rodnev Nelson Pre Se
Kespeco..ve~y
~ro ~e.

SUOJ[l.l.ttea,

2013

Penrod W. Keith (4860)
pkeith@djplaw.com
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
mieavitt@djplaw.com
Elijah L. Milne (I I J71)
emilne@djplaw.com
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500
45327.001

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH

REGGIE LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

[PROPOSED} ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

VS.

RODNEY NELSON,

Case No. 120500402
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.
- - - - - - --

------ - - - - - - - - - - - - -·- - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - -

This matter came regularly before the Court on Plaintiff Reggie Lewis's Moti9n to Dismiss

Counterclaim. Defendant Rodney Nelson did not file a memorandum in opposition to this
motion. Having reviewed and considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits, and other documents
on file, and for good cause appearing, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES as

STG_l 56029I. I

~ ptermber 16, 2013 11 :03 AM
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follows:
The Counterclaim which Defendant Rodney Nelson filed in this case on or about May 8,
2013, should be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss Counlerclaim.
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Penrod W. Keith (4860)
pkeith@djplaw.com
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
mleavitt@djplaw.com
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
PO Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH,
W ASffiNGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DIVISION

REGGIE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
V.

RODNEY NELSON
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S REVISED FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION,
INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
TO DEFENDANT
Civil No. 120500402
Judge James L. Shumate

Pursuant to Rules 26, 33. 34. 36 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Reggie
Lewis, hereby requests that Rodney Nelson defendant, separately and ful.ly respond in writing, to
the Requests for Admission, Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents
hereinafter set forth, and serve a copy of such responses on the undersigned within twenty eight
(28) davs after service of said Requests for Admission. Pursuant to Rule 36, the matters
addressed by the Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted unless the Requests for

Admission are responded to with in thirty (28) davs after service of said requests .

Pursuant to Rules 33 and 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Reggie Lewis hereby
requests that Rodney Nelson answer, separately and fully in writing, under oath, the following
interrogatories and serve the answers within twenty-eight (28) days after service of the
interrogatories, and thereafter supplement the answers as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Pursuant to Ru.I es 26 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Reggie Lewis hereby
requests that Rodney Nelson respond, separately and fully, including in writing as necessary, to
the following requests for production of documents and serve the responses and deliver the
documents within twenty eight (28) days after service of the requests. In connection with the
responses, identify each document withheld or intended to be withheld from production and,
with respect to each such document, state the privilege claimed or other ground for withholding
it from production.
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

1.

"You," "your" and ' defendant" shall refer to Rodney Nelson and his affiliates,

agents, and designees as may be required by the context of any discovery request below.
2.

Complaint" shall refer to the Complaint filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court

in and for Washington County, State of Utah, c.ivil no. 120500402, brought by Reggie Lewis as
Plaintiff against Rodney Nelson, an individual.
3.

"Answer" shall refer to the answer fr ied by Rodney Nelson to the Complaint.

4.

'Electronic Storage" means the following in your possession, custody, or

control, whether on or off business premises:

SLC_ l351349.2
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a.

Networks;

b.

Computer or other information retrieval systems (hardware and software),

including systems no longer in use, sometimes called "legacy" systems;

5.

c.

Servers;

d.

Archive disks and tapes and other forms of offline storage;

e.

Backup or disaster recovery systems;

f.

Tapes, discs, drives, cartridges and other storage media;

g.

Mobile phones and paging devices;

h.

Audio systems, including voicemail;

1.

Internet data and web pages and cookies;

J.

Laptop computers;

k.

Workstations;

l.

Minicomputers;

m.

Mainframes;

n.

Personal digital assistants(' PDAs") ; and

o.

Memory cards and memory sticks.

"Electronic Information" means the following, stored or recorded on or in any

Electronic Storage:
a.

E-mail messages, including attached files and metadata ("metadata" in

this context refers to information about when an email message was created, to whom it
was sent, when it was opened, responded to and who received blind copies, etc.);

SI.C_l351349.2
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b.

Word processing documents, including attachments, exhibits, schedules

and enclosures, and metadata ("metadata" in this context refers to information about
when a document was created, who created it, who looked at it, who edited it, what
amendments and changes were made to it, who made them, and when they were made,
etc.);
c.

Spreadsheets and metadata ("metadata" i.n this context refers to

information about when a spreadsheet was created, who created it, who looked at it, who
edited it, what amendments and changes were made to it, who made them, and when they
were made, etc.);
d.

Presentation documents such as PowerPo"int and metadata ("metadata" in

this context refers to information about when a presentation document was created, who
created it, who looked at it, who edited it, what amendments and changes were made to it,
who made them, and when they were made, etc.);

6.

e.

Audio/video/audiovisual records;

f.

Voicemail; and

g.

Data and data compilations.

A "document," whether singular or plural, means all written, recorded, graphic,

and electronic materials of every kind in your possession, custody, or control that directly or
indirectly relates in any way to the subject matter of these discovery requests, and includes,
without limitation, originals and all other copies no matter how prepared, and all memoranda,
drafts, and notes (whether typed, penciled, or otherwise), whether used or not. The term
"documents" includes all Electronic Information in all Electronic Storage media. Any
SLC_ i3513 49.2
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responsive data or data compilations kept in electronic form are to be produced in paper form
where such is possible; otherwise, they are to be downloaded to disk and produced with
instructions and all other materials necessary to use or interpret the data.
By way of example only, and not by way of limitation, the foregoing definition of

"document" includes the following:
a.

Memoranda, notes, notebooks, correspondence, letters, and telegrams,

whether received or sent;
b.

Minutes of meetings or any notes taken at meetings;

c.

Contracts, agreements, understandings, commitments, proposals, and other

business dealings;
d.

Recordings, transcriptio ns, and memoranda or notes made of any

telephone communications or face-to-face oral conversations between or among any
persons;
e.

Dictated tapes or other sound recordings;

f.

Computer printouts, files, e-mail communications and/or reports, and any

information stored in a computer; and
g.

Pictures, blueprints, drawings, photographs or other photographic

representations.
7.

The term "communications" means any contact, oral or written, formal or

informal, at any time or place and under any circumstances whatsoever, by which information of
any nature was transmitted or transferred, including, without limitation, the giving or exchanging

SL.C_l3 51349.2
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of information by speech, gestures, documents, or any other means, or any req uest for
information by any such means.
8.

The term "person" means, without limitation, any natural person, corporation,

partnership, proprietorship, joint venture, association, government entity (including, without
limitation, any governmental agency or political subdivision of any government), any group, or
any other form of public or private business or legal entity.
9.

"Relating to" means-in whole or in part-constituting, containing, relating,

concerning, discussing, describing, analyzing, identifying, evidencing, referring to, or stating.
10.

"And" and "or" have both conjunctive and disjunctive meanings.

I 1.

A request that you "identify" a document requires that you describe the document

by type (e.g., whether letter, videotape or film, electronic data, voice recording, etc.), that you
state the date upon which the document was generated, its author, the intended recipient, the
identity of all individuals who received copies of the document, whether the document still exists
and, if so, its present location or custodian.
12.

A request that you "identify" communications requires that you describe the

information that was communicated, including where possible the precise verbiage used; exp lain
how the communication was made (e.g., by letter, email , face-to-face or telephonic verbal
speech, etc.); state the date the communication occurred; identify where the communication
occurred; and name the parties and witnesses to the communications.
13 .

If a document is responsive to a request for production and is in your control, but

is not in your possession or custody, identify the person with possession or custody of such
document.
S LC_ 1351349.2
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14.

If any document was, but is no longer, in your possession or subject to your

control, state what disposition was made of it, by whom, and the actual or approximate date or
dates on which such disposition was made, and why.
15 .

Singular forms of any nouns or pronouns include the plural, and vice versa.

Masculine forms of any nouns or pronouns include the feminine and neuter genders. The past
tense includes the present tense where the clear meaning is not distorted by change of tense.
16.

Documents produced pursuant to these discovery requests should be tendered in

the precise form and manner as they are kept in the usual course of business or organized and
labeled to correspond to the categories that follow in the following individually numbered
discovery requests.
17.

If you withhold production of any document or refuse to respond to an

interrogatory because of a claim of privilege, set forth the privilege claimed, the facts upon
which you rely to support the claim of privilege, and identify (by date, author and subject matter)
all documents for which such privilege is claimed.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST NO. 1:

Admit that you entered into an agreement with Reggie Lewis (the

"Agreement") to purchase a supply route for Nutty Guys Inc (the "Supply Route").

REQUEST NO . 2:

Admit that the "Supply Route" was transferred from Reggie Lewis

REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit that the document attached hereto as Exhibit I contains all

to you.

of the material terms and conditions of your Agreement with Reggie Lewis to purchase the
Supply Route.
SLC_l3 51349.2
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REQUEST NO. 4:

Admit that you never signed the document attached here as

Exhibit 1.

REQUEST NO. 5:

Adm it that there are no other terms or conditions that govern the

purchase of the Supply Route other than those contained in Exhibit l.

REQUEST NO. 6:

Admit that you orally agreed to all of the terms and conditions

contained in the document attached hereto as Exhibit l.

REQUEST NO. 7:

Admit that you agreed that the terms and conditions contained in

Exhibit 1 would govern your purchase of the Supply Route.

REQUEST NO. 8:

Admit that you agreed to pay $25,000 as a cash/base payment for

the Supply Route.

REQUEST NO. 9:

Admit that you also agreed to pay Reggie Lewis the value of the

"reserve account" estab lished by Regg ie Lewis related to the Supply Route.

REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that Reggie Lewis on or about Jrumary of 2011 transferred
all of his rights and interests in the Supply Route to you.

REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that the value of the Reserve Account on the date you were
transferred the Supply Route was approximately $8,000.

REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that the total compensation owed by you to Reggie Lewis
under your Agreement to pw·chase the Supply Route was $33,000 plus interest as specified in the
document attached hereto as Exhibit l ("Purchase Price") .

REQUEST NO. 13 : Admit that since February of201 l you have exclusively operated
the Supply Route.

SLC_ 1351349.2
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REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that you agreed to pay Reggie Lewis the Purchase Price by
regular monthly payments .

REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that you agreed to assign your commission check from the
operation of the Supply Route as a monthly payment to Reggie Lewis.

REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that you paid Reggie Lewis a total of $11,000 for the
Supply Route under the Agreement.

REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that you failed to pay Reggie Lewis the remaining $22,000
owed under the Agreement.

REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that despite demand by Reggie Lewis, you have continued
to refuse to pay the remaining amount due on the Supply Route.

REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that you have recognized through emails sent to Reggie
Lewis or his agents that you have remaining payment obligations due to Reggie Lewis .

REQUEST NO. 20: Admit that you agreed to be responsible for attorney fees in the
event it became necessary to enforce the Agreement through Legal Process.

REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that all payments under your Agreement were to be
completed by July of 2012.

REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that until July of 2012, Reggie Lewis attempted to persuade
you to pay the past due amounts under the Agreement.

REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that you have failed to respond to any request to pay the
past due amounts under the Agreement.

REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that all money received since June of 201 I due to your
operation of the Supply Route has not been paid to Reggie Lewis .
SLC_ l351349.2
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REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that you have failed to perform the payment terms under the
Agreement.
REQUEST NO. 26: Admit that you have no legal defense to the payment terms.
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that the Agreement between you and Reggie Lewis did not
contemplate the delivery of any document related to the Supply Route.
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that you have been fully accepted by Nutty Guys Inc. as the
rightful owner and operator of the Supply Route.
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that Nutty Guys Inc. did not require any proof from you of
your ownership of the Supply Route.
REQUEST NO. 30: Admit that, at the time of the Agreement, Nutty Guys Inc. tracks
the owner/operators of their Supply Routes internally and do not issue any type of
ownership/operator license.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

If you deny any of the Requests for Admission served

herewith for any reason, state the factual basis for your denial including lack of information.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

If you answer any of the Requests for Admission other

than with an unqualified admission, explain the basis for your answer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify al l individuals with whom you have had any

communications concerning the Complaint or your Answer and provide a reasonable description
of the content of such communications.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Identify all communications between you and Reggie

Lewis or his counsel relating to the subj ect matter of the Complaint and yow- Answer.
SLC_ l351349.2
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INTERROGATORY NO . 5:

Identify all communications between you and any

person, including Reggie Lewis and Nutty Guys Inc., relating to the subject matter of _the
Complaint and your Answer.

INTERROGATORY NO . 6:

Identify all individuals with any knowledge of the facts

in the Complaint.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Identify all documents relating to the subject matter of

the Complaint including those that suppo1i or establish the allegations made in the Complaint
including contracts, invoices, notes and the like.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Identify all electronic information in your possession,

custody or control relating to the subject matter of the Complaint.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

State the factual basis for your defenses set forth in

your Answer including your defense of Breach of Covenant of Good Faith, Estoppel, Unclean
Hands, Bad Faith Filing, Ambiguity, Failure to state cause of Action, Failure of Condition
Precedent, No Damage, Breach of Contract by Plaintiff, Laches, Fraud, and Frustration of
Purpose.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

Identify and describe in writing all money received by

you from Nutty Guys, Inc. or any successor, affiliate or related company, from February of 2011
until the date of this document.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

Identify the amount and date of every payment made by

you to Reggie Lewis and identify every document which supports such payments.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

Identify and describe any term or condition of your

Agreement with Reggie Lewis which is not included in the document attached as Exhibit 1.
SLC_ l351 349.2
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Identify and describe in detail every act which you

assert Reggie Lewis did to interfere with your operation of the Supply Route including the dates
of such acts.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1:

All documents relied upon by you to answer the Interrogatories

and Requests for Admission served herewith.
REQUEST NO. 2:

All documents that support your responses to the either the

Complaint or the Interrogatories and Requests for Admission served herewith.
REQUEST NO. 3:

All documents in your possession, custody or control relating to

the allegations made in the Complaint.
REQUEST NO. 4:

All electronic information in your possession, custody or control

relating to either the allegations/facts in the Complaint or your Answer.
REQUEST NO. S:

All documents you have received from any third party that relate in

any way to the allegations made in the Complaint or Answer.
REQUEST NO. 6:

All documents that support your allegations in Lhe Answer.

REQUEST NO. 7:

All correspondence or communications with Reggie Lewis or his

counsel.
REQUEST NO. 8:

All correspondence or communications with Nutty Guys Inc.

REQUEST NO. 9:

All documents of any kind which evidence money received by you

from Nutty Guys, [nc. or its affiliated, successors or related companies.

REQUEST NO. JO: All documents relating to your operation of the Supply Route.

SLC_ l35l349.2
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REQUEST NO. 11: All other documents in your possession which related in any
manner to the allegations set forth in Complaint and Answer.

REQUEST NO. 12: All documents relating to any research or due diligence you
conducted relating to Reggie Lewis.

REQUEST NO. 13: All documents you believe, intend, or have a reasonable basis to
believe you will introduce or rely upon in any way relating to this action instituted by the
Complaint or any hearing related thereto.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2013.

Penrod W. Keith
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.

SLC_l351349.2
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Rodney Nelson
P.O. Box 69
Brigham City, UT 84302
FIFTH DISTRIC COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE, DIVISION
206 West Tabernacle Suite 100 St. George, UT 84770

REGGIE LEWIS
PLAINTIFF
VS.
RODNEY NELSON
DEFENDANT

Civil # 120500402
JUDGE: JAMES L. SHUMATE
ANSWER TO REVISED SET OF REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSION, INTERROGATORIES,
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

1. ANSWER TO REVISED SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

REQUEST NO l : Admit that you entered into an agreement with Reggie
Lewis (the "Agreement") to purchase a supply route for Nutty Guys Inc (the "Supply
Route).
Deny
REQUEST NO. 2. Adm it that the Supply Route" was transferred from Reggie
Lewis to you.
Deny
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that the document attached hereto Exhibit 1 contains
all of the material terms and conditions of your agreement with Reggie Lewis to
purchase the Supply Route".
Deny
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that you never signed the document attached here as
Exhibit I.
Admit
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that there are no other terms or conditions contained
in the document attached hereto as Exhibit I.
Deny
2. INTERROGATORIES

I decline to respond to any interrogatories, as no interrogatories are permitted in
a tier I case under the provisions of Rule 26(c)(5) URCP.

3. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

REQUEST NO. I: All documents relied upon by you to answer the
Interrogatories.
None
REQUEST NO. 2: AH documents that support your responses to either to the
Complaint or the Interrogatories and Request for Admissions served _herewith.
Defendant relied on only the documents submitted by Plaintiff.
REQUEST NO. 3: All documents in your possession, custody or control relating
to either the allegations made in the Complaint.
Defendant relied on only the documents submitted by Plaintiff.
REQUESTNO.4: All electronic infonnation in your possession, custody or
control relating to either the allegations/facts in the Complaint or your answer.
None
REQUEST NO.5 All documents you have received from any third party that
relate in any way to the allegations made in the Complaint or answer.
See attached Exhibit I and 2

S I G N E D ~·
~YNELSON

DATED:~

Penrod W. Keith (4860)
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
Elijah L. Milne (11171)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-4050

(801) 415-3000
(801) 415-3500 fax
pkeit:h@djplaw.com
rnl.eavitt@djplaw.com

em.ilne@djplav,.;.com
Attorneys for Reggie Lewis
45327.001

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D[STRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REGGIE LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

Memorandum in Support
of Plaintife s Motion for
Summary Judgment

vs.

Hearing Requested

RODNEY NELSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 120500402
Judge James L. Shumate

Plaintiff Reggie Lewis submits this memorandum in support of his motion for
summary judgment against Defendant Rodney Nelson.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

A person is entitled to a judgment for breach of conh·act where it is undisputed

that he performed his obligations under a contract and has been damaged by another

sn,_111 w.:iR.2

party's failure to perform its corresponding commitments. Lewis can show that, while
he performed his contractual obligations, he has suffered damages due to Nelson's
refusal to make payments under their contract. Nelson cannot show otherwise. Is Lewis
entitled to a judgment for breach of contract?
A person is entitled to judgment for unjust enrichment where it is undisputed

2.

that he conferred a benefit upon someone who accepted the benefit while knowing that
a return payment was expected in exchange. Lewis can show that be transferred his
right to operate a supply route to Nelson, which benefit Nelson accepted while
knowing that Lewis expected payment in return. Nelson cannot show otherwise. Is
Lewis entitled to a judgment for unjust enrichment?
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

1.

Nutty Guys is a business located in Salt Lake City, Utah, that distributes

comestible items to retail outlets. (Lewis Deel. , 2 ("EXHIBIT A").)
2.

Lewis paid $30,000.00 to acquire the right to operate a Nutty Guys supply

route (the "ROUTE") from the Route's prior operator. (Ex. A 1 3.)
3.

Lewis operated the Route continuously from July 2009 to January 2011. (Ex. A

4.

At the end of 2010, Rodney Nelson approached Lewis about acquiring the

right to operate the Route. (Ex.

SfC_1715938.2
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Aftel' a period of negotiation, Nelson agreed to purchase, and Lewis agreed to

5.

sell, the right to operate the Route in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth
in a written Asset Purchase Agreement (the" AGREEMENT") that Nelson prepared. (Ex. A

, 6; Reqs. for Adrnis., Nos. 6-7, at 8 ("EXHIBIT B").r
Although neither of the parties signed the Agreement, they orally agreed that

6.

its terms and conditions would bind both parties and govern Nelson's acquisition of the

right to operate the Route from Lewis. (Ex. A

~

7; Ex. B, Nos. 4, 6-9, at 8; Def.' s Answer

to Reqs. for Admis., No. 4, at 1 ("EXHIBIT c") .)'

7.

Among other things, the Agreement states:

1. [Lewis} has owned and operated a business known as "Southern Utah
Nutty Guys" (the "Business") which is an exclusive area and route assigned to
him by the Nutty Guys LLC. The Business consists of the exclusive area in
Southern Utah and other assets described below.
2. [NelsonJ desires to purchase and [Lewis] desires to sell the Business
and related assets as described above s ubject to associated and specified
liabilities, hereinafter together referred to as the Purchased Assets" on the
terms and conditions set forth herein and defined below.
11

1.1 The Sale. At the Closing ... , [Le'vvisJ shall sell, transfer, assign and
deliver to [Nelson] and [Nelson] shall purchase, receive and assume, all right,
title, interest and liability, both legal and equitable, in the Purchased Assets, as
hereinafter defined (the "Sale").
1.2 Purchased Assets. The "Purchased Assets" shall include the assets 0£
the Business including 1) the exclusive Nutty Guys Southern Utah area and
route, 2) assignment of the existing account receivables and the reserve held by
· The Court ordered Nelson to answer all of Lewis's discovery requests by June 27, 2013. (Court's Ruling
(May 23, 2013) (on file with the Court).) Nelson has never responded to Lewis's requests for admission
nos. 5 tlu-ough 30. (See Bx. C.) Accordingly, all such requests for admission are now automatically
deemed admitted. See UTAH R CIV. P. 36(b)(l).
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Nutty Guys LLC in the approximate amount of $8,000 ("the Reserve Account")
subject to the payment provisions set forth in Section 2.2 below, 3) all other
inventory, accounts, business names and other good will and intangible
property associated with the Nutty Guys Southern Utah area.
2.1 Purchase Price. The total purchase price (the "Purchase Price") to be
paid by [Nelson] for the Purchased Assets shall be Twenty Five Thousand and
No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00), which Purchase Price shall be payable as follows
and as set forth in paragraph 2.2 below: Two Thousand dollars ($2,000) to be
paid on April 1, 2011, and then subsequently [Nelson] shall pay and assign all
subsequent commission checks received from Nutty Guys LLC from January
23, 2011 until April 30, 2011 (with all payments due prior to the execution of
this agreement acknowledge received by [Lewis]) and then subsequently
[Nelson] shall pay 30% of Nutty Guys LLC commission checks beginning May
1, 2011 until the [$25,000.00J Purchase Price is paid in full. In the event the
Purchase Price is not paid in full by February 1, 2012, any unpaid balance shall
accrue interest at the rate of 8% until the Purchase Price is paid in full. All
payments pursuant to this paragraph shall be made no later than July 1, 2012.
2.2 Pavrnent for Reserve Account. In connection with the assignment of
the Reserve Account, [Nelson] shall pay to [Lewis] the value of the Reserve
Account by delivering to [Lewis] as received all collections on accounts
receivable attributable to [Lewis's] operation of the Business arising on or
before _ _ _ _ [date seller took over operations]. To the extent the
collection and payment to [Lewis] of such accounts does not equal the value of
the Reserve Account, [Nelson] on or before February 1, 2012 shall pay the
difference between the value of the Reserve Account (approximately $8,000)
and the payments previously made from the collection of the accounts
receivable.

5.4 Default. . . In any action pursuant to a default under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and expenses including
attorney fees.

(Ex. A
8.

~

8; see Ex. B, Nos. 6-9, 11-12, 14-15, 20-21, 27, at 8-10.)
In accordance with the Agreement, Lewis transferred all of the "Purchased

Assets" (as defined on page 1 of the Agreement) to Nelson in or about January 2011.

SfC_l715938.2
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(Ex. A 1[ 9; Ex. B, Nos. 10, 13, 27-30, at 8-10.)
9.

From February to May 2011, Nelson made several payments to Lewis totaling

approximately $11,000.00. (Ex. A 1 10; Ex. B, No. 16, at 9.)
10. Nelson has not made any payments to Lewis since May 2011. (Ex. A 111;

Ex. B, Nos. 16-18, 22-26, at 9-10.)
11. Because of Nelson 's cessation of payments, Lewis's attorney sent a letter to
Nelson on September 12, 2011, stating:
Last year, you entered into an oral agreement with Reggie Lewis for the
sale of a certain "Nutty Guys" route in Southern Utah. Many of the terms of
that agreement were embodied in a writing prepared by you, including the
purchase price for such mute and the terms of purchase.
You have failed to remit payment in accordance with your obligations
under the contract. Demand is made that you submit the unpaid balance of the
contract in accordance with its terms ....

(Ex. A

i! 12.)

12. Nelson responded to this letter via e-mail on September 14, 2011, as follows:
... I have on several occasions during the past few months requested from
[Lewis] documentation supporting his figures in this matter . . . . As of this date
I have not received these items.. .. I would really appreciate it if you could
forward all applicable documents to [my accountant} and provide answers to
any questions she has and I am confident this matter can be resolved without
further frustration on either side.

(Ex. A ,r 13.)
13. On September 26, 2011, Lewis's attorney replied to Nelson's e-mail thus:

In your em.ail you requested in effect an accounting setting forth payments
made by you on the contract referenced in my September 12, 2011 letter. We
STC_1715938.2
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are surprised that you do not have this information and we also note that this
information has been sent to you before by Mr. Lewis drrectly ....

(Ex. A ii 14.)
14. On October 4, 2011, Nelson sent the following response to counsel's letter:
In your demand letter you infer that I am in breach of the agreement because I
have not made payment when in fact on August 9[,J 2011(,] I offered Mr. Lewis
a payment in full of $11,000.00. This was an amount I guessed to be due
because Mr. Lewis refused to give me the accounting I am still requesting ....

(Ex. A ,1 15.)
15. The total amount of unpaid principal due under the Agreement .is currently at
least $22,000.00. (Ex. A

ft 16; Ex. B, Nos. 8-9, 11-12, 17-19, 24-26, at 8-10.) This figure

includes $14,000.00 for the unpaid balance of the Purchase Price (as defined in
Section 2.1 of the Agreement), and $8,000.00 for the unpaid value of the Reserve
Account (as defined in Section 1.2 of the Agreement). (See Ex. A

~

16; Ex. B if 1 8-9,

11-12, 14-19, 24-26.) This figure does not include any additional payments that may be
due under Section 2.2 of the Agreement; it also does not include interest, costs, or
attorney fees. (Ex. A 116; Ex. B 1il 12, 20.)
ARGUMENT
A. Judgment should be entered against Nelson for breach of contract.

Lewis is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on his first cause of action for
breach of contract against Nelson. "The elements of a prima fade case for breach of
contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of

STC_I715938.2
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the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom, 2001 UT 20, ~j 14, 20
P.3d 388 (citation omitted).
It is undisputed that the parties entered into an agreement. (See supra Statement of
Facts ~15-7, 12, 14.) It is undisputed that Lewis fully performed his obligations under
the agreement when he transferred all of the Purchased Assets to Nelson. (See id.

1~ 7-8.) It is undisputed that Nelson breached the agreement when he ceased making
payments to Lewis in May 2011. (See id.

1il 7, 9-10, 15.) And it is undisputed that

Nelson's breach has caused Lewis to suffer damages in the principal amount of at least
$22,000.00, together with interest, attorney fees, and other costs. (See id. 115.)
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Lewis's first cause
of action, he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law against Nelson for breach of
contract in the principal amount of at least $22,000.00, together with interest, attorney
fees, and other costs. (See id. ~-15.) An evidentiary hearing should be scheduled to
determine what additional amounts Nelson owes in excess of this $22,000.00.
B. Alternatively, judgment should be entered against Nelson for unjust enrichment ..

In the alternative, Lewis is entitled to judgment on his second cause of action against
Nelson for unjust enrichment. To recover for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must
establish three elements: "(1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or

STC_1715938.2
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retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Jeffs v.

Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation omitted).
It is undisputed that the Purchased Assets that Lewis provided to Nelson conferred
a benefit on Nelson. (See supra Statement of Facts

~,r 2, 5, 8, 14.) It is undisputed that

Lewis knew of and appreciated this benefit. (See id. ,r,r 4-9, 11-14.) And it is undisputed
that Nelson has accepted and retained this benefit while knowing that Lewis expected
full compensation for the same. (See id. ~,f 4-7, 91 12, 14.) As a result, Lewis is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law for unjust enrichment against Nelson in the principal
amount of at least $22,000.00, together with interest and other costs. (See id. ,r 15.) An
evidentiary hearing should be scheduled to determine what additional amounts Nelson
owes in excess of this $22,000.00.

CONCLUSION
Because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, Lewis is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of Jaw against Nelson. Upon granting this motion, an evidentiary
hearing should be scheduled to determine what additional amounts Nelson owes in
excess of $22,000.00.

STC_1715938.2
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Rodney Nelson
P.O. Box69
Brigham City, UT 84302

rN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
)
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

REGGIE LEWIS
PLAINTIFF

vs.

)
)

RODNEY NELSON
DEFENDANT

)

Case No. 120500402
Judge James L. Schumate

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant
,...,

Rodney Nelson ("Defendant") hereby subfru.ts his Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff Reggie Lewis's ("Plaintiff') Motion for Summary Judgment.
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.
Nutty Guys is a business located in Salt Lake City, Utah, that distributes
comestible items to retail outlets. (Lewis Deel. ,r 2 (EXIITBIT A").)

RESPONSE: This statement is not disputed.
2.
Lewis paid $30,000.00 to acquire the right to operate a Nutty Guys supply route
(the "ROUTE") from the Route's prior operator. (Ex. A~ 3.)

RESPONSE: Nelson has no personal knowledge of this statement.
3.

Lewis operated the Route continuously from July 2009 to January 2011 . (Ex. A

,r 4 .)

RESPONSE: Nelson has no personal knowledge of this statement.
,....,

4.
At the end of 2010, Rodney Nelso~ lpproached Lewis about acquiring the right to
operate the Route. _(Ex, A ,r 5.)

RESPONSE: Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Memorandum is disputed. Lewis advertised
the sale of an exclusive Nutty Guys route in Southern Utah on.ksl.com. Nelson. only
approached Lewis in response to this advertisement. (Nelson Deel. 12 ("EXHIBIT D).)
5.
After a period of negotiation, Nelson agreed to purchase, and Lewis agreed to
sell, the right to operate the Route in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth
in a written Asset Purchase Agreement (the AGREEMENT") that Nelson prepared. ·(Ex.
A ,r 6; Reqs. for Admis., Nos. 6-7, at 8 ("EXHIBIT B").)"

RESPONSE: Paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff's Memorandum is disputed. Nelson and
I

Lewis prepared a hand-written contract v.¢p. basic terms of the agreement. (Ex.D ,r 910.) Lewis maintained possession of the agreement. (Ex. D

~ 11.)

Five months later,

Lewis presented Nelson with a new Asset Purchase Agreement with dozens of new terms
and legalese prepared by another party. Nelson refused to sign the new agreement and
demanded a copy of the original agreement. (Ex. D

f 18.)

6.

Although neither of the parties signed the Agreement, they orally agreed that the
terms and conditions would bind both parties and govern Nelson's acquisition of the right
to operate the Route from Lewis. (Ex. A ,r 7; Ex. B, Nos. 4, 6-9, at 8; Def. 's Answer to
Reqs. for Admis., No. 4, at 1 ("EXHIBIT C").)"

RESPONSE: Paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Memorandum is disputed. Nelson disagreed
to the terms of the new Agreement presented him by Lewis and refused to sign it There
was never an oral agreement to be bound by the terms of the new agreement. (Ex. D

,r

/\_

20.)
7.

Among other things, the Agreement states:
1.

2.

[Lewis] has owned and operated a business known as "Southern Utah
Nutty Guys" (the ''Business") which is an exclusive area and route
assigned him by the Nutty Guys LLC. The Business consists of the
exclusive area in Southern Utah and other assets described below.
[Neslson] desires to purchase and [Lewis] desires to sell the Business
and related assets as descnoed above subject to associated and specified
liabilities, hereinafter together referred to as the "Purchased Assets" on the
terms and conditions set forth herein and defined below.

1.1 The Sale. At the Closing .... , [Lewis] shall sell, transfer, assign and deliver
to [Nelson] and [Nelson] shall purchase, receive and assume, all right, title,
interest and liability, both legal and equitable, in the Purchased Assets,~
hereinafter defined (the "Sale").
1.2 Purchased Assets. The "Purchased Assets" shall include the assets of the
Business including 1) the exclusive Nutty Guys Southern Ut.ah area and
route, 2) assignment of the ex~ting account receivables and the reserve held
by Nutty Guys LLC in the approximate amount of $8,000 ("the Reserve
Account") subject to the payment provisions set forth in Section 2.2 below,
3) all other inventory, accounts, business names and other good will and
intangible property associated with the Nutty Guys Southern Utah area.
2.1 Purchase Price. The total purchase price (the "Purchase Price") to be paid by
[Nelson] for the Purchased Assets shall be Twenty Five Thousand and no/
100 Dollars ($25,000.00), which Purchase Price shall be payable as follows
and as set forth in paragraph 2.2 below: Two Thousand dollars ($2,000) to be
paid on April 1, 2011, and then subsequently [Nelson] shall pay and assign all
subsequent commission checks received from Nutty guys LLC from January
23, 2011 until April 30, 2011 (with all payments due prior to the execution
of this agreement acknowledge received by [Lewis]) and then subsequently
[Nelson] shall pay 30% of Nutty Guys LLC commission checks beginning
May 1, 2011 until the [$25,000.00] Purchase Price is paid in full In the event
the Purchase Price is not paid in full by February 1, 2012, any unpaid balance
shall accrue interest at the rate of 8% until the Purchase Price is paid in full.
All payments pursuant to this paragraph shall be made no later th.an July 1,

2012.

2-2 Payment for Reserve Account~ connection with the assignment of the
Reserve Account, [Nelson] shall. pay to [Lewis] as received all collections on
accounts receivable attributable to [Lewis's] operation of the Business arising
on or before
[date seller took over operations]. To the extent the
collection and payment to [Lewis] of such accounts does not equal the value
of the difference between the value of the Reserve Account )approximately
$8,000) and the payments previously made from the collection of the accounts
receivable.
5.4 Default. . . In any action pursuant to a default under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and expenses including
attorney fees .
.@x. A ,r 8; see Ex. B, Nos. 6-9, 11-12, 14-15, 20-21, 27, at 8-10.)

RESPONSE: Paragraph 7 of the Plaintiffs Memorandum is disputed. Due to the fact
that Nelson never signed this agreement and the fact that Lewis is unwilling to provide

/\

Nelson or the Court with the original handwritten agreement, this agreement is nonbinding. If the Court finds this agreemenfas evidence of the handwritten contract,
Nelson will respond to the following paragraphs. Paragraph l is disputed because the
agreement states that Lewis owned an "exclusive area" for Nutty Guys in Southern Utah;
however, Nutty Guys never contracted with Lewis for this "exclusive area:" (Ex. D-1 ),
and therefore, Lewis should not be able to receive value for this imaginary "exclusive
area". Paragraph 1. 1 of the agreement is disputed as there was never a closing.
Paragraph 1.2 is disputed as it again claims to sell an "exclusive area" for Nutty Guys.
In addition, Nelson had no benefit from or control of the $8,000.00 reserve account
held by Lewis with Nutty Guys (Ex. D ,i 28). Paragraph 2.1 is disputed due to the fact

that a $2,000.00 payment-was never made by Nelson. (Ex. D if28). All of statements
in 2.1 were not part of the original agreefu'ent. Paragraph 2.2 is disputed. Lewis never
transferred or assigned and Nelson never received possession or control of the reserve
account (Ex. D ,r 28). Paragraph 5.4 is disputed as default provisions including costs,
expenses, and especially attorneys' fees were never included in the original handwritten
agreement or even discussed. (Ex. D 1f13).

8.
In accordance with the Agreement, Lewis transferred all of the "Purchased
Assets' (a:s defined on page 1 of the Agreement) to Nelson in or about January 2011 .(Ex.
A ,r 9; Ex. B, Nos. 10, 13, 27-30, at 8-10.)
RESPONSE: Paragraph 8 is agreed in that Lewis provided to Nelson a list of current
customers that he had dealt with in Southern Utah; however, it is disputed because Lewis
was unable to provide the exclusive area that he had originally contracted with Nelson.
(Ex. D-1)
9.
From February to May 2011, Nelson made several payments to Lewis totaling
approximately $11,00.00. (Ex. A 10; Ex. B, No. 16, at 9.)

RESPONSE: Paragraph 9 is not disputed as to the approximate amount; however,
Nelson has requested a detailed accounting of the payments made to Lewis by Nutty
Guys and has not received a satisfactory response. (Ex. D ,r20, Ex. A-2, Ex. A-5)
10.
Nelson has not made any payments to Lewis since May 2011. (Ex. A 111; Ex. B,
Nos. 16-18, 22-26, at9-IO.)

RESPONSE: This statement is not disputed.
11 .
Because of Nelson's cessation of payments, Lewis's attorney sent a letter to
Nelson on September 12, 2011, stating:
Last year, you entered int6' an oral agreement with Reggie Lewis for the
sale of a certain "Nutty Guys" route in Southern Utah. Many of the terms of
the agreement were embodied iri. a writing prepared by you, including the
purchase price for such route and the terms of purchase.
You have failed to remit payment in accordance with your obligations
under the contract. Demand is made that you submit the unpaid balance of the
contract in accordance with its terms . . ..
(Ex.
12.)

A,

RESPONSE: This statement is not disputed.
12.

Nelson responded to this letter via e-mail on September 14, 2011, as follows:
.. .I have on several occasions during the past few months requested from
[Lewis] documentation supporting his figures in this matter. . ..As of this
date I have not received these items... .I would really appreciate it if you
could forward all applicable documents to [my accountant] and prov:ide
answers to any questions she has and I am confident this matter can be
resolved without further frustration on either side.

RESPONSE: This statement is not disptited and shows Nelson's attempt at trying to get
applicable documents for accounting purposes.
13.

On September 26, 2011, Lewis's attorney replied to Nelson's e-mail thus :

In your email you requested in effect an accounting setting forth payments
made by you on the contract referenced in my September 12, 2011 letter.
We are surprised that you do not have this information and we also note
that this information has been sent to you before by Mr. Lewis directly ...
(Ex. A~ 14.)

RESPONSE: This statement is not disputed that Nelson received this email except to
the extent that Lewis never sent Nelson a detailed accounting. (Ex. A)
14.

On October 4, 2011, Nelson sent the following response to counsel's letter:

In your demand letter you infer that I am in breach of the agreement
because I have not made payment when in fact on August 9[,J 2011[,] I
offered Mr. Lewis a payment in full of $11,000.00. This was an amount I
guessed to by due because Mr. Lewis refused to give me the accounting I
am still requesting. . . .
·
(Ex. A 11 5.)

RESPONSE: This statement is not disputed.
15.
The total amount of unpaid principal due under the Agreement is currently at least
$22,000.00. (Ex. A 1 16; Ex. B, Nos. 8-9, 11-12, 17-19, 24-26, at 8-10.) This figure
includes $14,000.00 for the unpaid balance of the Purchase Price (as defined in Section
2. 1 of the Agreement), and $8,000.00 for the unpaid value of the Reserve Account (as
defined in Section 1.2 o:fthe Agreement). ( See Ex. A 16; Ex. B 8-9, 11.12, 14.19, 2426.) This figure does not include any additional payments that may be due under Section
2.2 of the Agreement; it also does not include interest, costs, or attorney fees . (Ex. A 16;
Ex. B mf 12, 20.)

RESPONSE: This statement is disputed as it relies upon a contract that was never
signed that contradicted many of the terms of an original handwritten contract that is in
possession of the Plaintiff. (Ex. D ,T 9-iti).

*
The Court ordered Nelson to answer all of Lewis's discovery requestc; by June 27,
2013. (Court's Ruling (M~y 23, 2013) (on file with the Court).) Nelson has never
responded to Lewis's requests for admission nos. 5 through 30. (See Ex. C.) Accordingly,
all such requests for admission are not automatically deemed admitted. See Utah R. CIV.
P. 36(b)(l).

RESPONSE: This statement is disputed. The Court ordered Nelson to answer Lewis's
discovery requests in accordance with URCP 26(c)(5) that place this as a Tier 1 case
under $50,000.00. As a Tier 1 case, each side is only given five total requests for
admission. Nelson responded to the first five req:uests for admission in accordance with
the Court's order. (Ex. B)

;"'\

ARGUME1'l'f

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
/\
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there are no genuine

issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. F.R.Civ.P. 56. Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249-250, 106 S.Ct. 2505
(1986); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). "A fact

is 'material' if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the
lawsuit. ... A dispute over a material fact is 'genuine' if a rational jury could find in
favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented." McCowan v. All Star
Maintenance, Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 921, 926 (10 th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's

grant of summary judgment for defendant because _there were genuine issues of material
fact)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
.

/\

In applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmovant's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its
favor. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S . at 255. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the
presence of triable fact issues. World ofSheep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F .2d
1467, 1474 (10 th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985). At summary judgment the
court's role "is simply to determine whether the evidence proffered by plaintiff would be

suffici~t, if believed by the ultimate fact finder, to sustain [plaintiffs] claim." Stinnett
v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10 th Cir. 2003).

II.

LEWIS FAD.,S TO MEET T~ ELEMENTS FOR BREACH OF

CONTRACT UNDER ms FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

/\
Lewis is unable to meet the elements for a breach of contract action. 'The
elements for a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance

by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4)
damages." Bair v. Axiom, 2001 UT 20, 1f 14, 20 P.3d 388.
Nelson was fraudulently induced into entering into a contract with Lewis. To
prove fraudulent inducement, Nelson must prove all of the following by clear and
convincing evidence: ( 1) Lewis represented that he was selling an "exclusive area" for

Nutty Guys in Southern Utah; (2)The representation was about a presently existing fact
that was important; (3) The representation was false and Lewis either knew that the

/\
representation was false or made the representation recklessly or without sufficient
knowledge upon which to base the representation; (4) Lewis made the representation to
induce Nelson to agree to the contract; (5) Nelson reasonably relied on this representation
without knowledge of its falsity; (6) Nelson entered into the contract; (7) Nelson would
not have entered into the contract if [he] had known that the representation was not true.

It is clear from the new c-0ntract that Lewis presented Nelson that he was selling
an "exclusive area" for Nutty Guys in Southern Utah. The fact that Nelson was
purchasing an exclusive area instead of a customer list increased the value of Nelson's
investment so the fact was important. Lewis likely knew that he did not have an
exclusive area with Nutty Guys or recklessly made the representation to Nelson to induce

him into a higher price for the purchase assets. Nelson reasonably relied on the
representation in detennining the purchase price and viability of the purchase assets. The
parties did in fact enter into a handwritten agreement. Nelson has stated that he would
never have entered into the contract without the exclusive area contracted through Nutty

Guys as the purchase assets would otherwise amount to only a current customer list that
could be poached or taken by any Nutty Guys representative. (Ex. D 1 30).
In.the alternative, if the Court finds that Nelson was not fraudulently induced into
the original contract then a finding of negligent misrepresentation would be appropriate.

If the Court does not find :fraudulent inducement or negligent misrepresentation
then it should be noted that the original agreement was drafted in Nelson's handwriting

and given to Lewis outlining the terms of the agreement. After several months, Lewis
attempted to get Nelson to sign a new contract that contained substantially different terms
than the original contract. Nelson refused to sign the new contract. The new contract has
no evidentiary value except as to its use as evidence of undisputed terms of the original
agreement.
Lewis was unable to or did not perform several essential elements of the contract.
Lewis initially contracted with Nelson to sell an "exclusive area" for Nutty Guys in
Southern Utah. Lewis was likely aware at the time that he did not have an exclusive
agreement with Nutty Guys at that ti.me. Lewis was unable to provide to Nelson an
"exclusive area" for Nutty Guys in Southern Utah..

It is obvious that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to
Plaintiff's first cause of action and Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
against Nelson for breach of contract.

ill.

NELSON WAS NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED
Lewis attempts to conceal his lack of a signed contract with an unjust enrichment

claim. However, the facts do not support this conclusion. To recover for unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must establish three elements: "(l) a benefit conferred on one

person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as
to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value."

Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998).

It is agreed that the Purchased Assets that Lewis conferred a benefit to Nelson
and that Nelson knew of and appreciated this benefit. It is also undisputed that that
Nelson accepted and retained this benefit while knowing that Lewis expected full
compensation for the same. However, Lewis never conferred that which he contracted to
confer. Without the ability to confer an "exclusive area" for Nutty Guys in Southern

Utah, Lewis effectively only conveyed a list of existing customers that were able to be
poached or taken by any Nutty Guys representative. Lewis still received approximately
$11,000.00 for his customer list which seems like an extremely fair amount considering
the fact that he misrepresented the original income numbers to Nelson.
As a result ofNelson receiving substantially less than what he bargained for,
Nelson was not unjustly enriched and may have paid Lewis more than the value in which
he received.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Nelson respectfully requests the Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment to be denied in its entirety.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 27the day of January, 2014.

Isl Rodney Nelson
RODNEY NELSON
Defendant
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5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT : Thank you, everyone.

We're back on the

7

record of March 24, 2014.

The matter before the Court is

8

Reggie Lewis vs. Rodney Nelson.

9

The matter before the Court has a motion f or a continuance

File number is 120500402.

10

from Mr. Nelson first,

and the plaintiff has taken the

11

position that we don't have a problem with a continuance.

12

lies - at least as long as we can hear the motion f or summary

13

judgment, and that is plaintiff's position .

It

14

Is that correct, counsel?

15

MR . KEITH : I don't think so, Your Honor, and I'm

16

not sure if we filed a reply to MR. MILNE : I think the problem was,

17

Your Honor,

is

18

we had discussed with Mr . Nelson's prior attorney, Wesley

19

Windsor, the possibility of doing a - seeking a continuance,

20

and I believe he subsequently informed Mr. Keith that they

21

were not interested in that.

22

wi t h the hearing and with the t rial .

23

THE COURT: All r i ght.

So we're prepared to go forward

Mr. Nelson,

you are now

24

representing yourself .

Mr. Windsor has withd r awn, and I got

25

from the withdrawal that the request to this charge, Mr.
1
L _

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ _ _ __ _ __

____ J

1

Windsor , was specifically yours.

You did not want him to

2

represent you, and that you had determined that you better go

3

forward on your own .

4

somehow , sir?

Have I got that right, or am I mistaken

5

MR . NELSON : No, I believe you got it right.

6

THE COURT : Okay.

Then let's - as the Court has

7

previou s ly ruled, I determined that the motion for summary

8

judgment should be addressed first. And let me see if I can

9

lay the framework so that everyone can know what I see in the

10

case right now .

11

rights to service - a distribution area , we ' ll call it - for

12

a business called Nutty Guys , who is headquartered out of the

13

Wasatch Front somewh ere .

14

the dist r ibution area i s in Southern Utah he r e .

15

Washington County, but in other southern counties of the

16

state .

17

it comes to the Court in two different fashions .

18

as a breach of contract .

19

agreement between the par ties, and that the exchange of value

20

- the consideration for the contract has failed because full

21

payment, as negotiated between you, Mr . Nelson, and you, Mr .

22

Lewis, has never been made completely .

23

contract claim.

24
25

This case is about the exch ange o f the

Just up north we 'l l s ay , and that
Not j ust in

Now , the mot i on for summary judgment is basically Number one

That there was an unsigned

I

That's the breach of

I

I

The other claim is sort of the flip side of a
contract action.

li

An unjust enrichment is a circumstance
2

l

- - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - · - - - · - - - -- - - - ·-

l

under which, if there is not a contract and yet the parties

2

behavior goes on as though there might have been a contract

3

and one party gains an advantage unjustly - and that is an

4

interesting way of putting it - but without appropriate

5

fairness in a mutual exchange between the parties ,

6

measure of damages i s what is being proposed .

then the

Now, the motion for summary judgment is based upon

7

8

the statement, the affidavit of Mr . Lewis outlining the

9

course of conduct leading up to the exchange of the route
That ' s an odd way of putting it , but I love

10

rights .

11

allite ra tion .

12

it .

So maybe route rights is the best way to do

And then you , Mr . Nelson ,

13

in your response have

14

asserted claims at variance from the claims made by Mr . Lewis

15

in his statement in support of the motion for summary

16

judgment, and it has been your position that there are

17

justiciable issues of fact that need to be determined by the

18

court at trial .
Counsel , have I got that set up?

19
20

Mr . Keith, is

that the way you all look at it?
MR . KEITH : That is correct , Your Honor .

21

We would

22

also contend that the motion for summary judgment is

23

supported by admissions by the defendant under appropriate

24

rules that governs admissions , and that THE COURT: And -

25

and
3

1 ____ __ _____

•

-

---·-----·--

..,

________

--------

---· -1
I

MR . KEITH : - he has admitted the core part of the

1

2

case , but that is -

3

of it .

4

I think that is a fair chara c terization

THE COURT: An d, Mr. Nelson ,

it 's important that I

5

make sure that you understand that when I address what the

6

r ecord shows on a motion for summary judgment,

7

responsibility to confine myself with what is in the record

8

and the form that the record is made out .

9

there are admissions that have been placed into the record in

it ' s my

Therefore ,

if

10

response to discovery and those kinds of things ,

11

admissions are und i sputed facts that come before the court .

12

If there are disputed facts ,

13

determination is whe ther or not those facts ,

14

disputed, are material to the issue before the court .

15

!

then those

then the court ' s next
even if they're

Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

16

demands that I focus my inquiry to the existing record that ' s

17

before us now ,

18

statement - you set forth the factual framework in which this

19

transaction took place as you see it .

and , Mr . Lewis ,

in your affida vit - your

i

20

Mr . Nelson ,

21

contested certain of those facts that you believe are

22

material to the motion itself ,

23

talk about right now.

24
25

I

in your responsive pleading , you

I

a nd that 's what we're going to

I

I

Mr . Keith , let me tell you where t he Court ' s head
is in looking at these matcers right now,

I

and then I ' ll give

4

1

you a chance to argue anything addition if you think I ' ve got

2

it wrong somewhere.
The fact that we don ' t have a written agreement -

3

4

the fact that everybody is of one accord on at least one

5

point , and that is that nothing got signed, and that there

6

were things proposed back and forth, but nobody signed

7

a n ything impresses the court that this may ,

8

unjust enrichment kind of case if your client would prevail.

9

The thing that I am curious about that I ' d like you to

in deed , be an

10

address is whether or not the record , under Rule 7,

11

your motion on that theory of unjust enrichment out of the

12

affidavit that we have from Mr . Lewis , his statement .

13

supports

So counsel , tell me about that, because looking at

14

this one , I'm a lot more comfortable with an unjust

15

enrichment, and , Mr . Milne, you ' re going to take the laboring

16

war?

17

MR . KEITH : Yes , he is .

18

MR . MILNE : Thank you,

Your Honor.

19

THE COURT: All right .

Then we'll go to the man on

20

the f ar - well,

21

a far left in t h e state of Utah .

22

I'm not going to say far left .

We can ' t

have

MR . MILNE : Your Honor, on the unjust enrichment

23

issue,

I would like to turn the Court ' s attention to what

24

isn ' t marked, but is ,

25

opposit i on memo .

in fact , page 10 of the defendant ' s

5

,----·-··-------------

-------------- - - -- -- - ---

THE COURT : All right .

1

---- - - ~ - -

Counsel , give me j ust a

2

second, an d I ' ll pull it out , because I did have it mar ked

3

for the hearing _

4

i t comes up .

5

r e sponse - or which argument , counsel?

6
7

MR -

Okay .

Here ' s the opposition memo , and here

That ' s page one , two ,

MILNE : Number three - Roman n ume r al t hree .

" Nelson was n ot u njustly enriched . "

8

THE COURT: I ' ve got you .

9

MR . MILNE : Okay .

10

Well ,

Okay .
I actually wa nt t o lo ok at

the last paragraph of that s ection ,
THE COURT: All right .

11

12

three , fo ur , five -

though .

I ' ll go to t he next page

here .

13

MR . MILNE: Well , t he secon d to t he last .

14

THE COURT: Ok ay .

15

MR . MILNE : Yes .

16

THE COURT : Okay .

17

MR . MILNE : It state s.

" It is agreed that? "

" It i s agreed that the

18

p ur chase as s ets that Lewis conferred a benefit to Ne l so n, and

19

that Nelson knew of and appreciated this benefit .

20

undisputed that that - Nelson accepted and retained this

21

benefit wh i le knowi n g that Le wis expected full compensation

22

for the same . "

23

requ i red for unjust enrichment .

24

disputing that in his argument.

25

It is a l so

Those are all three of the elements that are
So my position is he ' s not

And it goes on , and it says , " However, Lewis never
6

r-·--·

--------

- - - · -------- --·---- ····-

I

1

conferred that which he contracted to confer . "

2

is an entirely different issue .

The contract

And then it goes on, nwithout the ability to confer

3

4

an exclusive area for Nutty Guys in Southern Utah , Lewis

5

effectively only conveyed a list of existing customers that

6

were able to be poached or taken by any Nutty Guys '

7

representatives ," but there's no - if we're talking about

8

unjust enrichment , there's - he admits he received the

9

benefit .

There ' s - the language regarding exclusive area

10

would be irrelevant for the unjust enrichment .

11 '

that under the contract there was an agreement as regarding

12

the conveyance of an exclusive area .

13

He's claiming

THE COURT: So , counsel , your argument to me is

14

basically that from a conceptual and logical reasoned

15

approach to the issues before the Court that there is really
I

16

i
I

no way that the concept exclusive area can have an impact -

I

I

17

can be material to the elements of unjustrnent - unjust

18

enrichment for the reason that an exclusive area would have

19

been a contract term .

20

logical dilemma, can only rule in your favor,

21

elements of unjust enrichment haven't b e en admitted , and Mr .

22

Lewis' affidavit establ i shes the facts based upon which the

23

Court can render judgment?

24
25

I

I

I

II

And that the Court , in facing the

I

because the

MR . MILNE : Yes, and the exclusive area lang u age
would be relevant to th e existence of a cont r act .

My
7

I__ -· - -·-··--· - - - ---- - -· -

'

--~--· - - - - - - - - - -

I

1

understanding is that the - Mr . Nelson claims there is no

2

contract , because either - he says that he didn ' t get this

3

exclusive area , but that doesn't mean there 's no contract .

4

That just means there's breach , and so he ' s not -

5

or otherwise he says that the contract was never signed , but

6 ,

the case law is clear in Utah that you can have an oral

7

contract .
'

This isn ' t

I don ' t

covered by the Statute of Frauds .

-

And

8

I

so to the extent he claims that we didn't convey an exclusive

9

I

area , that doesn't mean there's no contract , that just means

I

10

I

11

I

that there ' s a potential breach.

I Nelson's
12 I

I

THE COURT : Counsel , one of the things that Mr .

l

II

response brings to my mind is that damages for

13

breach might be impacted by - it sounds like a Fish

14

case, but the impact of poachers - the way he ' s put it , that

I

15

is that if there was not an exclusive area but there was an

II

16

unjust enrichment,

17

impacted by what Mr . Nelson has pled and argued ,

18

people have come in and taken over the opportunity to

19

distribute Nutty Guys product .

20

about that concept ?

21

&

Game

I
I

that the measure of damages could be

I

that other

I
'

What do you want to tell me

MR . MILNE : I would like to refer the Court to Mr .

22

Nelson ' s declaration,

which is attached ,

23

Exhibit D to his opposition

24

THE COURT: Let me get -

25

MR . MILNE : - memoranda .

I believe , as

8
! __ _ ______ - ----------- - - -•·- - --- --

-·---- -

----- -- - - - - · - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -

-

-

j

- - - - - -·- ·-1

I

1 I

THE COURT: Let me get down to it, counsel .

2

D.

All right .

3

to go?

I am in his declaration .

And C,

Where do you want

Paragraph?
MR . MILNE : Well, essentially the only language I

4
5

can see regarding - well , paragraph 30.

6

never have entered into this agreement if I had known that I

7

was not purchasing an exclusive area as I was led to

8

believe . "

9

entered i nto this agreement.

10

It says ,

u r would

So in my mind I read that as an admission that he

Regarding the excl us ive area, I don ' t

see anywhere

11

in the declaration that he states that my client failed to

12

provide an exclusive area .

13

uouring t he time that I have owned and operated the route ,

14

other Nutty Guys distributors have openly contracted with

15

customers in the exclusive Southern Otah area causing a

16

substantial loss of business ,u but that doesn ' t say that my

17

client didn ' t provide an exclusive area .

18

other Nutty Guys distributors are acting inappropriately by

19

violating that exclusive area with Nutty Guys .

20

He does state in paragraph 26 ,

That just says that

THE COURT : Well, counsel , are you asking me to

21

inf e r that if other Nutty Guys distributors are coming into

22

this te rritory that Mr . Ne l son ' s relief is with Nu tty Guys ,

23

and complaining to them about allowing other distributors to

24

come into this area , and that it ' s really a breach of a

25

franchise agreement, or something along those lines?

9

--·---' -·-- -----

·--- ---- ·-· - - ---

-

-

---· ·- ----

--·
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------- --
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'
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MR . MILNE : Yes .

1

- --- --- -- -- -1
i

I don't see anything in the

I

2

agreement - in the declaration stating that Mr . Lewis failed

3

to provide an exclusive area .

4

the exclusive area was infringed upon by others ,

5

failure on Mr . Nelson's part . But more importantly I would

6

like to refer the Court to the fact that Mr . Nelson has

7

failed to respond to our client's request for admission .

8

attached a copy of those requests as Exhibit B to our opening

9

memorandum .

10

All I see is he claims that
not by any

We

THE COURT: Wel l , and Mr . Nelson has provided it to

11

me in his Exhibit B, that is the plaintiff's revised first

12

s e t o f request f or admiss i on?

13

MR . MILNE : Yes.

14

THE COURT: I've got it right here, Mr. Nelson .

15

MR . MILNE : He responded to the first five of those,

16

and nowhere in his response does he mention any of the other

17

paragraphs - any of the other requests for admission .

18

There's no objection made to any of those .

19

enter a ruling .

20
21
22
23

The Court did

THE COURT: Establishing those facts as proven,
counsel.
MR . MILNE : Well, es t ab l ish - ordering the defendant
t o respo nd to al l of th e requ e s t s for a dmission -

24

THE COURT: Okay .

25

MR . MILNE: - and he did not do s o .
10

1

2
3

4

THE COURT: So they must be deemed proven by the
Rules of Civil Procedure?
MR . MILNE: Yes , and there has been no motion to
withdraw those admissions or to amend them .

5

THE COURT: Okay .

6

MR . MILNE : There - in fact,

it not only has - even

7

if there were a motion, however , Mr. Nelson would need to -

8

according to Utah case law - the case for Barnes v . Clarkson ,

9

and I cite to it in our reply memorandum .

That case stands

10

for the proposition that if you're going to withdraw -

in

11

order to withdraw your admission, you need to set forth

12

specific detailed facts - evidence to contradict the

13

admissions , and that's not here in this declaration .

14

nothing in the declaration that provides with detail anything

15

that specifically contradicts the admissions in our request

16

for admission , and the truth is again there ' s no motion to

17

set those aside .

There's

18

THE COURT: All right, thank you , counsel .

19

MR . MILNE : Thank you , Your Honor .

20

THE COURT : Mr . Nelson , you've been listening very

21

careful l y to our discussion .

22

chance to put your s i de forward .

23

comfortable sitting at the table with the paperwork in front

24
25

1

of you , that's fine .
use the podium,

So it's time to give you a
I f you ' d be more

That's a good mic.

But if you want to

t he taxpayers paid for that too , and you're
11

r ---------· - - - - · - -

-

entitled to use it as well .

1

MR . NELSON : I appreciate that , Your Honor .

2

I can

see better if I ' m standing , if the truth be known .

3

THE COURT: All right .

4

Well , I can talk better if

5

I ' m stand i ng up, but I couldn't practice law in my own

6

courtroom anymore .
MR . NELSON : I may have to go back there for some

7

more paperwork , but we'll start it out this way .

8

9 I

I

Your Honor ,

I appreciate the chance to stand here

10

I

as a prose litigant and defend myself agai n st these

11

I

allegations .

I

I have no legal training , nor do I profess to

I

12

I

13

I

have any complete knowledge of the law .
THE COURT: You have excellent draftsmanship skills .

14

I've read your pleadings , Mr . Nelson , and I think you sell

15

yourself a bit short .

16

I think you ' ve done a pretty good job .

MR . NELSON : I have - I have done my best to comply

17

with all the requirements as I understand them and as I ' ve

18

learned them .

19

The case goes back to the very number one piece of

20

paper in it , and that paper would be the agreement , asset

21

purchase agreement that the plaintiff provided the court .

22

Now, in my affidavit - let ' s see if I can find which

23

1

24

I

25

paragraph it is .
THE COURT: I've got your affidavit righ t here your declaration anyway .
12

---------~----- ----~----- ·----- - -·----·----~. --~--- ·-- -·----- ----··-----1

1

MR . NELSON : Paragraph nine .

2

THE COURT: Okay .

3

MR . NELSON : uAfter some discussion, plaintiff and

4

I " - we agreed to terms on the purchase of the business , and

5

I handwrote an agreement , which bo th Lewis and I signed .

6
7

THE COURT: Has anybody been able to put that
agreement i n front of us?

8
9
10

MR . NELSON : Your Honor , that agreement was given to
Mr . Lewis , and he was taking it to his uncle , who was an
attorney , to have a contract drafted .

11

THE COURT: Based upon the terms on that agreement?

12

MR . NELSON : Based upon those terms .

13

THE COURT : And you ' ve never seen it since?

14

MR . NELSON : I have not seen it , and I ' ve asked f or

15

it on several occasions .

16 ,

THE COURT: Okay .

17

MR . NELSON : If that document were to be provided ,

18

then there ' s a lot more information that could be establ is hed

19

from that .

20

it in many legal documents that I disagree wi t h the asset

21

purchase agreement.

22

th at - that I , in f act, was the drafter of t h at asset

23

purchase agreement .

24
25

I have - I've stated many times , and I have put

The plaintiff has put in his paperwork

This is false .

THE COURT: The both of you worked on it toget h e r,
as I read your af fidavit .

Is that your position?
13

MR . NELSON : We worked on the one that I signed .
2

THE COURT : Okay .

3

MR. NELSON: And there is one that is signed , Your

4

Honor, and so that should take precedent, and I disagree with

5

the one that is put before this Court today , and I agree -

6

disagree with the t erms in that .

I

7

THE COURT: Well, and you never signed it because o f

I

8 ! that very reason , if I get you right?
I

9 I

MR . NELSON : I never signed it .

I

Actually ,

it was

10

only about a month ago that I actually understood what the

11

plaintiff had put in his pleadings arguing that I was , in

12

deed, the one that drafted that document .

13
14

THE COURT: Uh-huh (a ffirmative ) , and you dispute
that whole heartedly?

15

MR . NELSON : I dispute that contract whole

16

heartedly .

17

that I -

There are , however, terms and conditions in there

18

THE COURT: You ' ve agreed to?

19

MR . NELSON : - were a part of the original agreement

20

but there are stretches in there that I do not agree with and

21

cannot agree with .

22

Your Honor,

the plaintiff would ask you to rule

23

against me due to procedural error .

I did not answer all the

24

questions in their discovery for - or I failed to answer

25

admissions .

I would say there 's been errors on both sides in
14

~--- -- ----------

- · · - ---· ---·- I

1

this case.

2

tell you for sure when the ru ling was , but it's in - anyway -

I can ' t

THE COURT: I think the order to compel response to

3

4

The reason for the ruling back in - well ,

the -

5

MR . NELSON : Yeah .

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. NELSON : The order to compel happened because

- discovery .

8

plaintiff put in their motion for discovery based on

9

bankruptcy la w.

Obviously , it was an error .

But if that

10

error is overruled or l ooked over, then so should some of

11

mine, I guess .
THE COURT: So you ' re asking - i f they made a

12
13

mistake and you made a mistake, it all o u ght to about even

14

out?

15

MR . NELSON : Maybe .

But when you go back to the

16

discovery issues and what they say that I admitted to, it is

17

my understanding that under a tier one lawsuit under $50 , 000

18

you ' re limited to three hours of deposition , f ive - it ' s in

19

here somewhere.

20

THE COURT: Let me just pull this up real quick .

21

What I 'm actually doing, Mr . Nelson , is going b ack to the

22

filing date of the complaint to find out if this was f i led

23

before we went into the new discovery rules , and it was .

24

discovery rules came into effect November 1 of 2012 .

25

one was filed in July of 2012.

The

This

So it preceded the tier

15
- - - - - - - - - -····- - - -

- -- J

1

concept coming into discovery .
And, counsel , that's your position ?

2

Am I correct?

3

This is a prior - this is prior to the tier process?

4

MR . MILNE : Then this is in 2012.

So the tier

process would apply to the -

5
6

THE COURT : Oh, it 's 2011?

7

MR . MILNE: Yeah .

8

THE COURT: Well, what ' s a year amongst friends?

9

MR . MILNE : Well, it was filed -

10

THE COURT: My apologies.

I

11

MR . MILNE: - in 2-2012, right?

12

THE COURT: It was filed in July of 2012 .

13

MR . MILNE: Yeah .

14

So we would be under the new

rules.
THE COURT: Okay .

15
16

So we're in the tier system.

My

apologies everybody .

17 '

MR. MILNE : I have a response , but I won ' t .

18

THE COURT: Oh, that's okay .

We'll let Mr . Nelson

19

go on then.

Then he ' s got - he's got something to do with -

20

and he ' s concerned that the discovery itself exceeds a tier

21

one level case.

22

MR . NELSON : Again , Your Honor , I answered the first

23

five questions of that discovery, which is - my understanding

24

- I was required t o do under the tier one .

25

THE COURT: Uh - huh ( aff irrnati ve) .
16
L.

·-·

-

-

- - - - - - - - - - - - --·- - - - - -- ···1
I

1

MR . NELSON : If tier one did not come into play in

I
I
I

2

this case , the answer six through 30 that -

3

THE COURT : They're complaining about it .

4

MR . NELSON : - the p l aintiff is asking to be

5

admitted to - if yo u read those same questions ,

6

different ways of a s king the s ame first five questions ,

7

every one of the answers to those next 24 questions would be

8

referred back to the first five .

9

they are
a nd

THE COURT: Okay .

10

MR . NELSON: They ' re - they ' re - they ha v e n ot

11

produ ce d th e document - a contract or a n y documents that I

12

can agree with - to even argue here .

13

TH E COURT: Okay .

All right .

That ' s really quite

14

clear , Mr . Nelson .

15

about it other than what you ' ve already put in - and I -

16

going to complement you again.

17

pleadings .

18

outline your position very clearly .

19

off.

20

you ' ve put it before me masterfully .

21

like to say?

22
23

Anything else that you need to tell me
I am

These are really well drafted

Your responses are very straightforward and
I don ' t mean to cut you

If there are things you want to say, I ' ll listen ,

but

Anything else you ' d

MR . NELSON : I would like to touch on the unjust
enrichment claim .

24

THE COURT: Please.

25

MR . NELSON : I would agree with that .

I believe the

17

r------·•--------····-·---· · - - - - - -

1

plaintiff has been unjustly rewarded in this case .

2

brought to this court an asset purchase agreement that he

3

calls the contract , and he has asked me to live up to that

4

contract , which I did not agree to or sign .

5

live up to the agreement that I signed ,

6

After five months of living up to that agreement ,

7

plaintiff brought to be the asset purchase agreement and said

8

here,

9

not agree with what we signed on the previous document .

sign this .

He

I did , however ,

if it was produced .
the

That is the time when I says no .

This does

I
I
II
I
I

I

10

THE COURT : This isn ' t our deal?

11

MR . NELSON : This is not our deal .

I
I

There is no

12

exclusive territory that Mr . Lewis ever owned down here .

13

through deposition , we found out tha t

14

did he ever have , a contract with Nutty Guys .

15

have anything to sel l , but he represented it in an

16

advertisement for sale on KSL . com , which I answered .

17

advertised an exclusive territory in Southern Utah with Nutty

18

Guys.

19

And

he does not have , nor
So he did not

He

I agreed to purchase , based on those facts THE COURT : Just so I get a flavor for it , Mr .

20

Nelson .

When you are servicing this area , what is it that

21

you are distributing to buyers?

22

MR . NELSON : Nuts,

23

THE COURT: Okay.

candy , dried fru it , popcorn .
The sort of th ing you walk into

24

the convenient store , and there it is?

25

MR . NELSON : Uh-huh

(affirma tive)
1,8

1

THE COURT : You don ' t use -

2

MR . NE LSON : Yo u should have seen -

3

THE COURT: - Maverick beca u se t hey supply their own

4

stuff?

But anybody who ain ' t a Maverick is fa i r game?

5
6

MR . NE LSON : Actually , Nu t ty Guys ' corp orate off i ce
went into the Maverick -

7

THE COURT: Okay .

8

MR . NELSON : - for a short period of time and -

9

THE COURT : Du ring the t i me that yo u were ope r ating

10

your route?

11 '

MR . NELSON : Yes , and t hey also had made sales in

12

t his area a nd made deliveries in th i s area a r ound me , wh i ch I

13

got no compensation for .

14

deposition of the owner of Nutty Guys , Nate Murray .

Th i s we also found out i n

15

THE COURT : Okay .

16

MR . NELSON : So it ' s not exclusiv e .

17

Now , whe n I purchased it , it was an exc lu sive area ,

18

and I had these terms t h at I had to follow to keep it

19

exclusive .

20

exp l ained to me by Nate Murray , who was a t the time the owne r

21

of Nutty Guys .

This was expla i ned to me by Mr . Lewis as it was

22

THE COURT : Okay .

23

MR . NELSON : At that time , I asked f or a contract

24

stipulating those terms .

At that time , Mr . Murray said the

25

l awyer was redraf t ing i t , and h e wo u ld get it to me .
19

1

THE COURT: But it never came?

2

MR . NELSON : It never came.

Subsequently , when

3

five months later and Mr . Lewis came with a contract for me

4

to sign , and I said I disagree with this contract , and I need

5

you to provide me wi th a detailed accounting of the monies

6

you ' ve been paid , and then we can square this all up and get

7

it taken care of .

8

received an accurate accou n ting of the monies that he paid .

9

Now ,

And to this date , Your Honor ,

I have not

I have been able to find bits and pieces that I can put

10

together with some guessing on my part, but I ca n not get an

11

a c c ur ate acco u nti n g , nor does the plaintiff provide one in

12

their pleadings .
THE COURT : Okay .

13

Anything else you ' d like to

14

cover , sir?

I think I've got your argument .

15

the same ground you did in the paperwork .

16

anything else you want to emphasize , I ' m here to listen .

MR . NELSON : No , Your Honor .

17

You ' ve covered

But if there ' s

I think - I just

18

1

appreciate your understanding of the sides of this and your

19

1

patience with me .

20
21

THE COURT: Well , you ' ve done a good job .
doesn ' t take very much patience to listen to you ,

It
sir .

22

MR . NELSON : Thanks , sir .

23

THE COURT: All right , tha nk you .

24

My job , how e ve r , gentlemen , is to issue a ruling .

25

Looking at the form of this lawsuit and the form of the
20

1

pleadings under Rule 7 as we have ,

2

motion for summary judgment.

I'm going to grant the

Now, remember , Mr . Milne and Mr . Keith ,

3

that we do

4

not issue findings of fact .

There are undisputed issues of

5

fact in the various statements and declarations as well as

6

the arguments , but - and you can include those ,

because I

I

7

I

(

want there to be a clear record for Mr . Nelson to appeal .

I

I

8

Mr . Nelson , the reason I say this is that if my analysis

I

of this is wrong ,

9

10 !r t h at .

II his

11

I don ' t

I want the Court of Appeals to tell me

think it is .

I think Mr . Lewi s is ent i tled to

recovery as he ' s prayed for .

But if my analysis is

incorrect and this is truly an unjust enrichment case ,

12

that ' s

l3

the way I read it based upon the record that's before the

14

Court , but the minute - the process goes like this .

15

will prepare a proposed order granting the motion for summary

16

judgment based upon the facts in the record as we have them

17

and the pleadings before the court.

18

then separate and apart from that .

19

responsib i lity under the Rules of Civil Procedure to get that

20

t o you at least five days, and counsel, let ' s make it eight

Counsel

There will be a judgment
Counsel has a

'

21

days .

Make sure - it ' s the electronic world ,

and sometime

rI

22 I people forget about the mailing portion , but eight days

I before

23 !

it's submitted back to the court.

Now,

in eight days ,

24

I'll no longer be a district judge .

25

but either in my capacity as a senior judge I can sign it or

I ' ll be a senior judge,

I
I

i

! ___ . __________ ----

21

- - - - ---···

r·-·--·

I

------- -------· -·- - - - -- -

I

I
1 I my successor, Judge Westfall , will receive it and be in a
2

position to put a signature on it .

In that eight day period

3

of time , you ' ll have a chance to look at what the documents

4

say that they ' re going to submit to the court for signature .

5

You can file objections to those , and Judge Westfall could

6

rule on them , or you could just look at those and say t his

7

record does not support that claim .

8

record not supporting that claim , the order should not be

9

signed , and Judge Westfall could have a hearing on it a nd

And based upon this

10

make that decision .

11

order .

12

your appeal time - that 30-day appeal time starts to run .

13

All you have to do is file a notice of appeal and the

14

security bond requirement , which i s a $300 bond .

15

with the clerk of the court .

16

Court of Appeals , but I just - I don't want you to be

17

whipsawed by the calendar running out on you .

18

look for that process .

19

the next few days , and then , frankly ,

I ' ve got to check with

20

my superiors to see if I can sign it .

Even though I granted

21

it today while I was still a real judge - when I turn into a

22

pumpkin April

23

is going to continue beyond that , especially in cases that

24

would wrap up right now .

25

have anybody else ' s fingerprints.

Or if he denied it , he would sign the

But the minute that the order is signed , that ' s when

1sc

File that

You could take it up to the

I want you to

Counsel will be submitting these in

at midnight,

I don't know if my authority

Sensibly,

it should .

It shouldn ' t

But before I did sign it,
22

,~-- - --··--- - · - - - -----

--·-·--··------ -------

--- - - -

1

I ' d check the file and look at your objections if you signed

2

them .

3

Thank you everyone.

4

We'll stand adjourned.

5

MR . KEITH : Thank you,

6

MR . NELSON : Thank you.

7

(Whereupon t he hearing was concluded)

Your Honor .

8

9
10
11

12

13
14

15
16

I

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHING TON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGGIE LEWIS,

Order Granting Plaintiff's
Plaintiff,

Motion for Summary Judgment

vs.

RODNEY NELSON,

Case No. 120500402
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

On March 24, 2014, a hearing was held before the Honorable James L. Shumate on
Plaint[fj\· Motion for Summa,y Judgment. Plaintiff Reggie Lewis was present and was

represented by his attorneys Penrod Keith and Eli Milne of the law firm of Durham Jones &
Pinegar, P.C. Defendant Rodney Nelson was present and represented himself prose. Having
reviewed and considered the pleadings, motion, memoranda, exhibits, documents on file, and
oral arguments of the parties, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby

FINDS

and

CONCLUDES as follows:

1.

All of the following material facts are undisputed:
a.

Nutty Guys is a business located in Salt Lake City, Utah, that ci~~tributes

comestible items to retail outlets.
b. Lewis paid $30,000.00 to acquire the right to operate a Nutty Guys supply
route (tbe ''ROUTE") from the Route's prior operator.

c.

Lewis operated the Route continuously from July 2009 to January 201 I.

d.

At the end of 2010, Rodney Nelson approached Lewis about acquiring the

right to operate tbe Route.

e.

After a period of negotiation, Nelson agreed to purchase, and Lewis

agreed to sell, the right to operate the Route in accordance with the terms and conditions

set forth in a ·written Asset Purchase Agreement (the "AGREEMl:NT").
f.

Although neither of the parties signed the Agreement, they orally agreed

that its terms and conditions would bind both parties and govern Nelson's acquisition of
the right to operate the Route from Lewis.
g.

Among other things, the Agreement states
1. [Lewis] has owned and operated a business known as "Southern

Utah Nutty Guys" (the "Business") which is an exclusive area and route
assigned to him by the Nutty Guys LLC. The Business consists of the
exclusive area in Southern Utah and other assets described below.
2. [Nelson] desires to purchase and [Lewis] desires to sell the Business
and related assets as described above subject to associated and specified
liabilities, hereinafter together referred to a~ the ''Purchased Assets" on the tem1s
and conditions set forth herein and defined below.

1.1 The Sale. At the Closing ... , [Lewis.I shall sell, h·ansfer, assign
and deliver to [Nelson] and (Nelson] shall purchase, receive and assume,
aJI right, title, interest and liability, both legal and equitable, in the
Purchased Assets, as hereinafter defined (the "Sale").
1.2 Purchased Assets. The "Purchased Assets" shall include the assets of
the Business including 1) the exdusive Nutty Guys Southern Utah area and route,
2) assignment of the existing accow11 recv. vables and the reserve held by Nutty

Guys LLC in the approximate amount of $8,000 ("the Reserve Account") subject
to tbe payment provisions set forth in Section 2.2 below, 3) all other inventory,
accounts, business names and other good will and intangible property associated
with the Nutty Guys Southern Utah area.

2.1 Purchase Price. The total purchase price (the "Purchase Price")
to be paid by [Nelson] for the Purd1ased Assets shall be Twenty Five
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00), which Purchase Price shall be
payable as follows and as set forth in paragraph 2.2 below: Two TI10usand
dollars ($2,000) to be paid on April 1, 2011, and then subsequently
[Nelson] shall pay and assign aU subsequent commission checks received
from Nutty Guys LLC from January 23, 2011 until April 30, 2011 (vvith all
payments due prior to the execution of this agreement acknowledge
received by [Lewis]) and then subsequently (Nelson] shall pay 30% of
Nutty Guys LLC commission checks beginning May 1, 2011 until the
[$25,000.00] Purchase Price is paid in full. 1n the event the Purchase Price
is not paid in full by February 1, 2012, any unpaid balance shall accrue
interest at the rate of 8% until the Purchase Price is paid in full . All
payments pursuant to this paragraph shall be made no later than July 1,
2012.
2.2 Payment for Reserve Account. In connection with the assignment of
tbe Reserve Account, [Nelson] shall pay to [Lewis] the value of the Reserve
Account by delivering to [Lewis] as received al.I coJlections on accounts
receivable attributable to [Lewis's] operation of the Business arising on or before
_ _ _ _ [date seller took over operations]. To the extent the collection and
payment to [Lewis] of such accounts does not equal the value of the Reserve
Account, [Nelson] on or before February 1, 2012 shall pay the difterence between
the value of the Reserve Account (approximately $8,000) and the payments
previously made from the collection of the accounts receivable.
5.4 Default. .. rn any action purstiant to a default u11der this section, the
prevailing paity shall be entitled to recover costs aud expenses including attorney
fees.
h.

In accordance with the Agreement, Lewis transferred al! of the ''Purchased

Assets" (as defined in the Agreement) to Nelson in or about Janumy 2011.
L.

From Febrmuy to May 2011 Nelson made several payments to Lewis

totaling approxima rely $1 l,000.00.

J-

Nelson has not made any payments to Lewis since May 2011.

k.

Because of Nelson's cessation of payments, Lewis's attorney sent a letter

to Nelson on September 12, 20 I

t, stating:

Last year, you entered into an oraJ agreement with Reggie Lewis for the
sale of a certain "Nutty Guys" route in Southern Utah. Many of the terms of that
agreement were embodied in a writing prepared by you, including the purchase
price for such route and the terms of purchase.
You have failed to remit payment in accordance with your obligations
under the contract. Demand is made that you submit the unpaid balance of the
contract in accordance with its terms . ...

1.

Nelson responded to this letter via e-mail on September 14, 2011, as

follows:
.. . I have on several occasions during the past few months requested from
[LewisJ documentation supporting his figures in this matter. . .. As of this date I
have not received these items . ... I would reaily appreciate it if you could
forward all applicable documents to [my accountant] and provide answers to any
questions she has and I am confident th.is matter can be resolved without further
frustration on either side.
m.

On September 26, 20 l l, Lewis's attorney replied to Nelson's e-mail thus:

In your e-mail you requested in effect an accounting setting forth payments made
by you on the contract referenced in my September 12, 2011 letter. We are
surprised that you do not have this information and we also note that this
information has been sent to you before by Mr. Lewis directly. . ..
n.

On October 4,201 I, relson sent the following response to counsel's

letter:
In your demand letter you infer that I am in breach of the agreement because I
have not made payment when in fact on August 9[,J 2011[,] I offered Mr. Lewis a
payment in full of $11 000.00. This was an amount I guessed lo be due because
Mr. Lewis refused to give me the accounting I am still requesting ....
o.

The total amount of unpaid principal due under the Agreement is currently

at least $22,000 .00. This figure includes £14,000.00 for the unpaid balance of the

Purchase Price (as defined in Section 2.1 of the Agreement), and $8,000.00 for the W1paid
value of the Reserve Account (as defined in Section 1.2 of the Agreement) . This figure
does not include any additional payments that may be due under Section 2.2 of the
Agreement; it also does not include interest, costs, or attorney fees .
2.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case.

3.

For the reasons set forth in Plaint{/]',' Mmion for Summary Judgment and the

memoranda that Lewis submitted in support of the same, Lewis is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law on his First and Second Causes of Action for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, respectively, against Nelson in the priocipal amount of $22,000.00, together with
pre- and post-judgment interest at the contract rate of 8% per annum beginning February l, 2012,
and attorney fees and costs in an amount to be establ ished by affidavit.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motionji1r

Summa,y Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

*
APPROVED AS TO FOR.\1:

Rodney Nelson
Defendant, pro se

*

*

Penrod W. Keith (4860)
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
Elijah L. Milne (11 l 7 l)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
(435) 674-0400
(435) 628-1610 fax
_pkeith@djplaw.com
emilne@djplaw.com
Attorneys for Reggie Lewis
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Final .Judgment

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 120500402

RODNEY NELSON,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

The Court, having granted Plaintiff's Motion fo r Summary Judgment against Defendant
Rodney Nelson, now hereby ORDERS, DECLARES , and ADJUDlCAT.ES as follows :
1.

Plaintiff Reggie Lewis is awarded judgment against Defendant Rodney Nelson as

foHows:
$22,000.00
$3,818.96
$864.12

2.

Principal
Interest as of Apdl 3, 2014
Costs ac; of April 3, 2014

$14,979 .50

Attorney fees as of April 3, 2014

$41,662.58

Tota) Judgment

Th is judgment, and all amounts due hereunder, shall accrue interest at the post-

judgment rate of 8% per annum, and shall be further augmented in the amount of reasonable

costs and attorney fees incun-ed in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shali be
established by affidavit.
3.

This order shall constitute the final order of the Court in th.is case, and no

additional order is necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

*
APPROVED AS TO FO RM:

Rodney Nelson
Defendant, pro se

*

*

.,. Fl L··E·o
201:0CTID PH 3: 30
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGGIE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

WA_S_HH DIS TR'ICT COURT
INGTON COUNTY

----.:...___

BY

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 120500402

RODNEY NELSON.,
Defendant.

Judge G. Michael Westfall

•.1, . .... · · - · •• ·;·:. ;

Before the Court are Defendant's (1) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and (2) Motion
10 Alter or Amend Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral

argument on the motions on September 9, 2014. Having considered the motions, memoranda,
and arguments of counsel, and being fully advised, the Court finds and orders as follows:
"Our case law is clear that where a coU1t's oral ruling differs from a final written order,

the latler controls." MF v. J.F 20 l 3 UT App 247, ii 6, 312 P.Jd 946, quoting Evans v. S!Clle,
963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998). The Court notes, therefore, that to the extent there were any
deficiencies in the prior oral ruling on summary judgment or any discrepancies between that
ruling and the written order, the written order obviously prevails.
Although Defendant now raises the statute of frauds to contest the summary j uclgmenl in
this matter, it was not previously set forth in the answer as required by Utah Rule of Civil

--·• •4 .. ,

948, (alteration in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2) (current version id . R.
36(b)(l))).
(Emphasis added.) The fact that Plaintiff may have exceeded the number of requests for
admission set forth under URCP 26(c)(5) for a Tier 1 case does not justify Defendant's apparent
decision to ignore 1he requests and hope for the best; rather, Defendant should have objected or
otherwise sought the Court's intervention on the discovery dispute prior to summary judgment.
Finally, the Court previously found that the contract al lows "the prevailing party ... to
recover costs and expenses including attorney fees." Defendant argues that Plaintiff's recovery
for postage, copying c·osts, and "Tracers People Search CSR Investigations" should be
disallowed, and the Court agrees. These items are sufficiently unusual that it seems qu ite
unlikely they were contemplated by the parties to be "costs" allowed by the contract. See

Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Walts, 2009 UT App 137, ii~ 62-63, 210 P.3d 977, 993 .

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Motion to
Alter or Amend Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment are DENIED, except as to
the costs for postage, copying, and "Tracers People Search CSR Investigations." Plaintiff's
counsel is directed to prepare an Amended Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
reflecting the change to these three items in the foregoing rul ing.
DATED this

10·

I

day of October, 2014 .

3

Penrod W. Keith (4860)
Elijah L. Milne (11171)
DuRJ1AM JoNES

& Pn~EGAR, P.C.

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
(435) 674-0400
(435) 628-1610 fax
pkeith@dj plaw .com
emilne@djplaw.com
Attorneys for Reggie Lewis
...45327.001 .................... ............................... ............. ............................ . ............................................. ...... ......................... ......... ................................ .

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REGGIE LEWIS,

Amended Judgment

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 120500402
Judge G. Michael Westfall

RODNEY NELSON,
Defendant.

For the reasons set forth in the Court's October IO, 2014 Memorandum Decision and
Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Motion to Alter or Amend Order Granting
Summary Judgment7 the Final Judgment that the Court entered against Defendant Rodney
Nelson in this matter on May 20, 2014, is hereby Ai\1.ENDED as set forth below, and the Court
hereby ORDERS, DECLARES, and ADJlJDlCATES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Reggie Lewis is awarded judgment against Defendant Rodney Nelson as

follows:
$22,000.00

$3,818.96
$610.00

Principal
lnterest as of April 3, 2014
Costs as of April 3, 2014

2.

$14,979.50

Attorney fees as of April 3, 2014

$41,408.46

Total Judgment

This judgment, and all amounts due hereunder, shall accme interest at the post-

judgment rate of 8% per ammm beginning May 20, 2014, and shall be further augmented in the
amoun t of reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in collecting said judgment by execution
or otherw·ise as shall be established by affidavit.

3.

This order shall constitute the final order of the Court in this case, and no

additional order is necessary.
IT JS SO ORDER.ED.

[The Court's signature appears at the top of the first page of this Order.]
- - - - - - - - - - - - -END OP ORDER- - - - - - - - -- - - --

Approved as to form:

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ
Attorney for Rodney Nelson

Penrod W. Keith (4860)
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
Elijah L Milne (11171)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, ur 84110-4050

(801) 415-3000
(801) 415-35Dq fax
pkeith@djplaw.com
mleavitt@djplaw.com
emilne@djplaw.com
Attorneys for Reggie Lewis
45327.oot

IN THE FIFIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REGGIE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RODNEY NELSON,

Declaration of Reggie Lewis
in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment
Case No. 120500402
Jµ.dge James L. Shumate

Defendant
The undersigned makes the following declaration pursuant to Utah Code
§ 78B-5-705.

1.

I, Reggie Lewis, am the plaintiff in the above-captioned. case, and I am at least

18 years old. I have personal knowledge and am competent to testify regarding the

matters herein. I make this declaration in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

STG_J7l6594. I

Judgment.
Nutty Guys is a business located in Salt Lake City, Utah, that distributes

2.

comestible items to re@il outlets.
I paid $30,000.00 to acquire the right to operate a Nutty Guys supply route (the

3.

''ROUTE") from .the Route's pri'or operator.

4.

I operated the Route continuously from July 2009 to January 2011.

5.

At the end of 2010, Rodney Nelson approached me about acquiring the right to

operate the Route:
6.

After a period of negotiation, Nelson agreed to purchase, and I agreed to sell,

the right to operate the Route in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in a
written Asset Purchase Agreement (the" AGREEMENT") that Nelson prepared. A true and
correct copy of the Agreement is a ttached hereto as

F.XlllDJT A-l.

Although neither Nelson nor r signed the Agreement, we both orally agreed

7.

that its term:, and conditions woulu bind us and govern Nelson's acquisition of the
right to operate the Route from me.

8.

Among other things, the Agreement states:

J . . [Lewis] has owned and operated a business known as "Sou them Utah
Nutv; Guys" (the "Business") which is an exclusive area and route assigned to
him by the N\J.tty Guys LLC. The Business consists of the exclusive area in
Southern Utah and other assets described below.
2. [Nelson] desires to purchase and [Lewis] desires to seil the Business
and related assets as described above su bjecl to associated and specified

src. 171&~94.1

2

liabilities, hereinafter together referred to as the "Purchased Assets" on the
tErms and conditions set forth herein and defined below.
1.1 The Sale. At the Oosing . .. , [Lewis] shall sell, transfer, assign and
deliver to [Nelson] and [Nelson] shall purchase, receive and assume, all right,
title, interest-and liability, both legal and equitable, in the Purdtased Assets, as
hereinafter defined (the "Sale").
1.2 Purchased Assets. The "Purchased Assets" shall include the assets of
the Business including 1) the exclusive Nutty Guys Southern Utah area and
route, 2} assignment of the existing account receivables and the reserve held by
Nutty Guys LLC in the approximate amount of $8,000 ("the Reserve Account'')
subject to the payment provisions set forth in Section 2.2 below, 3) all other
inventory, accounts, business names and other good will and .intangible
property associated with the Nutty Guys Southern Utah.ar.ea.
2.1 Purchase Price. The total purchase price (the "Purchase Price") to be
paid by [Nelson].for the Purchased Assets shall be·Twenty Five Thousand and
No/ 100 Dollars ($25,000.00), which Purchase Price shall be payable as follows
and as set forth in paragraph 22 below: Two Thousand dollars ($2,000) to be
paid on April 1, 2011, and then subsequently [Nelson} shall pay and assign all
subsequent com.mismon checks received from Nutty Guys LLC from January
23, 2011 until April 30, 2011 (with all payments due prior to the execution of
this agreement acknowledge received by [Lewis]) and then subsequently
{Nelson] shall pay 30% of Nutty Guys LLC commission checks beginning May
1, 2011 until the [$25,000.00] Purchase Price is paid in full. In the event the
Purchase Price is not paid in full by February 1, 2012, any unpaid balance shall
accrue interest at the rate of 8 % until the Purchase Price is paid in full. All
payments pursuant to this paragraph shall be made no later than July 1, 2012.
2..2 Payment for Reserve Account In connection with the assignment of
the Reserve Account, [NelsonJ shall pay to [Lewis] the value of the Reserve
Account by delivering to [LewisJ as received all collections on accounts
receivable attributable to [Lewis's) operation of the Business arising on or
before _ _ _ _ [date seller took over operations]. To the extent the
collection: artd payment to [Lewis] of such accounts does not equal the value of
the Reserve Account, (Nelson] on or before February 1, 2012 shall pay the
difference between the value of the Reserve Account (approximately $8,000)
and the payments previously made from the collection of the accounts
receivable.

STG_1716594.1
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5.4 Default .. In any action pursuant to a default under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and expenses including
attorney fees.
(Ex. A-1, atl-3, 5.)
9.

In accordance with the Agreement, I transferred all of the "Purchased Assets"

(as defined on page 1 of the Agreement) to Nelson in or about January 2011. (See Ex. A-1
at 1.)
10. From February to May 2011, Nelson made several payments to me totaling

approximately $11,000.0Q.
11. Nelson has not made any payments to me since May 2011.

12. Because of Nelson's cessation nf payments, my attorney sent a letter to Nelson

on September 12, 2011, stating:
Last year, you entered into an oral agreement with Reggie Lew;s for tlw
sale of a certain "Nutty Guys'' route in Southern Utah. Many of the terms of
that agreement w~re embodied in a writing prepared hy you, including the
purchase price for such route and the terms of purchase.
You have failed to·rcmit payment in accordancC:" with your obligations
under the contract. Demand is utadc tharyou submit the unpaid bulance of the
contract in accordance with its terms .. . .
A true and correct copy of my attorney's letter is ~ttache<l hereto as P.XHTBIT A-l,

13. Nelson responded to my attorney's letter via c-_mnil on SP.pternhcr 14, 2011, as
follows:

. . . I have on several occasions during the past few months requested from
[Lewis] documentation .supporting his figures in this matter .. . . As oi this date
s rc;. 1716594. t
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I have not received these items . . . . I would really appreciate it if you could
forward all applicable documents to [my account.ant) and provide answers to
any questions she has and I am confident this- matter can be resolved without
further frustration on either side.
A true and correct copy of Nelson's e-mail is attached hereto as EXHIBIT A-3.

14. On September 26, 2011, my attorney replied to Nelson's e-mail thus:
In your email you requested in effect an accounting setting forth. payments
made by you on the contract referenced in my September 12, 2011 letter. We
are surprised that you do not have this- information and we also note that this
information has been sent to you before by Mr. Lewis directly .. ..

A true and correct copy of my attorney's reply is attached hereto as EXHIBIT A-4.
15. On October 4, 2011, Nelson sent the following response to my attorney:

In your demand letter you infer that I am in breach of the agreement because I
have not made payment when in fact on August 9[,] 2011[,] I offered Mr. Lewis
a payment in full of $11,000.00. This was an amount I guessed to be due
because Mr. Lewis refused to give me the accounting I am still requesting... .
A true and correct copy of Nelson's response is attached hereto as EXHIBIT A-5.
16. The total amomtt of unpaid principal due under the Agreement is currently at
least $22,000.00. (See Ex. A-1 §§ 1.2, 2.1, 22, at 1-3.) This figure includes $14,000.00 for
the unpaid balance of the Purchase Price (as defined in Section 2.1 of the Agreement),
Md $8,000.00 for the unpaid value of the Reserve Account (as defined in Section 1.2 of
the Agreement). (See id.) This figure does not include any additional payments that may
be due UJ1~er Section 2.2 of the Agreement; it also does not include interest, costs, or
attorney fees. (See id. §§ 2.1, 2.2, 5.4, at 2-3, 5.)
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*

*

*

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and
correct
DATED: January

_/_Q_, 2014.
MGGIELEWIS
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Rodney Nelson
P.O. Box69

Brigham City, UT 84302

IN THE FIFrn JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY. STA TE OF UT AH

PLAINTIFF
VS.

) DECLARA T.ION OF RODNEY NELSON
) IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF 1S MOTION
)
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RODNEY NELSON
DEFENDANT

)
)
)

REGGIE LEWIS

Case No. 120500402
Judge James L. Schumate

The undersigned makes the following declaration pursuant to Utah Code §78B-5-705.
1.

l, Rodney nelson, am the defendant in the abovt:-eaptioncd c.ase, and I am ar least 18 years
old. I have personal knowledge and um competent to testify regarding the mntters herein.
make this declaration in opposition to Plaintiff'.~ Motion.for Summary Judxmenl.

2. 1n the fall of2010 1 answcrtd an ad on KSL.com by Reggie Lewis offering an ·•exclusive"
Nutty Guys di~tribution route in Southern Utah.

3. After several phone calls with Lewis. 1 agreed to accompany Lewis for deliveries on January
I, 2011.

4. Lewis explained he needed to sell the business so he could take a job with UTA in Salt Lake
City.

5. Following th_is delivery, I told Lewis that I was not intere:ned in purchasing the business, but l
would help with deliveries
6.

011

occasion.

One week later, Lewis called me and said that he had the UTA job and asked if I would take

over the route
7.

I agreed to do the next round of deliveries and subsequently agreed to take over the route.

8.

I met with Lewis at his in-laws home in South Salt Lake where he showed me how to do
invoices and run the business.

9. After some discussion, we agreed to tenns on the purchase of the business and I hand wrote
an agreement which both Lewis and I signed.

I 0. This agreement contained only basic tenns of our agreement.
11. Lewis retainc;d the handwritten agreement and was going to take it to his uncle, who is an

attorney, to draft a legal contract.
12. Due to the fact that Lewis maintained the contract, r am unable co remember the entire
contract.

13. The contract tcnns 1 do ri:membc;r 11re M follows:

•l 11gr,:ed to purchase an exclusive Southern Utah Nutty Guys djstributorship, the existing
customer base, 11nd all oth~ rights included in the business.
-The purchase was $25,000.00 .

•for the first five months following the handwritten wntract, Lewis was to rctcive 100%
of the commission ch.eeks that Nelson received through Nutty Guys.
-Any amount of the purchase price still owing following the initial five months would be
paid out by 30% of the commission checks until paid in full.
-No interest would be charged in the first year and in February 2012. any outstanding

baJance would be charged an 8% interest.
-I would receive 25% of existing accounts receivable that I l;ollected credited toward the
purchase price.

-Lewis agreed to help with any questions I had during the initial months of ownership
and agreed

10

run the route if I needed time. off.

I4. Lewis explained that the sale of the route had to be approved by Nate Murray, the owner of

Nutty Guys.
15. Murray approved the sale of the route.
16. After taking over the route, it became very difficult to reach Lewis when I had questions or
needed help.

17. In June 2011, Lewis came to my warehouse in Hurricane, Utah, to get me to sign a Nuny
Guys commission check thal had b~n written lo me by mist.ak1:.
18. During this visit, he presented me with a new contract and attempted to get me to sign it

attached hereto as EXHIBIT A- I .
19. After reading over the contract

it was easily evident that

this was an entirely different

contract.

20. I told Lewis that l would not sign the contract and he needed to get me an accurate
accounting of lhe b11hmcc remaining und proof of the

"exclusive area•· as contracted.

21. I also asked a copy of the original contract.
22. Several w«ks later Lewis te:-.tcd a dollar amount owing and demanded payment.
23. I responded that he needed to provide an accurate, itemized accounting with payments.

credits, and accounts receivable. as my figures differed substantially ITQm hi~.
24. Lewis continued to demand payment, threatened legal action. and that he would come and
take over the route.
25. Over this time. I continued to ask for an accounting, original documentation. and provide
proof of an exclusive Nuny Guys area in Southern Utah .

26. During the time that I have owned and operated the route, other Nutty Guys distributors have
openly contracted with customers in the ·"exclusive" Southern Utah area causing a substantial loss
of business.
27. On April 18, 2012, I received an email from Ryan Ollivier, an owner of Nutty Guys, stating
that I was just a sales agent and not a distributor. (Ex. D-1.)
28. At no time have I ever received benefit or control over the disputed reserve account that
Lewis held in his name.

29. I never made en initial $2,000.00 as described in the contract that Lewis tried to have me

II

sign.

30.

r would never have enrered inro this agreement if I had known that I was not purchasini an

exclusive ar¢a as I was led to believe.

I declare under criminal penolty of the Stute of Utah that the foregoing is trUC and correct.
DATED: January 27. 2014.
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1

know.

2

Q.

Okay .

3

A.

I would have hoped that he would have.

4

Q.

In the contract that you would have had

5

written between Nutty Guys and a sales rep, that

6

contract wou ld give them an exclusive territory for

7

their route?

8

A.

Mm- hmm .

9

Q.

And they would have specific criteria that

10

they had to perform to keep that route?

11

A.

Yes .

12

Q.

What would be in that contract that would

13

allow Nutty Guys to retain it in the -- in the - - if

14

the representative did not fulfi ll their obligation?

15

A.

One of them would be if they didn ' t add
Because if you had an area that

16

enough new accounts.

J. 7

had 10 million people and the guy had six accounts

18

and years later somebody else wanted it and they

19

still only had six accounts, we ' d say you have to

20

grow the area or we can take it away from you or

21

reduce your area .

Reduce it.

22

The other thing would be if there was too

23

many customer complaints, if things were not being

24

done properly, then we also retained the right to

25

pull t he area .
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1

Q.

So i f there was not a contract in force --

2

A.

Mm- hmm .

3

Q.

- - what would the options be for Nutty Guys

4

5

at that time?
Well, with no contract , I suppose we could

A.

6

jus t take an area over .

7

contract .

8

Q.

9

We don ' t h a ve to have a

We don't have to give notice .
Okay .

So at this point, you do not know of

any lega l document signed by Reggie Lewis and Nutty

10

Guys givi ng Reggie a -- an exclusive Nutty Guys

11

route?

12

A.

I don ' t know for sure , no .

13

Q.

Okay .

If production of this document could

14

end the laws uit and produce a payment to you or to

15

an ybody e lse, how long would you think it would take

16

to produce th at document , if it existed?

17

A.

Well , I would think they should be able to

18

f i nd it within an hour or two of looking , if it

J. 9

exists .

20

21

Q.

Okay.

time to produce that document if it existed?

22

A.

Sure.

23

Q.

Okay .

24
25

So two years would be substantial

MR . NELSON :

I think th at's all I have
t

questions f or at t his time .
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE
NASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF' UTAH

REGGIE LEWIS ,
Plaintiff ,

MINUTES
ORDER 'l'O SHOW CAUSE 1ST
APPEARANCE/SUPPLEMENTAL ORDERS

vs.

Case No : 120500402 CN
Judge :
G MICHAEL WESTFALL
Date:
March 3 , 2015

RODNEY NELSON ,

Defendant.

Clerk :
jamieap
No Pa r ties Present
Audio
3C
Tape Number:

Tape Count : 9 : 38/9:43

HEARING
TIME: 9:38 AM
No one is present but the Court wants to make a record of its review of the file .
Court is aware that there are two motions pending. Motion to Quash the Order to Show
Cause and Motion to Quash a Writ of Execution. Court believes that the stay which was
issued by the Court cf Appeals on the conditio n that a supersedous bond be posted that
that stay would preclude the execution provided that bond had been filed timely .
However , there is an issue as to whether er not the bond was timely filed . The bond
that has been posted is in t he amount of approximately $41 , 000 . The Court is not
reso l ving the issue of the bond but the Court has some concerns because the Court of
Appeals' decision wh ich was received by the Court on Feburary 12 , 2015, indica te d that
the Defendant was to file a supersedous bond wit h in 14 days of the date of that order

which means that it was due on February 26 , 2015 . They were to file that bond and a
Motion for Approval of that bond by the dist ri ct court . If no bond was timely filed ,
then the stay would be dissolved . The Motion was filed to appr ov e the supersedious
bond and that was timely filed on the last date that it could have been filed a nd an
objectio n to that motion was filed . That needs to be set for hearing on a civil law
and motion calendar and resolve the issue of the bond .
This Court does no t beleive that even if the stay were to continue that was issued by
the Court of Apepals that that would affect a partie s ' failure to appear for
supplemental proceedings and order to show cause for failure to appear . The failure to
appear pursuant to a court order is a totally separate and disti nct action from an
enforcement and collection on a judgment. There is a Motion to Quash the Order to Show

Case No: 120500402 Date:

Ma r 03 , 2015

Cause and tliere was a objection and this Court expected cha t the Defendant would be
here on the Order to Show Cause. Court is concerned about whether the Order to Show
Cause was properly served on the Defendant. Court reviews the file.
It is the Court's position that the Order to Show Cause is a valid, enforceable order
but it does not !lave a return of ser:vice . Court grant;:; permission to redat.e and
reserve the Order to Show Cause. If the Defendant i s served with the Order to Show
Cause , the Defendant would be required to appear and if t he Defendant did not appear
then a warrant would be issued for the Defendant's arrest . At t his point, since no one
is p r esen t and no return of service on the Order to Show Cause, the Court take no
further action in the matter. Copy of th i s minute entry to be sent to counsel.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

Rule 26. General provisions governing disclosure and discovery.
(a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule
governing disclosure and discovery in a practice area.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3) , a
party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties:
(a)(1 )(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of:
(a)(1 )(A)(i) each individual likely to have discoverable information
supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying
the subjects of the information; and
(a)( 1)(A)(ii) each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and,
except for an adverse party, a summary of the expected testimony;
(a)(1 )(8) a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored
information, and tangible things in the possession or control of the party that the
party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and demonstrative
exhibits that have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed in accordance
with paragraph (a)(5) ;
(a)(1 )(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all
discoverable documents or evidentiary material on which such computation is
based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
(a)(1 )(D) a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to
satisfy part or all of a judgment or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made
to satisfy the judgment; and
(a)(1 )(E) a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.
(a)(2) Timing of initial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph
(a)(1) shall be served on the other parties:
(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after filing of the first answer to the
complaint; and
(a)(2)(B) by the defendant within 42 days after filing of the first answer to the
complaint or within 28 days after that defendant's appearance, whichever is later.
(a)(3) Exemptions.
(a)(3)(A) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties,
the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) do not apply to actions:
(a)(3)(A)(i) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making
proceedings of an administrative agency;
(a)(3)(A)(ii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C ;
(a)(3)(A)(iii) to enforce an arbitration award;

(a)(3)(A)(iv) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4,
Determination of Water Rights.
(a)(3)(8) In an exempt action , the matters subject to disclosure under
paragraph (a)(1) are subject to discovery under paragraph (b).
(a)(4) Expert testimony.
(a)(4)(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a
discovery request, serve on the other parties the following information regarding
any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) the expert's name and qualifications,
including a list of all publications authored within the preceding 10 years, and a
list of any other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to
which the witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other information that will
be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the
compensation to be paid for the witness's study and testimony.
(a)(4)(B) Limits on expert discovery. Further discovery may be obtained
from an expert witness either by deposition or by written report. A deposition shall
not exceed four hours and the party taking the deposition shall pay the expert's
reasonable hourly fees for attendance at the deposition. A report shall be signed
by the expert and shall contain a comp lete statement of all opinions the expert
will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for them. Such an expert may not
testify in a party's case-in-chief concerning any matter not fairly disclosed in the
report. The party offering the expert shall pay the costs for the report.
(a)(4)(C) Timing for expert discovery.
(a)(4)(C)(i) The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which
expert testimony is offered shall serve on the other parties the information
required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of fact
discovery. Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may
serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph
(a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The
deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties,
within 28 days after the election is served on the other parties . If no election is
served on the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be
permitted.
(a)(4)(C)(ii) The party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue
for which expert testimony is offered shall serve on the other parties the
information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later
of (A) the date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or

(B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the expert's deposition
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i). Within seven days thereafter, the party
opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of the
expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(8) and Rule 30, or a written report
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(8). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall
be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on
the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further
discovery of the expert shall be permitted .
(a)(4)(C)(iii) If the party who bears the burden of proof on an issue wants
to designate rebuttal expert witnesses it shall serve on the other parties the
information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later
of (A) the date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii) is due, or
(B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the expert's deposition
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii). Within seven days thereafter, the party
opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of th~_
expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall
be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on
the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further
discovery of the expert shall be permitted.
(a)(4)(D) Multiparty actions. In multiparty actions, all parties opposing the
expert must agree on either a report or a deposition. If all parties opposing the
expert do not agree, then further discovery of the expert may be obtained only by
deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30.
(a)(4)(E) Summary of non-retained expert testimony. If a party intends to
present evidence at trial under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence from any
person other than an expert witness who is retained or specially employed to
provide testimony in the case or a person whose duties as an employee of the
party regularly involve giving expert testimony, that party must serve on the other
parties a written summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
expected to testify in accordance with the deadlines set forth in paragraph
(a)(4)(C). A deposition of such a witness may not exceed four hours.
(a)(S) Pretrial disclosures.
(a)(S)(A) A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the
other parties:
(a)(S)(A)(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and
telephone number of each witness, unless solely for impeachment, separately
identifying witnesses the party will call and witnesses the party may call;

(a)(5)(A)(ii) the name of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be
presented by transcript of a deposition and a copy of the transcript with the
proposed testimony designated; and
(a)(5)(A)(iii) a copy of each exhibit, including charts, summaries and
oemonstrative exhibits, unless solely for impeachment, separately identifying
those which the party will offer and those which the party may offer.
(a)(5)(8) Disclosure requi red by paragraph (a)(S) shall be served on the other
parties at least 28 days before trial. At least 14 days before trial, a party shall
serve and file counter designations of deposition testimony, objections and
grounds for the objections to the use of a deposition and to the admissibility of
exhibits. Other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, objections not listed are waived unless excused by the court for good
cause.
(b) Discovery scope.
(b)(1) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged , which is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards
of proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable or
admissible in any proceeding of any kind or character include all information in any
form provided during and created specifically as part of a request for an
investigation, the investigation , findings , or conclusions of peer review, care review,
or quality assurance processes of any organization of health care providers as
defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act for the purpose of evaluating care
provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to improve the quality of medical care,
or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics, competence, or professional conduct
of any health care provider.
(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if:
(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' resources , the
importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues;
(b)(2)(8) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or
expense;
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and
will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case;
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative;
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is more
conven ient, less burdensome or less expensive; and

(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to
obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the parties'
relative access to the information.
(b)(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing
proportionality and relevance. To ensure proportionality, the court may enter orders
under Rule 37.
(b)(4) Electronically stored information. A party claiming that electronically
stored information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost
shall describe the source of the electronically stored information, the nature and
extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and any other
information that will enable other parties to evaluate the claim.
(b)(S) Trial preparation materials. A party may obtain otherwise discoverable
documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or
for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the p~'s
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials and that the party
is unable without undue hardship to obtain substantially equivalent materials by
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials, the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party.
(b)(6) Statement previously made about the action. A party may obtain without
the showing required in paragraph (b)(S) a statement concerning the action or its
subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party
may obtain without the required showing a statement about the action or its subject
matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may
move for a court order under Rule 37. A statement previously made is (A) a written
statement signed or approved by the person making it, or (8) a stenographic,
mechanical, electronic, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and
contemporaneously recorded.
(b)(7) Trial preparation; experts.
(b)(?)(A) Trial-preparation protection for draft reports or disclosures.
Paragraph (b)(S) protects drafts of any report or disclosure required under
paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.
(b)(7)(B) Trial-preparation protection for communications between a
party's attorney and expert witnesses. Paragraph (b)(5) protects
commun ications between the party's attorney and any witness required to
provide disclosures under paragraph (a)( 4 ), regardless of the form of the
communications, except to the extent that the communications :
(b)(7)( B)(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;

(b)(?)(B)(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that
the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or
(b)(?)(B)(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and
that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.
(b)(?)(C) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party
may not, by interrogatories or otherwise, discover facts known or opinions held
by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called
as a witness at trial. A party may do so only:
(b)(?)(C)(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or
(b)(?)(C)(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by
other means.
(b)~B) cfaims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials. ~
(b)(8)(A) Information withheld. If a party withholds discoverable information by
claiming that it is privileged or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents,
communications, or things not produced in a manner that, without revealing the
information itself, will enable other parties to evaluate the claim .
(b)(8)(B) Information produced. If a party produces information that the party
claims is privileged or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial , the producing
party may notify any receiving party of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until
the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly present the information to the
court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the
information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The
producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
(c) Methods, sequence and timing of discovery; tiers; limits on standard
discovery; extraordinary discovery.

(c)(1) Methods of discovery. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the
following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land
or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental
examinations; requests for admission; and subpoenas other than for a court hearing
or trial.
(c)(2) Sequence and timing of discovery. Methods of discovery may be used in
any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery shall not delay any
other party's discovery. Except for cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party

may not seek discovery from any source before that party's initial disclosure
obligations are satisfied.
(c)(3) Definition of tiers for standard discovery. Actions claiming $50,000 or
less in damages are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 1. Actions
claiming more than $50,000 and less than $300,000 in damages are permitted
standard discovery as described for Tier 2. Actions claiming $300,000 or more in
damages are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 3. Absent an
accompanying damage claim for more than $300,000, actions claiming nonmonetary relief are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2.
(c)(4) Definition of damages. For purposes of determining standard discovery,
the amount of damages includes the total of all monetary damages sought (without
duplication for alternative theories) by all parties in all claims for relief in the original
pleadings.
(c)(S) Limits on st~ndard fact discovery. Standard fact discovery per siq~--(plaintiffs collectively, defendants collectively, and third-party defendants collectively)
in each tier is as follows . The days to complete standard fact discovery are
calculated from the date the first defendant's first disclosure is due and do not
include expert discovery under paragraphs(a)(4)(C) and (D).

Tier

Amount of
Damages
$50,000 or
less

Total Fact
Deposition
Hours

Days to
Complete

Rule 33
Interrogatories

Rule 34
Requests

Rule 36
Requests

including all
discrete subparts

for
Production

for
Admission

Standard
Fact
Discovery

3

0

5

5

120

2

less than
$300,000 or
nonmonetary
relief

15

10

10

10

180

3

$300 ,000 or
more

30

20

20

20

210

1

More than
$50,000 and

(c)(6) Extraordinary discovery. To obtain discovery beyond the limits
established in paragraph (c)(S) , a party shall file:

(c)(6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits
of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a stipulated statement that
extraordinary discovery is necessary and proportional under paragraph (b )(2)
and that each party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget; or
(c)(6)(B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits
of standard discovery imposed by these rules , a motion for extraordinary
discovery setting forth the reasons why the extraordinary discovery is necessary
and proportional under paragraph (b)(2) and certifying that the party has
rev iewed and approved a discovery budget and certifying that the party has in
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the other party in an effort to
achieve a stipulation.
(d) Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response by an
organization; failure to disclose; initial and supplemental disclosures and
responses.

(d)(1) A party shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the
information then known or reasonably available to the party.
(d)(2) If the party providing disclosure or responding to discovery is a corporation,
partnership, association, or governmental agency, the party shall act through one or
more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons, who shall make
disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or
reasonably available to the party.
(d)(3) A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because the
party has not completed investigating the case or because the party challenges the
sufficiency of another party's disclosures or responses or because another party has
not made disclosures or responses.
(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response
to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or material
at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause
for the failure.
(d)(S) If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect in
some important way, the party must timely serve on the other parties the additional
or correct information if it has not been made known to the other parties. The
supplemental disclosure or response must state why the additional or correct
information was not previously provided.
(e) Signing discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every disclosure,
request for discovery, response to a request for discovery and objection to a request for
discovery shall be in writing and signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party
if the party is not represented . The signature of the attorney or party is a certification
under Rule 11 . If a request or response is not signed, the receiving party does not need
to take any action with respect to it. If a certification is made in violation of the rule , the

court , upon motion or upon its own initiative , may take any action authorized by Rule 11
or Rule 37(e).
(f) Filing. Except as requ ired by these rules or ordered by the court, a party shall not
file with the court a disclosure, a request for discovery or a response to a request for
discovery, but shall file only the certificate of service stating that the disclosure, request
for discovery or response has been served on the other parties and the date of service.

Advisory Committee Notes
Legislative Note

78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jmisdiction.
(l) Tbe Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue al1 extraordjnary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to cany into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from fonnal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engmeer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile cmuts;
(d) interlocutmy appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a fiJ"st degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constihiting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital
felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinmy writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree
or capita] felony ;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support,
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transfen-ed to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
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Document Title

Entry Date

Page Number

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

07/02/2012
07/06/2012
09/10/2012

1
21
41

09/27/2012
09/27/2012
10/18/2012
12/1712012
12/17/2012
01/02/2013

44

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
SUMMONS ON RETURN upon RODNEY J. NELSON for
Motion to Dismiss - ROONEY NELSON
Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss
REPLY RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
REQUEST/NOTICE TO SUBMIT
RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION
Court's Ruling on Motion to Dismiss: Motion denied. Defendant has 20 days to file
an answer.
Request for Documents
Proof of Service
Answer to Complaint - RODNEY NELSON
ADVISORY NOTICE OF DISCOVERY COMPLETION DATES UNDER UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE {URCP RULE 26)
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE FOR PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS
RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE FOR PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY TO DEFENDANT
RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION
Objection lo Plalntiffs First Set of Requests For Admission, Interrogatories, and
Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant
Certificate of Mailing/Service for Plaintiff's Revised First Set of Discovery to
Defendant
Reply Response lo Objection to Discovery
Retum of Electronic Notification
Counterclaim
LEWIS
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim - REGGIE
RequesVNotice to Submit
Return of Electronic Notification
Return of Electronic Notffica\\on
Court's Ruling on Request to Submit for Decision: Objections are overruled.
Defendant must answer/respond to all discovery by 6127/13.
Certificate of Service Defendants Answer to Revised Set Admissions, Request for
Documents and Interrogatories
·
·
Motion for Leave of the Court to File Amended Counterclaim as Compulsory
Counterclaim and Memorandum in Support of Compulsory Counterclaim RODNEY NELSON
Certificate of Service
Objection to Motion to Amend Counterclaim
Return of Electronic Notification
Response to Objection to Motion \o Amended Counterclaim
Certffrcate of Service Response to Objection to Motion to Amended Counterclalm
Feb 2, 2015
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45

54
58

60
62

01/25/2013
-01/2512013
01/25/2013

64

01/25/2013

72

03/01/2013

73

03/01/2013
03/22/2013

74
76

03/22/2013
04/22/2013

77

05/06/2013

82

05/06/2013
05/06/2013
05/08/2013
05/21/2013
05/21/2013
05/21/2013
05/21/2013
05/23/2013

83

65
67

79

109

111
141
145
148
150
152

06/27/2013

154

06/28/2013

155

06/28/2013
07/09/2013
07/09/2013
07/25(2013
07/25/2013

156
157
195

197
201
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Request to Submit (motion for leave to fife amended counterclaim)
MOTIONS HEARING
RequesUNolice to Submit for Decision {re: Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim]
Order (Proposed) Granting Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim
Return of Electronic Notification

07/29/2013
OB/16(2013
09/11/2013
09/11/2013
09/11/2013
09/12/2013
09/16/2013
09/16/2013

MOTION HEARING
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim
Return of Electronic Notification
Nollc:e of Entry of Order
Return of Electronic Notification
Order {Proposed) Denying Defendants Motion to Amend and Granting Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss
Return of Electronic Notification
Order Denying Defendants Motion to Amend and Granllng Plaintiffs Motion to
Dismiss
Return of Electronic Notificafon
Notice of Entry of Order
Return of Electronic Notification
Notice for Case 120500402 ID 15542660
Objection to Proposed Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Amend and Granting
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss
Objection to Defendants Proposed Order
Response to Objection to Courts Order
Order (Proposed) Sustaining Plaintiffs Objection and Overruling Defendants
Objection
Return of Electronic Notification
Order Sustafning Plaintiffs Objection and Overruling Defendants Objeclion
Return of Electronic Notification
Notice of Entry of Order Sustaining Plaintiffs Objection and Overruling Defendants
Objection
Return of Electronic Notffication
Appearance of Counsel Notice of Appearance of Counsel
Return of Electronic Notification
Certificate of Service for Plaintiffs Pretrial Disclosures
Return of Electronic Notification
Motion Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Hearing Requested) • REGGIE
LEWIS
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Hearing
Requested)
Return of Electronic Notification
Motion for Postponement of Trial• REGGIE
LEWIS
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Postponement of Trial
Order {Proposed) Postponing Trial
Feb 2, 2015
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Page Number
202

204
205
207
210
212
213

216
218

09/23/2013
09/23/2013
10/08/2013

225

10/08/2013
10/11/2013

228
230

10/11/2013

233
235
241

10/11/2013
10/11/2013
10/23/2013
11/20/2013
11/26/2013
11/26/2013
11/26/2013
11/26/2013

223

243
245
262

265
268

11/29/2013

271
273

t10W2013
12/02/2013

276
278

12/02/2013
12/02/2013
12/02/2013
01/09/2014
01/09/2014
01/10/2014

284
286
288
290
292
294

01/10/2014

297

01/10/2014
01/10/2014
01/10/2014
01/10/2014

339
341

343
346
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Return of Electronic Notification

01/10/2014
01/14/2014

349
351

01/14/2014
01/15/2014

354
356

01/15/2014
01/28/2014

362
364

01/28/2014
02/05/2014

366
368
418
431
434

Order Postponing Trial
Return of Electronic Notification
Notice of Entry of Order
Return of Electronic Notification
Notice for Case 120500402 ID 15722038
Notice of Bench Trial
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintlffs Motion for Summary Judgement
Reply In Support of Plaintlffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Request/Notice to Submit for Decision (Hearing Requested)
Return of Electronic Notification
RULING: Motion for Summary Judgment (set for 1 hr hearing - to be heard
before BT on 3/24
Notice of Deposition of Nathan Murray
Return of Electronic Notification
Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance Of Wesley Winsor
Return of Electronic Notification
Notice of Withdrawal and Certificate of mailing
Relum of Electronic NotifrcaUon
BENCH TRIAL
Objection to Proposed Judgement
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs
Order (Proposed) Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Judgment (Proposed)
Return of Electronic Notification
Reply Response to Defendants Objection to Proposed Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Reply ta Plaintlffs Response to-Oelendal'1t's1'bjecliorl'1tr Judgment
Order (Proposed} Overrullng Defendants Objection to Proposed Judgment
Request/Notice to Submit for Decision
Return of Electronic Notification
Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Llmfled Appearance
Return of Electronic Notification
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Order Overruling Defendants Objection lo Proposed Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Return of Electronic Notification
Judgment

Return of Etectronlc Notification
Notice of Entry of Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Feb 2, 2016
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02/06/2014
02/0612014
02/06/2014
02/15/2014

436

03/10/2014
03/10/2014

437
440

03/13/2014
03/13/2014
03/18/2014

442
444
446

03/18/2014
03/24/2014
04/14/2014

450
451

04/15/2014

454

04/15/2014

463

04/15/2014
04/15/2014
04/15/2014
04/16/2014
04/25/2014
04/29/2014

469

04/29/2014
04/29/2014
05/05/2014
05/05/2014
05/20/2014
05/20/2014
05/20/2014
05/20/2014
05/20/2014
05/20/2014
05(20/2014
05/20/2014

448

472
474 :

47a
480
483
485
488
490

492
494
500
502
504
506
509
511
527
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Motion To Alter or Amend Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment RODNEY NELSON
Memorandum ln Support of MotionTo Alter or Amend Order on Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment
Motion To File Over-Length Memorandum - RODNEY NELSON
Memorandum In Support of Motion To File Over-Length Memorandum
Molion To Alter or Amend Judgment - RODNEY NELSON
Memorandum In Support of Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Alter or Amend Order
Granting Summary Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Motion to File Over-Length Memorandum • RODNEY NELSON
Molion to Alter to File Over-Length Memorandum - RODNEY NELSON
Memorandum In Support of Motion to Alter to File Over-Length Memorandum
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum Reply in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Order on Summary
Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum Reply in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
RequestfNolice to Submit re Defendants Motion to Aller or Amend Judgment
Request/Notice to Submit re Defendants Motion to Alter or Amend Order on
Plaintiffs Molion for Summary Judgment
Order (Proposed} Denying Defendants Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Order (Proposed) Denying Defendants Motion to Aller or Amend Order Granting
Summary Judgment
R'ettlrn of Electronic Notlficafforr·
Notice for Case 120500402 ID 16026517
Motion to Continue Hearing • RODNEY NELSON
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Continue Hearing
Retum of Electronic Notification
Request/Notice to Submit
Return of Electronic Notification
Response to Defendants Motion to Continue Hearing
Return of Electronic Notification
MOTION ALTER JUDGMENT
MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Order Granting
Summary Judgment
Other. Unsigned Order (Proposed) Denying Defendants Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment
Feb 2, 2015
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06/02/2014

629

06/02/2014

531

06/02/2014
06/02/2014
06/02/2014
06/02/2014
06/02/2014
06/16/2014
06/16/2014
06/16/2014

611

613
616
618

811

813
818
820

825

06/16/2014
06/21/2014
06/21/2014
06/21/2014
06/21/2014
06/23/2014

834
836

06/23/2014
06/23/2014
06/23/2014
06/23/2014

844
851
853

06/23/2014
06/23/2014

855
857

06123"/2014
06/26/2014
07/04/2014
07/04/2014
07/04/2014
07/17/2014
07/17/2014
07/17/2014
07/17/2014
07/22/2014
09/09/2014
10/10/2014

859
861
863
865
870
872
874
876
879
881
882
883

10/20/2014

887

827

829
831

843

2:22 PM

Case: 120500402

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE

Appellate #:20141086

LEWIS, REGGIE vs. NELSON, RODNEY

Document Title

Entry Date

Page Number

Other • Unsigned Order (Proposed) Denying Defendants Motion to Alter or Amend
Order Granling Summary Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Return of Electronic Notification

10/20/2014

889

10/20/2014
10/20/2014
10)21/2014

891
893

895

10/21/2014

898

10/21/2014
10/21/2014

901
903

10/21/2014
10/21/2014
10/21/2014

904
907
909

Objection to Proposed Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Objection to Proposed Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Order Granting
Summary Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification

Ex Parte Motion for Order in Supplemental Proceedings - REGGIE LEWIS
Supplemental Order (Proposed)
Return of Electronic Notification
Reply Response to Defendants Objections to Proposed Orders Denying Motions
to Alter or Amend
Return of Electronic Notification
Supplemental Order
Return of Electronic Notification
Motion to Vacate Order in Supplemental Proceedings • ROONEY NELSON
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Order in Supplemental Proceedings
Return of Electronic Notification
Judgment {Proposed) Amended Judgment
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Vacate Order in
Supplemental Proceedings
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Order in
Supplemental Proceedings

10/21/2014

912

10/21/2014
10/21/2014
10/21/2014
10/21/2014
10/21/2014
10/29/2014

914
918

920
923

10/29/2014
10/29/2014

932
934

10/29/2014
10/30/2014

938
940

1013Dl201~

~- 944

. r0130120-'MReturn of Electronic Notification
Order (Proposed) Denying Motion to Vacate Order in Supplemental Proceedings
11/05/2014
Request/Notice to Submit re Motion to Vacate Order in Supplemental Proceedings 11/05/2014
11(05/2014
Return of Electronic Notification
Order Denying Motion to Vacate Order in Supplemental Proceedings
11/17/2014
11/17/2014
Judgment • Amended
11/17/2014
Return of Electronic Notification
11/17/2014
Return of Electronic Notification
11/17/2014
Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment
·11/17/2014
Return of Electronic Notification
11/19/2014
Notice of Appeal • Civil • Civil
11/19/2014
Return of Electronic Notification
11/20/2014
Motion Bo.nd for Costs on Appeal - RODNEY NELSON
11/20/2014
Return of Electronic Notification
11/20/2014
Motion For Stay Pending Appeal · RODNEY NELSON

946

·::Errata
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927
929

948
951
953
955

958
961

963
965
975
977
979
981
983
985
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Memorandum In Support of Stay Pending Appeal
Return of Electronic Notification
Letter from Utah Supreme Court of Appeals #20141086
Letter from Utah Supreme Court or Appeals
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending
Appeal
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Pending Appeal
Return of Electronic Notification
Application for Writ of Execution
Writ of Execution (Proposed)
Request/Notice to Submit

11/20/2014
11/20/2014
12/02/2014
12/02/2014
12/04/2014

987
1001
1003
1005
1009

12/04/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/10/2014
12/10/2014
12/10/2014
12/10/2014
12111/2014
12/11/2014
12/11/2014
12/11/2014
12/11/2014
12/1112014
12/16/2014

1025
1027
1033
1035
1039
1042
1044
1046
1049
1051
1053
1057
1059
1061

01/06/2015

1063

01/06/2015
01/07/2015

1066
1068

01/07/2015

1078

01/07/2015
01/07/2015

1081
1083

01/07/2015
01/15/2015
01/15/2015
01/26/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015

1086
1088
1091
1092
1093
1096
1090
1101
1103
1108
1109
1110

Return of Electronic Notification
Writ of Execution
Return of Electronic Notification
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution· RODNEY NELSON
Memorandum in Suoport of Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
Request/Notice to Submit Request for Expedited Decision
Return of Electronic Notification
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals (case assigned Utah Court of Appeals by
Supreme Court of Appeals)
Return of Service of Order ln Supplemental Proceedings upon ELECTRONIC
NOTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY for
Return of Electronic Notification
Motion (Ex Parte) to Allow Allemative Service of Writ of Execution - REGGIE
LEWIS
Ex Parte Order (Proposed) Granting Ex Parte Motion to Allow Alternative Service
of Writ of Execution
Return of Electronic Notification
Praecipe for Rodney Nelson
Return of Electronic Notification
RequesVNotice to Submit
Return of Electronic Notification
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
Opposition to Defendants Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
Return of Electronic Notification
Objection to Defendants 01/15/2015 Request to Submit
Return of Electronic Notification
Exhibit Ust: Exhibit A to Objection lo Defendants 01'15/2015 Request to Submit
Return of Electronic Notification
Amended Certificate of Service
Return of Electronic Notification
Feb 2, 2015
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Case: 120500402

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE
LEWIS, REGGIE vs. NELSON, RODNEY

Appellate #: 20141086

Document Title

Entry Date

Motion Ex Parte Motion for Order to Show Cause - REGGIE LEWIS
Statement Supporting Ex Parte Motion for Order to Show Cause
Ex Parte Order (Proposed} Order to Show Cause
Return of Electronic Notification
Memorandum in Response to Lewis Belated FIiing
Return of Electronic Nolification
TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-24-2014

01/30/2015
01/30/2015
01/30/2015
01/30/2015
02/01/2015
02/01/2015
04/22/2014

Page Number

1112

1115
1120
1123
1125
1130

1132

